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Wray v. State
Citations: 64 Ark. App. 166; 984 S.W.2d 45; 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 804Docket: CA CR 98-683
Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; December 2, 1998; Arkansas; State Appellate Court
Joseph Wray was convicted of DWI, second offense, receiving a one-year jail sentence (nine months suspended) and a $2,000 fine. Wray appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for his conviction, specifically disputing the timing of his prior DWI offense. He was charged with DWI on April 5, 1997, and contested the trial court's acceptance of a municipal court document indicating a prior offense date of October 30, 1994, which he claimed lacked clear arrest date evidence. The trial court allowed the document's use, noting Wray's objection, and instructed the jury regarding the prior DWI conviction. Under Arkansas law, for a second DWI conviction, the State must demonstrate that the first offense occurred within three years of the second. The relevant statutes indicate a minimum seven-day and maximum one-year imprisonment for DWI second offenses within this timeframe. The State argued that the evidence presented, including the municipal court's master inquiry and related documents, was sufficient to establish Wray's identity and the circumstances of the prior offense. While Wray maintained the documents were vague and inadequate to confirm the October 30, 1994 arrest date, the court noted that circumstantial evidence could support a conviction if it eliminates other reasonable hypotheses of innocence. In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the court views it in favor of the State and affirms if substantial evidence exists to uphold the conviction. Evidence must be substantial, compelling reasonable minds to reach a conclusion beyond mere suspicion. In this case, alternative reasonable inferences from the 'master inquiry' data sheet indicate insufficient evidence regarding the date of the appellant’s first offense. It is possible that the appellant's initial circuit court appearance was in November 1994, with a prior municipal court appearance on October 30, 1994, or that the master inquiry was established on that date. Due to the presence of speculation, the date of the first offense, crucial for a DWI second offense conviction, cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, based on the double jeopardy clause, which prohibits a second trial when evidence is insufficient, the court modifies the conviction from DWI second offense to DWI first offense and remands the case for resentencing. The decision is affirmed as modified, with agreement from the presiding judges.