Hill v. White-Rodgers

Citations: 10 Ark. App. 402; 665 S.W.2d 292; 1984 Ark. App. LEXIS 1495Docket: CA 83-318

Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; February 29, 1984; Arkansas; State Appellate Court

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Tommy Hill appeals a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Commission affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) finding that his injury was a scheduled injury limited to the right foot and could not be considered as affecting the body as a whole. Hill argues that the Commission erred by not allowing additional evidence during the appeal process. The case stems from a crushing injury Hill sustained to his right foot while employed at White-Rodgers in April 1979, resulting in a temporary total disability. Dr. H. Austin Grimes initially rated Hill's permanent partial disability at 15% to the right leg, while Dr. Jerry L. Thomas rated it at 25% to the foot. Hill received full benefits for the 25% loss but continued to experience complications that affected his leg and hip. In December 1982, Dr. Grimes provided a report stating a 5% permanent partial impairment rating to the body as a whole, clarifying that this did not stem from a new injury. The ALJ ruled that Hill's injury was a scheduled one and could not be deemed an injury to the body as a whole without total disability being demonstrated, citing legal precedents. The appeal was ultimately denied, affirming the ALJ's original decision.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Commission following the administrative law judge’s opinion, requesting to brief and argue the case orally, as well as to submit additional medical evidence. A letter from Dr. Grimes was included, indicating that the appellant’s foot and leg pain had aggravated his back condition. The Commission denied the motion to submit additional evidence, citing Ark. Stat. Ann. 81-1327(c. Supp. 1983), which mandates that all evidence should be presented at the initial hearing, with additional hearings permitted only at the discretion of the hearing officer or the Commission. The Commission based its decision on Mason v. Lauck and Haygood v. Belcher, establishing that the Commission has discretion regarding the introduction of new evidence and that such decisions are not reversible unless there is an abuse of discretion.

In Haygood, the criteria for admitting new evidence were outlined as relevance, whether it is cumulative, potential to change the outcome, and the diligence of the movant. Although the appellant contended that the Commission acted arbitrarily, this argument was not presented in the brief, and thus was not considered. The appellant accepted that the Commission applied the correct criteria but argued that the proffered evidence was relevant. The majority upheld the procedural rule against considering unadvanced points on appeal and noted that prior rulings limiting scheduled injuries are legislative mandates, not subject to judicial reinterpretation. Consequently, the Commission's refusal to reopen the record was found to be without abuse of discretion, as doing so would be futile given the established legal framework.

The proffered evidence was deemed cumulative of previously submitted information. The appellant contended that if the established rule were not reconsidered, a scheduled injury should not prevent the recognition of an additional compensable unscheduled injury stemming from the scheduled one. He suggested that had proof of an unscheduled injury been presented, his disability could have been apportioned to his body as a whole. The case law allows for compensation of both scheduled and unscheduled injuries, but other wage loss factors are only relevant to the unscheduled injury unless total disability is found. The court found no merit in the appellant’s argument, noting it was not raised before the Commission or the administrative law judge, who only acknowledged a single injury to the lower extremity. The appellant's petition to the Commission did not assert a claim for a second unscheduled injury. Dr. Grimes had consistently indicated there was no new injury, and the appellant’s supplementary letter did not substantiate a claim for an independent injury or detail any resulting disability. The court reinforced that grounds for relief cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal, a principle applicable in Workers’ Compensation Commission appeals. The decision was affirmed, with dissenting opinions noted.