Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; July 29, 2019; Arizona; State Appellate Court
William Mixton appeals his convictions for twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under fifteen years of age, claiming that law enforcement violated his constitutional rights by obtaining information from service providers without a warrant, identifying him as the sender of incriminating internet messages. He argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence acquired through this warrantless action. Although the court found this acquisition violated the Arizona Constitution, it determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, leading to the affirmation of Mixton's convictions and sentences.
In March 2016, an undercover detective investigating child exploitation placed an ad targeting offenders on an internet forum. A user responded with the screen name "tabooin520" and shared child pornography in a group chat. Following further communication, federal agents obtained the user’s IP address through a federal administrative subpoena, which allowed them to identify the user’s internet service provider (ISP) and subsequently obtain a search warrant for the address linked to Mixton. During the search, police seized multiple devices from Mixton's room that contained child pornography and evidence linking him to the messages exchanged. A grand jury indicted Mixton on twenty counts of sexual exploitation after the trial court severed other charges. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to seventeen years for each, to be served consecutively.
Prior to trial, Mixton sought to suppress the subscriber information and evidence collected from his home, arguing a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment and the Arizona Constitution. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that Mixton lacked a recognized privacy interest in the subscriber information.
Mixton contends that his identifying information sent to service providers is protected under both the Fourth Amendment and Arizona's article II, section 8. The court reviews constitutional issues raised in a motion to suppress de novo, considering only the evidence from the suppression hearing, which in this case consisted solely of the parties' filings and undisputed facts viewed favorably to uphold the trial court's ruling. Mixton argues for addressing article II, section 8 before the Fourth Amendment to honor the framers' intent to protect Arizonans' rights independently from federal law. However, Arizona's Supreme Court has established that the interpretation of article II, section 8 aligns closely with Fourth Amendment principles, as both aim to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court notes that interpretations of article II, section 8 typically follow Fourth Amendment precedent, and it has not diverged from this in cases not involving physical home invasions. While the court emphasizes the importance of independent interpretation of state constitutional rights, it recognizes that federal precedent significantly influences Fourth Amendment analysis. Consequently, the court will analyze Mixton's claims starting with the Fourth Amendment due to his challenges under it. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches, necessitating a warrant supported by probable cause for searches infringing on reasonable expectations of privacy. However, it generally does not protect information shared with third parties, even under the assumption of limited use. Federal courts have consistently held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information such as IP addresses or subscriber data voluntarily provided to third-party service providers, indicating that the government's warrantless acquisition of bank records does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
An internet user lacks a recognized Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their IP address or the personally identifying information provided to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The third-party doctrine prevents the government from accessing the contents of communications from third-party providers. Mixton argues a reasonable expectation of privacy exists due to his efforts to maintain anonymity, such as using a minimally intrusive messaging application and a pseudonym. However, for Fourth Amendment protection to apply, a subjective expectation of privacy must also be deemed "reasonable" by societal standards. Established precedents indicate there is no recognized privacy interest in an internet user's identity or subscriber information, even when shared with a single third party. Furthermore, federal courts do not protect IP addresses under privacy interests. Mixton acknowledges that while they are not bound by federal circuit cases, they are bound by the precedent set in Smith, which supports the absence of a federally recognized privacy interest in his subscriber information or IP address. Consequently, law enforcement did not require a warrant to obtain this information, and the trial court correctly denied Mixton's Fourth Amendment claim.
Regarding Arizona’s constitutional protections, Article II, Section 8 ensures no disturbance in private affairs or home invasions without legal authority. Although this provision is similar to the Fourth Amendment, Arizona courts have occasionally recognized broader protections against warrantless intrusions into homes, but have not extended these protections to other contexts outside the home. The Arizona Supreme Court has not definitively ruled that Article II, Section 8's protections of "private affairs" align entirely with Fourth Amendment protections. Mixton contends that the explicit mention of "private affairs" in Article II, Section 8 suggests broader protections than those provided by the Fourth Amendment. However, the court is not convinced that Arizona's constitutional protections exceed those of the Fourth Amendment in this case. No existing opinions have addressed the third-party doctrine under Arizona's Constitution, and the court will evaluate the recognition of privacy expectations under constitutional law de novo.
Mixton advocates for interpreting article II, section 8's protection of "private affairs" as distinct from Fourth Amendment protections due to differing language. He argues that assessing whether a private affair has been disturbed should prioritize "the nature of the government's actions" over the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard typically applied under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, he concedes that Arizona courts have historically utilized this reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test for both article II, section 8 and the Fourth Amendment, suggesting that "private affairs" pertain to matters where individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Mixton claims internet users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their identities when communicating under pseudonyms, urging a shift away from the third-party doctrine, which traditionally asserts that individuals forfeit privacy rights over information shared with third parties.
He references landmark cases such as Miller and Smith, where the U.S. Supreme Court determined that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties, including bank records and phone numbers dialed, suggesting that revealing information to a third party carries inherent risks of government access. Mixton's concerns echo historical dissenting opinions by Justices Stewart and Marshall, who argued for the privacy of communications and criticized the third-party doctrine. Legal scholars have similarly expressed that privacy involves selective disclosure rather than absolute secrecy, highlighting that while individuals may accept limited knowledge by specific parties, they do not consent to broader dissemination or government access to that information.
Many states have rejected the third-party doctrine from Miller and Smith, asserting that individuals possess a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information provided to companies for banking, phone, and internet services. In State v. Reid, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to suppress an internet user's subscriber information, emphasizing that under the state's search-and-seizure provisions, internet users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy similar to that of bank records and phone communications. The court highlighted that an IP address, which is assigned by an ISP, typically does not suffice to identify a user, and the government's access to subscriber information can reveal deeply personal details about an individual's life.
The court affirmed that internet users expect confidentiality in their subscriber information, arguing that disclosing identities to ISPs does not negate this privacy interest. It noted that, in the digital age, the storage of sensitive information by third parties parallels the protection afforded to physical records at home or in an office. The third-party doctrine, according to the court, allows unwarranted governmental intrusion into private affairs, equating it to a government search through a person's home. The state argued for the doctrine based on the classification of the information as "non-content" and voluntarily submitted, but the court countered that such information is integral to personal privacy.
The court found that warrantless collection of this data constitutes a significant intrusion and that individuals do not relinquish their expectation of privacy simply by revealing their identities to ISPs. It expressed particular concern about the doctrine allowing government access to the identities behind anonymous speech without any suspicion of unlawful behavior, underscoring the constitutional prohibition against such invasions of privacy.
Anonymity for authors is a protected aspect of free speech under the First Amendment, influenced by fears of retaliation, social ostracism, or a desire for privacy. Government identification of anonymous speakers can hinder free expression and may be used to suppress dissent. The right to free association is compromised when the government can trace individuals through internet activity, as demonstrated in NAACP v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court held that disclosing member identities infringed on their freedom of association. The Court recognized that revealing identities could result in economic repercussions, job loss, and public hostility, which could deter individuals from participating in advocacy groups. Compelled disclosure threatens the ability to freely associate and express beliefs, as exposure to consequences can lead to member withdrawal and discourage new membership. Additionally, warrantless government access to information about a person's online communications poses risks to privacy rights in associations. While some argue that evidence obtained from government investigations should be suppressed, the broader constitutional protections extend beyond criminal proceedings to prevent government overreach. The dissenting opinions suggest that law enforcement could obtain warrants without significantly hindering crime investigations, supporting the idea that privacy rights should be upheld even at minimal costs to law enforcement efficacy.
The warrant requirement is upheld regardless of whether private affairs occur online, reflecting a commitment to Fourth Amendment standards. Arizona courts aim to maintain consistency with federal exclusionary rules, though they reject the federal third-party doctrine for identifying information in this context. The search warrant in question, based on information obtained in violation of Mixton's rights under Arizona law, raises the issue of evidence suppression. The exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct; however, if law enforcement acts with an objectively reasonable belief that their actions are lawful, the rule does not apply, invoking a good-faith exception.
Despite identifying information being acquired via an administrative subpoena rather than a warrant, the good-faith exception from federal precedent is deemed applicable because evidence was later obtained through the execution of a warrant. Mixton’s argument against the warrant's validity lacks merit, as the exceptions recognized in federal precedent do not apply. Supporting factors include the detective's reliance on a warrant from a neutral magistrate, the federal recognition of no privacy expectation for identifying information provided to service providers, and the absence of Arizona appellate rulings establishing a greater privacy expectation than that afforded by the Fourth Amendment. The good-faith exception is determined by reasonable reliance on binding legal precedent rather than perfect foresight.
No binding appellate precedent explicitly authorized the warrantless search under Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution; however, existing appellate law supported the search as reasonable. The police acted within objectively reasonable reliance on this precedent, as established in *State v. Weakland*, which noted that the good-faith exception does not necessitate binding authority for police practices, only a reasonable belief in their legality. No systemic negligence by police was evident that could invalidate the good-faith exception, as referenced in *State v. Havatone*. Arizona law favors good faith in suppression proceedings, allowing evidence to be admitted if seized under a reasonable, good-faith belief of propriety. Although the evidence used against Mixton was obtained in violation of his privacy rights under Article II, Section 8, the good-faith exception applied, leading to the affirmation of his convictions and sentences.
Judge Eckerstrom concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority's assertion that a warrant was required under Article II, Section 8, emphasizing that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy over intimate online details. He expressed concern that failing to recognize a violation would undermine the constitutional guarantee against unwarranted disturbances in private affairs. Eckerstrom highlighted that while lower federal courts have ruled that individuals possess no expectation of privacy in information shared with internet service providers, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Carpenter* challenges this view, asserting that warrantless tracking of cell-site location information implicates Fourth Amendment protections.
Chief Justice Roberts, representing the majority opinion, refrained from applying the third-party doctrine in cases where the government obtains a comprehensive record of an individual's movements through essential technologies for modern life. The majority asserted that new privacy domains necessitate distinct Fourth Amendment analyses, detailing criteria for evaluating privacy interests. The Court would reject the third-party doctrine if (1) there is a significant societal privacy interest and (2) accessing the privacy domain requires the incidental disclosure of private information to a third party.
The majority emphasized that online activities reveal personal thoughts and beliefs as extensively as physical movements, asserting that internet access is vital for modern participation in society. Engaging with internet services often involves sharing private information, similar to cell phone usage. The expectation of privacy in internet use is argued to be greater than that for physical movements in public, as online visits are generally anonymous unless intentionally disclosed.
The Court has mandated a warrant for tracking a suspect's physical location when it reveals intimate aspects of their life and argued that a similar requirement should apply to digital behavior. Roberts found no valid distinction between this case and prior rulings, specifically referencing Carpenter, which necessitates a warrant for accessing identifying information from an internet provider. He noted that the Fourth Amendment's application to technology is rooted in historical privacy understandings, asserting that the evolution of technology should not diminish protections against government intrusion. The opinion concludes that law enforcement must still adhere to constitutional protections while enforcing laws.
Law enforcement must adapt to new technologies as they become integral to human behavior, requiring appropriate legal justification, as confirmed by a neutral magistrate, when infringing on individual privacy in these new areas. An IP address, being unique to each device, does not inherently enjoy Fourth Amendment protections, as established in United States v. Vosburgh. The trial court ruled that the evidence obtained was admissible and addressed the case under both the Fourth Amendment and Arizona's Article II, Section 8, concluding that their protections align for this case. The court declined to adopt a separate exclusionary rule for state law in search and seizure matters, noting that the precedent set by Carpenter was limited to cell phone tracking and did not apply here.
In State v. Welch, the court suggested that any expectation of privacy regarding an internet provider was unreasonable, but since this expectation was not asserted in that case, the remark was considered dicta and not binding. The court differentiated Arizona's interpretation of privacy rights from that of Washington, which has a different analytical approach that does not rely on the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test but rather on historical treatment, case law, and statutes. The absence of any evidence regarding the terms of Mixton's contract with the ISP or the provider's privacy policy means that the court will not assess how these factors might influence a subscriber's expectation of privacy.
Judge Espinosa asserts that an expectation of privacy is not reasonable under circumstances where identification from an IP address is easily achievable. He questions why law enforcement required subpoenas to identify Mixton if such identification was straightforward, emphasizing that the record lacks evidence for identification outside of his ISP. The judge argues that the risk of ISP security breaches does not diminish the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, akin to the risks of burglary in a home.
The state outlines four conditions that negate the good-faith exception under the Leon ruling: 1) misleading information from the affiant, 2) the magistrate's abandonment of their judicial role, 3) a warrant affidavit lacking probable cause, and 4) a facially deficient warrant. The warrant in this case was issued before the Supreme Court's Carpenter decision, which does not undermine previous federal court cases that upheld reliance on the third-party doctrine.
While acknowledging that many internet users forgo privacy through public activities, the judge clarifies that an expectation of privacy does not equate to total secrecy. Privacy rights in homes remain intact even when inviting others in, and similarly, internet privacy is not waived entirely due to public sharing. He concurs that the state's actions regarding Mixton were in good faith, as the Carpenter ruling came after the search. Prior federal case law did not recognize a constitutional violation in similar contexts, and no Arizona court had determined that Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution provided greater privacy rights than the U.S. Constitution, aside from unlawful home entries. Evidence from Mixton's email correspondence, including child pornography, justified the warrant for his identifying information.
