United States v. Eric Jones, A/K/A Erick Jones, A/K/A Warren J. Lacy

Citations: 21 F.3d 429; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15991; 1994 WL 108963Docket: 93-1423

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; March 29, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Eric Jones, also known as Erick Jones and Warren J. Lacy, appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His conviction stems from a search conducted by ATF agents on July 24, 1992, at his residence in Detroit, where they found two firearms, along with personal items belonging to Jones. He acknowledged being on parole and aware of his prohibition against possessing firearms. Following a grand jury indictment, Jones's pretrial motions, including one to suppress the seized firearms, were denied. A jury found him guilty on December 22, 1992, and he was sentenced to 85 months in prison.

Jones's appeal focuses on the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the agents exceeded the warrant's scope since no drugs were found during the search. The court reviews such denials under an abuse of discretion standard. It highlights that a search is not invalidated merely by the seizure of items not covered by the warrant unless there is a flagrant disregard for the warrant's limitations. In this case, the court concluded that the agents did not violate the warrant's scope and thus upheld the admission of the firearms found during the search.

The warrant's language specifying that weapons were to be "kept for the protection of said controlled substances or proceeds" does not make the search unreasonable despite the absence of drugs, but it may limit the types of weapons that can be seized as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine supports the seizure of firearms in this case. The validity of a warrantless seizure under this doctrine relies on three criteria: 1) lawful intrusion without violating the Fourth Amendment; 2) the item being in plain view; and 3) the incriminating nature of the item being immediately apparent. Here, the initial intrusion was executed under a valid warrant, and testimony indicated that the firearms were in plain view within the same bedroom as parole documents linked to Jones. Furthermore, Jones acknowledged that being in the residence with access to the firearms violated his parole. Consequently, the firearms, initially held during the drug search, became evidence of a separate crime (felon in possession) and were lawfully seized, as affirmed in United States v. Robinson. 

Jones contends that the evidence at trial was inadequate to support his conviction for felon in possession. The standard for evaluating this claim is whether a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), it is illegal for anyone convicted of a felony to possess firearms or ammunition. The parties agreed that Jones had a felony conviction and that the guns had crossed state lines, leaving the jury to determine if he knowingly possessed the firearms. Jones disputes the sufficiency of evidence regarding his possession.

Possession of firearms can be classified as either actual or constructive, which may be joint rather than exclusive. Actual possession refers to a tangible object being in immediate control of a person, while constructive possession indicates a person’s power and intention to control an object without having actual possession. Evidence for both types of possession can be direct or circumstantial, and it is not necessary for the evidence to eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.

In this case, the government acknowledged it did not provide evidence of Jones' actual possession of the guns, instead arguing he had joint constructive possession with his girlfriend, Michelle Thompson. Jones contended that the evidence did not support such a claim, citing factors like the guns not being registered to him, his lack of ownership of the home, their location in Thompson's bedroom, potential involvement of her brother, absence of fingerprints, and unverified clothing.

However, several trial testimonies supported the assertion of Jones' constructive possession: he lived at the residence, was present during the search, had a close relationship with Thompson, and evidence like his identification was found near the guns. Additional circumstantial evidence included the presence of men’s clothing and shoes in the closet where the guns were found.

Comparatively, in United States v. Craven, evidence was deemed sufficient for establishing constructive possession based on similar circumstances. The court concluded that the evidence against Jones was adequate to support the jury's verdict for joint constructive possession.

Jones also challenged the district court's jury instructions, claiming they failed to emphasize the requirements of dominion and control necessary for constructive possession. The appeal standard assesses whether the jury instructions, as a whole, fairly presented the legal issues, allowing for the possibility that an instruction, while flawed in isolation, may still be upheld in the context of all instructions provided.

The district court has discretion in formulating jury instructions, and failure to use the circuit's pattern instructions is not automatically considered an error. Instead, the focus is on the substance of the given instructions compared to the refused pattern instruction. For constructive possession, the government must demonstrate that the defendant had the right and intent to control the firearms, but mere presence is insufficient for possession. The instructions provided by the district court, which differentiate between actual and constructive possession, align closely with the established legal standards, particularly referencing prior case law. 

Jones contended that there was insufficient evidence for the jury instruction on constructive possession; however, the court found adequate evidence for joint constructive possession, thus validating the instruction. Additionally, Jones claimed reversible error for not granting a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines based on necessity and duress.

A defendant can appeal only specific types of sentencing issues: (1) sentences that violate the law, (2) incorrect application of guidelines, or (3) upward departures from guidelines. The refusal of a district court to grant a downward departure from a properly computed guidelines range is not reviewable. Jones received an 85-month sentence, which fell within the applicable range of 77 to 96 months; thus, the sentence is not subject to appeal. 

Jones attempted to frame the issue as a denial of his right to present a justification defense in mitigation of his sentence, but he failed to demonstrate that he was prevented from presenting any evidence. The court reviewed police reports attached to his motion for a downward departure, which detailed neighborhood racial hostilities, but ultimately decided against granting the downward departure. While sentencing guidelines permit downward departures for mitigating circumstances not adequately considered by the guidelines, the judge possesses discretion to decide whether to depart, and this discretion is not subject to appeal.

Jones also contended that the district court found he waived his right to an incomplete justification defense at sentencing by not raising it during the trial. He conceded that the facts did not legally support this defense at trial. He argued that the court's refusal to consider this defense violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. However, the district court did consider and reject the justification defense on its merits, finding it less persuasive since it wasn't presented to the jury. The court did not suggest Jones needed to testify, and he could have called a witness to support his claim. The conclusion is that Jones' rights were not violated, and the sentence is affirmed as unreviewable. Additionally, Jones claimed reversible prejudice from the district court's failure to strike his alias from the indictment and references to it before the jury, despite having agreed to stipulate to his identity.

The circuit disapproves of including aliases in indictments unless the alias is relevant to identifying the defendant. In this case, Jones had a prior felony conviction under an alias, which he argued should not have been included in the indictment after he stipulated to the conviction. The stipulation indicated that Jones was convicted in 1989 under the name Eric Jones. Despite this, the use of his alias was deemed pertinent for linking him to evidence found in the bedroom, including firearms and related documentation. Testimony confirmed that both names were associated with Jones, establishing his residence at the location where the guns were discovered.

The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to strike the alias from the indictment, referencing previous cases that allow for aliases when necessary to connect defendants to the charged acts. Even if there was an error in including the alias, it was considered harmless given the stipulation and the nature of the charges, which required the jury to know about Jones' criminal history. The judgment of the district court was affirmed, with the proceedings framed around the relevant facts and legal standards regarding the use of aliases in indictments.

The judicial council's resolution on the Sixth Circuit pattern instructions clarifies that these instructions do not imply approval of their content, which requires case-by-case judicial review. Jones’ reliance on United States v. James regarding constructive possession is deemed inappropriate because the government pursued a theory of constructive possession and presented evidence supporting it. Although the district court instructed the jury on actual possession, the government admitted it lacked evidence for that claim, but Jones did not challenge this instruction, so its appropriateness remains unaddressed.

Reports from police detail incidents involving Thompson, including receiving death threats and shots fired at her residence. Jones’ attorney intended to have Thompson testify about neighborhood hostility, but the district court's rejection of the justification defense led to a reconsideration of that decision.

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide for sentence reductions under certain circumstances where a crime may be committed to avoid greater harm or under serious coercion. The circuit recognizes a narrow justification defense for felons possessing firearms, requiring proof of an imminent threat, no reckless behavior leading to that threat, lack of reasonable legal alternatives, and a direct causal link between the illegal act and the avoidance of harm. Additionally, Jones’ parole officer testified that he recognized Jones by an alias and noted Jones reported a change of address on June 25, 1992.