United States v. Patrick Rugiero (92-2412) Ara Basmajian (92-2414)

Citation: 20 F.3d 1387Docket: 92-2412, 92-2414

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 8, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Patrick Rugiero and Ara Basmajian, defendants in a drug-related conspiracy case, appealed their convictions after an extensive trial. They faced charges including conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and heroin, using a weapon in relation to drug dealing, and threatening a witness. The government claimed Rugiero led an armed drug distribution ring in southeast Michigan since 1985, with Basmajian participating and using his family’s party store as a drug distribution site. Evidence included undercover drug transactions and testimonies linking both defendants to the distribution of significant amounts of drugs.

Basmajian was convicted on two counts: conspiracy to distribute drugs and aiding and abetting a heroin offense. The defendants argued that jury misconduct occurred when a television report associating Rugiero's trial counsel with organized crime reached the jury, potentially influencing their verdict. Although they alerted the district court, the judge initially declined to investigate the matter further. Subsequently, individual juror inquiries revealed that some jurors had seen the report, and there were claims of discussions among jurors about it. Despite this, all jurors denied that the report affected their decision-making, leading the district court to deny the motion for a mistrial.

The standard for assessing a district court's handling of alleged juror misconduct involves determining whether there was an abuse of discretion. In cases of unauthorized juror contact, four key points are established: (1) a hearing must be held when a defendant claims juror contact has tainted the trial; (2) no presumption of prejudice arises from such contact; (3) the defendant must prove actual juror bias; and (4) juror testimony at the hearing is not inherently suspect. 

In this case, the district court conducted a hearing on claims of jury taint, appropriately refraining from presuming prejudice from juror exposure to a television broadcast related to the attorney of a defendant, Rugiero. The court required proof of actual juror bias and decided to defer inquiries until after jury deliberations. The trial judge limited detailed questioning of a juror who wrote notes, citing rules against revealing extraneous prejudicial information. Individual juror testimonies were deemed credible, reinforcing the court's findings.

Even assuming the jury foreman mentioned the broadcast to others, the district court did not abuse its discretion, as no presumption of prejudice was established. The defendant Basmajian acknowledged that juror testimony on outside communication effects is largely inadmissible and contested the reliance on unsworn juror denials. Ultimately, the court found no abuse of discretion or error regarding the jury misconduct claims against Basmajian and determined no actual bias or prejudice had been demonstrated. The defendant bears the burden of proving that juror communications resulted in actual prejudice.

Basmajian's motion for a separate trial was based on charges against his co-defendants, the Rugiero brothers, related to firearms and witness intimidation. The jury acquitted the Rugiero brothers, demonstrating their ability to distinguish between the different defendants and charges. The district court's denial of the severance motion was upheld, as the counts against the defendants were interconnected with overlapping evidence. The court presumes juries can separately consider evidence for each defendant unless the defendant proves otherwise, which Basmajian failed to do.

Regarding the conspiracy charges, Basmajian did not request a jury instruction on the possibility of multiple conspiracies, and the court considered this claim only for plain error. The court found that the evidence did not solely support a finding of multiple conspiracies. It was established that not every conspirator needs to know each other or have direct contact, and Basmajian demonstrated awareness of others involved in the drug conspiracy. A formal agreement is not needed; rather, a tacit understanding and active participation are sufficient. The existence of sub-groups within a conspiracy does not indicate multiple conspiracies as long as they work toward a common goal. The jury had enough evidence to determine whether Basmajian was merely a seller or an active participant in the conspiracy.

Basmajian was held responsible for distributing two kilograms of heroin, with the sentencing judge affirming that the evidence clearly identified him as the source. Additionally, he was implicated in dealing three kilograms of cocaine from at least two sources. The district court dismissed Basmajian's objections regarding the contraband quantities listed in the presentence report, and its findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous. The court found no error in attributing the full two kilos of heroin to Basmajian, despite only half a kilo being delivered. Consequently, Basmajian's convictions and sentence were affirmed.

Rugiero challenged the district court’s decision not to grant a mistrial over jury misconduct. Although he was acquitted on three of five charges, the court concluded that the jury disregarded adverse information about Rugiero's attorney, as evidenced by their acquittal of Rugiero and his brother on multiple counts. 

Regarding the sequestration of witnesses, the district court had ordered sequestration upon Rugiero's request. However, government witness Keith Milewski entered the courtroom and heard part of another witness’s testimony before being called to testify himself. The court ruled that Milewski was not disqualified to testify because the government did not know of his presence during the cross-examination, and he lacked knowledge about the witness's testimony. Rugiero argued that the government should be held accountable for Milewski's presence due to his subpoena. Initially, Milewski denied knowledge of Rugiero's drug activities but later agreed to testify after governmental assurances of immunity.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Milewski to testify, despite his presence in the courtroom during earlier testimonies, as there was no evidence of government collusion. However, the situation becomes more complex regarding Milewski's conversation with co-defendant Jamil Ahmed, which occurred with the government's cooperation while Ahmed was testifying. Milewski testified that he reconsidered implicating himself and Rugiero in drug activities after speaking with Ahmed and consulting his lawyer.

The prosecutor had intended for Milewski to meet with Ahmed before Ahmed's testimony, but Milewski did not appear. When he finally did meet Ahmed, the prosecutor aimed to inform Milewski of potential implications of his testimony to encourage him to seek legal counsel. The prosecutor was present during this meeting, which did not involve discussing Ahmed's prior testimony, and the prosecutor maintained that the conversation could have occurred independently of Ahmed's testimony.

Milewski's meeting with Ahmed was primarily to clarify his legal risks, leading Milewski to request legal counsel, after which all questioning ceased. Milewski believed Ahmed had not yet testified, and he stated that without this meeting, he likely would have committed perjury.

The arrangement of the meeting raised concerns about violating the exclusion rule for witnesses, prompting the defendant to seek a mistrial due to an alleged circumvention of Rule 615 and a breach of the court's sequestration order. After review, the district court concluded that Ahmed did not share any of his testimony with Milewski, who was unaware of Ahmed's status as a witness at that time and speculated he might testify later in the trial.

The ruling denies the defense's motion regarding witness sequestration, primarily because there is no evidence that Ahmed communicated his testimony to Milewski. While the lack of a specific request to bar witness discussions after leaving the courtroom is a minor factor, it is not the central reason for the decision. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the government's subpoena of Milewski violated the sequestration rule, emphasizing that the government had the right to bring Milewski to the courthouse for relevant information regarding the charges. Although the manner of bringing witnesses together without court consent approaches a violation of the sequestration rule, such a violation does not automatically exclude testimony. The district court was aware of the circumstances surrounding Milewski's testimony and any violations by the government. For a new trial to be granted, the court must find both an abuse of discretion and prejudicial impact on the defendant's right to a fair trial, which was not established in this case due to the presence of substantial similar evidence and the district court's discretion. Consequently, the court found no prejudicial error regarding the rulings on Milewski's testimony.

Nathaniel Craft's testimony regarding Rugiero's alleged inquiry about killing a federal agent was deemed permissible by the district court. Rugiero objected to Craft's testimony, claiming improper calling before the grand jury post-indictment, a violation of his right to counsel, and undue prejudice. He argued that the grand jury's process was abused as no new indictment resulted from Craft's testimony. However, the court found no error, indicating that the government had a legitimate purpose for calling Craft. It emphasized that a grand jury's investigation should not be interfered with unless its primary goal is to uncover facts related to a defendant's pending indictment. The burden of proof lies with Rugiero to show any irregularities, and the law presumes grand juries act within their authority. Although Craft's testimony was prejudicial, the court concluded that Rugiero did not demonstrate a wrongful purpose behind the testimony. The district court determined Rugiero initiated the conversation with Craft, ruling that the government did not orchestrate the meeting. Ultimately, the district court's admission of the testimony was not considered an abuse of discretion. Rugiero's challenges were found to lack merit, leading to the affirmation of his convictions and sentences.

Chief Judge Merritt dissents, advocating for the reversal of Rugiero's conviction due to a significant breach of the sequestration rule by the prosecutor. The prosecutor allowed Milewski, who was under subpoena, to remain in the courtroom during testimony and facilitated an interaction between Milewski and a witness, which appeared aimed at aligning Milewski’s testimony with that of the witness. This conduct is characterized as a clear violation that undermines the integrity of the trial and cannot be dismissed as a harmless error. Merritt expresses concern that overlooking such egregious misconduct could encourage prosecutors to disregard procedural rules, particularly in the context of heightened enforcement in drug-related cases. He emphasizes the importance of adhering to the rule of law and calls for a new trial. The dissent also notes various juror comments questioning the impartiality of the verdict and references relevant case law, distinguishing the current case from precedents cited by the defense. The excerpt highlights the critical role of the sequestration rule in ensuring fair testimony and preventing the alteration of witness statements.