Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; November 11, 1998; Arkansas; State Appellate Court
Judge Margaret Meads presided over the appeal by Bill Crawford, doing business as Crawford Builders, Inc., contesting a summary judgment favoring the appellees. Crawford entered into a contract on November 16, 1995, with James Culp, the Superintendent of the Lee County School District, for asbestos abatement and soffit covering at Strong Elementary School for $27,500. He filed a complaint on May 31, 1996, in chancery court, seeking specific performance and alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment due to non-payment for the completed work. The case was transferred to circuit court on September 26, 1996, where appellees moved for summary judgment on May 15, 1997, which was granted.
Crawford appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on three grounds: (1) appellees did not meet their burden of proof under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56; (2) he was denied the opportunity to depose appellees under Ark. R. Civ. P. 30; and (3) the Lee County School Board had ratified the contract. Summary judgment is permissible under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the court must consider facts in favor of the non-moving party.
Appellees contended that the contract was void and unenforceable, noting that while Culp signed the contract and Crawford began work, the School Board did not approve it until January 1996, after work had commenced, and that Crawford failed to post a required bond for public building work. Affidavits from Culp and J. Harvey Shaw, president of the School Board, supported this claim, indicating that approval was contingent upon board consent and that the board first learned of the work in January 1996, subsequently declining to approve the contract due to its unauthorized commencement.
Appellant contended at the hearing that his complaint included claims for both breach of contract and unjust enrichment, asserting that the school board ratified the contract by being aware of the work and hiring a quality-control agent. He argued that appellees passively benefited from the asbestos removal without disputing their unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment on November 18, 1997, ruling that the contract was invalid as it lacked school board approval and a required bond, resulting in the dismissal of appellant's complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, appellant claimed the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without allowing him to depose appellees, citing Ark. R. Civ. P. 30. He indicated that requests for depositions were made prior to the summary judgment decision, but appellees’ counsel delayed the depositions until after the motion was resolved. Appellant referenced a precedent case where the court ruled summary judgment was premature before discovery was complete. However, unlike that case, he did not obtain a ruling on his discovery motion, did not raise the discovery issue during the summary judgment hearing, and failed to file an affidavit under Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to support his inability to gather necessary evidence.
Appellant’s first argument claimed that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because appellees did not meet their burden of proof regarding the breach of contract. He maintained that there was a factual dispute regarding the board's ratification of the contract, asserting that appellees could see the ongoing work.
Appellant contends that appellees, by contracting with Murdock Enterprises for quality-control services in asbestos abatement, acknowledged that appellant was performing contracted work. However, the court found that appellees met their burden of proof concerning appellant’s contract claim, as affidavits indicated that roofing work was conducted at the school without the school board's awareness of appellant's involvement until January 1996. Appellant failed to provide any affidavits or evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding this claim.
Regarding the quality-control contract, the evidence presented by appellant, including a purported contract and checks to Murdock Enterprises, was deemed insufficient, lacking verification and signatures, and predating appellant's contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment ruling on the breach of contract issue.
Contrastingly, the court acknowledged the potential for appellant's claim of unjust enrichment, noting that Arkansas law recognizes this principle even in cases involving illegal contracts. The court highlighted that a claim in quantum meruit, which falls under unjust enrichment, could succeed regardless of the existence of a void contract. Despite appellees’ failure to challenge the unjust enrichment claim in their summary judgment motion, affidavits indicated that appellant performed work related to asbestos removal. Consequently, the court reversed and remanded the unjust enrichment claim for trial, affirming the summary judgment in part while reversing it in part.
