United States v. Jose B. Bueno

Citations: 21 F.3d 120; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6971; 1994 WL 117213Docket: 93-6083

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 11, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Jose B. Bueno appeals his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for possession with intent to distribute approximately 5.2 pounds of cocaine. The incident leading to his arrest occurred on January 20, 1993, when Sergeant Bunning, conducting surveillance at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, noticed Bueno's suspicious behavior as he arrived on a flight from New York, a known narcotics source. Bueno stood out due to his attire and actions, including making a complete turn to check for observers and speaking to a flight attendant.

Sergeant Bunning followed Bueno, verifying his connection to a flight at gate 15, where only two passengers had connections from New York. After discounting one passenger, he focused on Ralph Alicia, who had purchased a one-way ticket for $749 cash just before the flight. Bunning recalled a previous incident involving cocaine mistakenly sent from New York to Anchorage and suspected Bueno was involved in narcotics.

Upon encountering Bueno, Bunning identified himself and asked to speak with him. Bueno presented a suspicious identification card under the name Ralph Alicia, which Bunning suspected was easily obtainable and not official. During questioning, Bueno struggled to recall his final destination until prompted. When requested, he consented to show his airline ticket, which contained a baggage claim matching the name on the flight connection sheet. The officers returned Bueno's ticket and identification after examining them. The court ultimately affirmed part of the decision and reversed another part regarding the case.

The interview with the defendant was conducted entirely in English, despite his heavy Spanish accent. Officers Sergeant Bunning and Detective McKenzie did not display weapons or physically touch the defendant during their interaction. After an initial conversation, the officers requested to search the defendant's carry-on bag, which he consented to. Sergeant Bunning suggested conducting the search in a less crowded side hallway of the airport, which the defendant agreed to, although he later claimed he was asked to move before being asked for identification or consent to the search.

To access the hallway, Sergeant Bunning had to unlock a door with an electronic keypad; however, the door did not require unlocking to exit back into the terminal, a fact the defendant was unaware of and thought he was locked in. The hallway was a small area, approximately ten by fourteen feet. Once inside, the officers again asked to search the defendant's carry-on bag, and he agreed. The search revealed baby clothes, diapers, children's crayons, and a pair of pants.

Sergeant Bunning then requested to search the defendant's person, which he also consented to. During a pat-down, Bunning found the defendant's wallet and sought permission to search it, which was granted. Inside, he discovered a New York driver's license with the name Jose Bueno. Bunning informed the defendant about Kentucky's law against providing a false name, to which the defendant admitted his true identity. The defendant explained he was using the name "Alicia" to check into hotels after a dispute with his wife.

Bunning then inquired about the defendant's checked baggage, which the defendant initially denied having. After being reminded of a baggage claim check on his ticket, he acknowledged having a small green bag. The officers asserted that he consented to search this checked bag, and after doing so, they discovered approximately five pounds of cocaine concealed in a detergent box. Following this discovery, the officers arrested the defendant, who was not informed of his Miranda rights until after the arrest.

On February 10, 1993, the defendant was indicted in Kentucky for possession of approximately 5.2 pounds of cocaine with intent to distribute, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Following a motion to suppress evidence filed on March 3, 1993, an evidentiary hearing took place on March 11, 1993. The motion was denied on May 28, 1993. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea on June 3, 1993, preserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He objected to a presentence investigation report that included a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, which the district court overruled. Ultimately, on August 12, 1993, he was sentenced to 66 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $50.00 assessment.

The defendant claims his seizure by officers violated the Fourth Amendment, arguing that any consent to search his luggage was tainted by this unlawful seizure. The Fourth Amendment recognizes three types of police-citizen encounters: consensual encounters, Terry stops based on reasonable suspicion, and arrests requiring probable cause. The defendant contends that being moved into a stairwell constituted an arrest without probable cause, referencing the Supreme Court case Florida v. Royer, which ruled that consent obtained after unlawful detention is invalid. However, the court distinguishes this case from Royer, concluding that the encounter escalated from consensual to a legitimate temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion rather than an illegal arrest. The court finds that the defendant's detention was lawful and did not exceed the permissible limits for an investigative stop.

The district court favored the officers' testimony over the defendant's due to corroboration from Detective McKenzie, a decision that is upheld unless deemed clearly erroneous, as credibility assessments are within the trial court's purview. The officers' account indicated that Sergeant Bunning's initial encounter with the defendant at the airport was a consensual interaction, not constituting a seizure. Bunning approached the defendant in a calm manner, identified himself, and asked a few questions, which the defendant willingly answered without any display of force or weaponry. The defendant voluntarily produced his ticket and identification, which were returned promptly, and consented to a search of his carry-on bag.

The scenario contrasted with the Royer case, where coercion was evident. The consensual nature of the encounter provided a basis for reasonable suspicion, justifying a subsequent investigative stop. Key factors contributing to this suspicion included: 1) the defendant's unusual behavior after deplaning, which included avoiding ticket agents and acting furtively; 2) his purchase of a one-way ticket for a significant cash amount shortly before departure, aligning with drug courier profiles; 3) knowledge of ongoing cocaine transport from New York to Anchorage, including a past incident involving a misdirected bag with cocaine; and 4) the type of identification provided by the defendant, which was commonly associated with drug couriers.

Defendant's inability to recall his final destination without prompting by Officer Bunning raised reasonable suspicion for a temporary detention, even though individual factors did not prove illegal activity. The legality of this detention hinges on two criteria: the presence of reasonable suspicion and the use of the least intrusive investigative measures. Officers testified that defendant voluntarily agreed to move to a less crowded stairwell to avoid embarrassment from luggage inspection, which indicated no coercion. Their conversation was non-threatening, and the detention lasted approximately five minutes, distinguishing it from similar cases where longer detentions occurred. The district court accepted the officers' account that defendant had the option to remain in the concourse but chose to move, supporting the conclusion that the detention did not escalate to an unlawful arrest. After this brief encounter, defendant was allowed to continue to his flight, affirming that the officers acted within constitutional bounds under the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant's consent to search his checked luggage was not tainted by an illegal seizure, and the validity of the consent hinges on whether it was freely and voluntarily given. The government bears the burden of proving that consent was given without coercion or duress. The voluntariness of consent is assessed based on the totality of circumstances, requiring clear and positive proof. The district court found that the defendant had indeed consented to the search, crediting the testimony of the officers involved. 

Defendant contended that he did not consent, and if he did, it was under duress and due to a language barrier. However, the court concluded that the circumstances did not indicate coercion; the search request occurred in a non-threatening environment with no display of weapons or overbearing behavior from the officers. The defendant was not informed he couldn't leave or threatened with additional detention for refusing consent.

The court further rejected the argument regarding language comprehension, pointing out that the defendant, a naturalized citizen fluent in English, had lived in the U.S. for many years and had studied in English. Testimonies confirmed that the interaction was conducted in English without any reported issues in understanding. Thus, the district court's determination that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search was upheld.

McHugh's testimony indicated that the defendant could respond to personal history questions, demonstrating an ability to understand English, except for an initial misunderstanding regarding his occupation. The defendant answered questions about personal details, including his birth date, weight, drug use, and family, without significant language issues. The district court found that the defendant's consent was voluntary despite claims of language barriers, and this finding was upheld as not clearly erroneous.

However, during sentencing, the district court determined that the defendant committed perjury by claiming he understood no English at all. The court referenced evidence that the defendant had taken English courses and had communicated in English with law enforcement. The appellate review concluded that the district court erred in its perjury finding, citing the defendant's testimony that he could understand and speak some English. Consequently, the appeal highlighted that testimony should be evaluated favorably for the defendant, and merely raising a defense does not equate to obstructing justice.

Ultimately, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed, while the enhancement for obstruction of justice was reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.