Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Deweese v. State
Citations: 26 Ark. App. 126; 761 S.W.2d 945; 1988 Ark. App. LEXIS 565Docket: CA CR 88-67
Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; December 7, 1988; Arkansas; State Appellate Court
Stewart Deweese appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense, arguing that the charge should have been dismissed due to the statute of limitations. Deweese was arrested on June 22, 1984, in Marion County, Arkansas, after Officer G.B. Harp observed him weaving on the highway and determined he was obviously intoxicated. Deweese registered a blood alcohol content of 0.24% and was initially charged with DWI, fourth offense, and driving with a suspended license, with a court appearance scheduled for July 9, 1984. He failed to appear, leading to a bench warrant issued on August 6, 1984, which remained unexecuted until March 20, 1987. The trial occurred without a jury on October 29, 1987, where Deweese was found guilty of DWI, third offense. The court did not provide a specific rationale for this finding, but one prior conviction was excluded from evidence due to lack of counsel representation. Deweese contends that the misdemeanor conviction is barred by limitations, noting that under the Omnibus DWI Act, the prosecution for misdemeanors must occur within one year of the offense. The limitations period begins the day after the offense is committed. Prosecution commences with the issuance of an arrest warrant or other charging instrument, contingent upon the warrant being executed without unreasonable delay. In *Thompson v. City of Little Rock*, the court addressed whether a uniform traffic ticket initiates prosecution, concluding that it does and thus tolls the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The current case establishes that prosecution began on August 6, 1984, with the issuance of an arrest warrant based on information filed that day, well within the one-year limit from the offense date. Although the information was not docketed until March 23, 1987, this delay was attributed to court procedures and the appellant's unavailability. The court noted that the issue of unreasonable delay was not raised at trial and thus could not be considered on appeal. Additionally, there were no objections concerning the information charging a fourth DWI offense when the appellant was found guilty of a third, and the information's filing under the prosecuting attorney's name, despite being sworn to by a deputy, did not invalidate it. The precedent from *Beckwith v. State* reinforces that a warrant can be issued based on the prosecuting attorney's information without a court order. The ruling was affirmed, with both Chief Justice Corbin and Justice Cooper concurring.