United States v. Ronald Fontenot
Docket: 93-1216
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 13, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions may be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is attached to the citing document or furnished to the court and all parties during oral argument. In the case of United States v. Ronald Fontenot, the Tenth Circuit Court addressed the appeal of a suppression order concerning evidence obtained from Fontenot's home. A grand jury indicted Fontenot on three counts of distributing cocaine base after undercover purchases were made from him. The government argued that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied since the police executed a warrant that allowed them to enter without notice due to concerns about armed drug traffickers and evidence destruction. The district court had suppressed the evidence for four reasons: lack of exigent circumstances for the no-knock entry, an unreasonable delay of five days between the warrant's issuance and execution, the belief that exigent circumstances existed post-arrest was not objectively reasonable, and the state judge's lack of thorough review of the no-knock provision. The Tenth Circuit reversed this decision, referencing a precedent case, United States v. Moland, which found that the good faith exception applies under similar circumstances. The court determined that the officers acted in accordance with the warrant, which was valid under state law, and they were not required to investigate further beyond the face of the warrant. The officers' conduct did not disqualify them from relying on the good faith exception as established in Leon. The district court's conclusion that the state judge acted merely as a rubber stamp for police warrants is incorrect. The record does not demonstrate that the state judge failed to exercise his authority independently or did anything but adhere to established state law. Citing United States v. Brown, it is noted that a judge's experience in issuing warrants does not imply a lack of neutrality; rather, it is the exercise of judgment that matters. In this case, there is no evidence indicating that the state judge abandoned his proper role. The previous ruling is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The order and judgment are not binding precedent, except under specific legal doctrines, and the court generally discourages the citation of such orders. The district court's erroneous belief regarding the state judge's issuance of immediate entry provisions in over 200 cases was factually incorrect; while the state judge did issue some immediate entry warrants, the affiant confirmed he had never been denied a request for a no-knock warrant.