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First State Bank of DeQueen v. Gamble
Citations: 14 Ark. App. 53; 685 S.W.2d 173; 1985 Ark. App. LEXIS 1804Docket: CA 83-452
Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; February 20, 1985; Arkansas; State Appellate Court
Basil V. Hicks, Jr., Special Judge, presided over a foreclosure proceeding where the Appellant sought recovery on multiple promissory notes and a mortgage associated with Frank J. Gamble, III, and his wife, Appellee Anita Gamble. Frank J. Gamble executed several promissory notes in favor of the Appellant between April and October 1980, with a joint note signed by both spouses on December 26, 1980. Appellant sought recovery against Frank J. Gamble individually, on the joint obligation, and for foreclosure of the mortgage as security. The parties stipulated to the execution of the notes and mortgage, amounts due, default dates, and interest accruals. The Chancellor found that Frank J. Gamble failed to appear, granting relief against him, and ruled in favor of Appellant on the joint note. However, foreclosure was granted only on the joint note, with attorney’s fees imposed on both Frank and Anita Gamble. Anita subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or modification of the Decree, claiming she had tendered payment of principal and interest before the due date, and argued that the property was her separate property. At the hearing, it was stipulated that a note for $29,556.99 was secured by the mortgage and that Anita's tender of payment had been made before June 1981 but was refused by Appellant, who claimed the mortgage secured other notes executed solely by Frank J. Gamble. On August 29, 1983, the Chancellor modified the Decree, determining that Appellant wrongfully refused Anita's tender and discharging her from further interest on the note. The Chancellor also relieved her from the $1,300 in attorney’s fees. Appellant appealed the modified Decree, arguing that the defense of tender was improperly raised after the original Decree and that the tender was not unconditional, thus entitling them to interest. The Chancellor's decision is upheld, affirming the wide authority granted to trial courts under the Rules of Civil Procedure (specifically rules 59 and 60) regarding new trials and modifications of judgments. The court retains the power to modify or set aside judgments for sufficient cause during the term they are made, as established in Massengale v. Johnson, which emphasizes that this power is inherent and exists independently of statutory limitations, subject only to the court's discretion. The Chancellor correctly assessed the facts, including property title and the execution of a single note by the Appellee, without any challenge from the Appellant regarding the mortgage's application to the Frank J. Gamble, III obligations. The Appellant's second claim for reversal concerns the validity of the Appellee's tender of payment. The Uniform Commercial Code discharges subsequent liability for interest and attorney’s fees once a valid tender is made, and the record supports that a valid tender occurred. The Appellee's request for relief—release of the mortgage securing the executed note—was not conditional, countering the Appellant's assertions. The Chancellor's ruling on the note related to the mortgage has not been appealed. Additionally, any requirement for renewal of the tender is deemed unnecessary due to the Appellant’s position. The decision is affirmed, with dissent from Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., and Corbin, J. not participating.