Kevin F. Marchand v. Mercy Medical Center, an Idaho Corporation, and Neil K. Farris, D.O.
Docket: 92-36733
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 25, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Kevin Marchand was awarded $4.2 million in a medical malpractice lawsuit after suffering severe injuries, including paralysis, due to negligence by medical staff at Mercy Medical Center. The case involved Dr. Neil Farris, who treated Marchand in the emergency room and radiology department. Farris removed Marchand's cervical collar, claiming it was necessary for examination despite no documentation of respiratory distress. He failed to complete the full set of x-rays originally ordered, which led to the missed diagnosis of a cervical spine fracture.
Following a jury trial, Farris, along with Dr. Blome and radiologist Dr. Truksa, was found negligent, each bearing one-third of the fault. Marchand sought attorney fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) due to Farris's refusal to admit key facts regarding negligence and causation, which he later proved at trial. The district court awarded Marchand $205,798.34 in fees against Farris alone. Farris appealed the fee award, but the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing the review standard for abuse of discretion and confirming that the lower court did not err in its judgment.
A party that fails to admit the truth of a matter requested under Rule 36 may face a court order to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by the requesting party to prove that matter, including attorney's fees, unless specific exceptions apply. These exceptions include if the request was objectionable, the admission sought was not substantially important, the party failing to admit had reasonable grounds to believe they might prevail, or there was another good reason for the failure to admit. The enforcement of this Rule aims to encourage the early identification of undisputed issues to avoid unnecessary costs and align with the Federal Rules' objective of just, speedy, and inexpensive case resolutions.
In this case, Farris provided misleading responses to requests for admission that significantly impacted the costs of Marchand's prosecution, contradicting the goal of effective discovery. Notably, Request for Admission 26 asked Farris to admit that his care for Marchand at Mercy Medical Center in March 1987 did not meet the applicable standard of care, to which he denied. Farris contended that sanctions under Rule 37(c) were unwarranted as he had reasonable grounds to believe he might prevail, supported by expert testimony affirming that he complied with the standard of care.
Expert Dr. Carlson testified that Farris met the standard, and other experts confirmed the adequacy of the x-rays taken. However, the court emphasized that reliance on expert opinion alone does not guarantee a reasonable belief of prevailing at trial. The district court found sufficient evidence to question the validity of Farris's and the expert testimony, particularly regarding Farris's actions in removing Marchand's cervical collar. Farris's trial statements lacked corroboration, and contradictions arose between Carlson's trial and deposition testimonies about the necessity of keeping the cervical collar in place. Moreover, Farris's late admission of removing the collar before acquiring complete x-rays was seen as particularly damaging to his case.
The district court found that Farris could not reasonably deny negligence after he removed the cervical collar before completing a full series of cervical spine x-rays. The court applied the appropriate legal standard without abusing its discretion. In response to a request for admission regarding the removal of spine immobilization devices, Farris objected, citing vagueness but later admitted that some devices lessening spine mobility were removed after Kevin Marchand's admission to the hospital. The court concluded that Farris had no reasonable basis to deny removing the immobilization devices, despite his objections.
With respect to causation, Farris similarly objected to multiple requests for admission regarding the relationship between Marchand's quadriplegia and the removal of immobilization, labeling the requests as compound and ambiguous. The district court rejected Farris's rationale, noting that he acknowledged the removal of the collar, implying that proper immobilization could have prevented the quadriplegia. Farris's failure to admit was not excused by his objections, as the court emphasized that objections should not be used to evade disclosure. The court highlighted that Farris could have provided clearer answers or alternative wording if he disagreed with the requests. His reliance on objections, rather than addressing the core question of causation, was deemed insufficient.
Farris lacked a reasonable basis to deny causation regarding Marchand's paralysis. Expert testimony indicated that proper immobilization would have prevented the paralysis, and Farris did not cross-examine this expert or present counter-evidence. His reliance on another expert's deposition was insufficient, as that expert also acknowledged a greater than 50 percent chance that paralysis could have been avoided with proper care. The district court found no error in this determination.
In relation to fees and costs, Marchand incurred expenses due to Farris's refusal to admit negligence and causation, allowing for recovery of reasonable expenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Although typically a remand for recalculation would be warranted, the expenses related to the removal of a neck support were intertwined with proving negligence, thus no remand was required. Farris's argument that Marchand did not establish a direct link between the expenses and his denial was dismissed, as Farris's admissions would have reduced the burden of proof on Marchand.
The court assessed the requested hours and determined they were reasonable, constituting 25% of the total time spent on the case. The district judge adjusted the hourly fee, significantly reducing the award from $350,000 to $156,360, with well-supported costs of $49,438.34, culminating in a total award of $205,798.34. The judgment was affirmed, with jurisdiction established under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332 and Sec. 1291. Further notes highlighted the importance of compliance with discovery obligations and the significance of admissions in establishing causation.
