People v. Johnson

Citation: 446 P.3d 826Docket: Court of Appeals No. 13CA2378

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; January 25, 2017; Colorado; State Appellate Court

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The court ruled that the offense of retaliation against a witness or victim, defined under section 18-8-706, C.R.S. 2016, does not extend to retaliation related to civil proceedings, leading to the vacating of Burnest Alvis Johnson's conviction for witness retaliation. Johnson's actions stemmed from a custody dispute involving his children, which he believed was influenced by his former friend, Elizabeth Ranals, who reported him to the Colorado Department of Human Services (DHS). After the removal of his children, Johnson shot at a vehicle resembling that of the DHS employees and later fired shots at Ranals' home, where she and children were present but unharmed. 

Johnson was initially charged with multiple offenses, including attempted murder, but was acquitted of seven charges. His conviction for witness retaliation was based on the prosecution's claim that he acted against Ranals due to her involvement in the dependency proceedings. Johnson contended that his actions could not be classified as witness retaliation under the statute, as it solely pertains to criminal proceedings, a stance the court supported, resulting in the vacated conviction. Additionally, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of Johnson's motions for mistrial and a new trial regarding his other convictions. The legal analysis emphasized the interpretation of statutes, focusing on legislative intent and the plain language of the law.

If a statute is ambiguous, courts may reference prior law, statutory history, legislative objectives, and the statute's context within broader legislation for clarification. Section 18-8-706 defines retaliation against a witness or victim as actions involving threats, harassment, or harm directed at individuals connected to a witness or victim of any crime. In *People v. Hickman*, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the statute against vagueness claims, asserting that it requires specific intent to retaliate based on a person's relationship to criminal proceedings. However, it left open the question of whether the statute also protects individuals linked to civil proceedings. 

The plain language of the statute indicates various classifications of protected persons, including witnesses and victims of any crime, individuals believed to be called as witnesses, and their family members or those in close relationships. The phrasing lacks clarity on whether protections extend beyond criminal contexts. Consequently, the language is deemed ambiguous, necessitating further interpretation to ascertain legislative intent. 

In *Hickman*, the court emphasized that the General Assembly aimed to safeguard those involved in criminal proceedings, highlighting the statute's role in protecting the administration of criminal justice as part of the Colorado Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1984. The statute's placement within this context supports the conclusion that its protections are primarily intended for criminal proceedings, a perspective reinforced by additional legislative intent sources.

The enacting bill's title reflects a legislative intent to protect individuals related to criminal proceedings, emphasizing the rights of victims and witnesses and creating offenses to safeguard them. The House sponsor, Representative Don Mielke, highlighted the bill's purpose of addressing gaps in Colorado's laws, particularly regarding witness intimidation before a case is filed. In 1992, significant amendments to section 18-8-706 removed the phrase 'for giving testimony in any official proceeding' and added 'to any crime,' reinforcing legislative intent to protect witnesses and victims in criminal contexts.

The legislature's omission of 'to a crime' in the protection of certain individuals suggests a deliberate limitation of scope to actions directed at those involved in criminal proceedings. A related statute, section 18-8-706.5, explicitly protects jurors in both criminal and civil trials, indicating that if protection for civil proceedings was intended in 18-8-706, it would have been clearly stated. The definition of 'witness' in section 18-8-702 focuses on knowledge and reporting of crimes, without mention of civil proceedings, further indicating that the legislature did not intend to expand the definition of 'witness' to include those in civil contexts.

Section 18-8-706 is applicable solely to retaliation against witnesses or victims regarding criminal proceedings, not civil ones. Relevant case law, including Hickman and Grynberg, confirms that intimidation must involve individuals who are victims of or witnesses to a crime. In the trial, evidence presented showed that Ranals provided information to the Department of Human Services (DHS), leading to an investigation and the removal of Johnson's children, with Johnson subsequently retaliating against Ranals. However, since dependency and neglect proceedings are civil in nature under the Colorado Children's Code, Ranals' potential role as a witness does not support a conviction under section 18-8-706. Consequently, Johnson's conviction for witness retaliation is vacated.

Additionally, Johnson appealed two other issues regarding his remaining convictions for reckless endangerment, child abuse, illegal firearm discharge, and criminal mischief. He objected to a statement made by Ranals about Johnson’s domestic violence, which violated a pre-trial ruling on inadmissible evidence. The trial court denied Johnson's motion for a mistrial and instead instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Johnson later filed a motion for a new trial based on a juror's affidavit claiming the jury ignored the court's instruction and made derogatory remarks about him. The court denied this motion, citing Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) that restricts examination into jury deliberations.

Johnson contends the trial court erred in denying both motions. The court's decision on the mistrial motion was upheld as there was no abuse of discretion; a mistrial is only warranted in cases of significant prejudice that cannot be remedied otherwise. The court recognized that while exposure to inadmissible evidence is prejudicial, it does not automatically necessitate a mistrial, as shown in previous cases.

Instructing jurors to disregard erroneously admitted evidence is generally deemed sufficient, unless the evidence is highly prejudicial to the extent that it could have influenced the jury's verdict. In this case, during the prosecution's examination, a witness made a remark about the defendant, Johnson, allegedly beating his girlfriend, prompting an objection and a motion for mistrial from his counsel. The trial court denied the mistrial but instructed the jury to disregard the statement. The court concluded it did not abuse its discretion, noting that the remark was brief and lacked detail, and there was no indication the prosecutor intentionally elicited this information. Johnson's counsel expressed concern that the jury might infer ongoing domestic violence, but the court found the instruction sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice.

Johnson later argued that the jury was prejudiced, citing a juror's affidavit stating that jurors characterized him negatively during deliberations. However, the court rejected this argument for two reasons: first, references to past criminal acts are not automatically prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial, as evidenced by Johnson's acquittal on several serious charges, including attempted murder. Second, the court declined to consider the juror's affidavit due to the prohibition under CRE 606(b), which prevents inquiries into jurors' deliberations and protects the integrity of the verdict. This rule strongly disallows juror testimony that could impeach a verdict based on internal deliberative processes or misunderstandings.

CRE 606(b) prohibits inquiries into jury deliberations, affirming the presumption that jurors follow court instructions unless credible evidence suggests otherwise. Johnson's argument regarding the inability to rebut this presumption lacks sufficient grounds, despite acknowledging some potential for juror statements to challenge this presumption. The district court acted within its discretion by issuing a limiting instruction instead of granting a mistrial.

Johnson's post-verdict motion for a new trial, based on a juror affidavit alleging disregard for a court instruction regarding Ranals' testimony, was also denied. The court ruled this was an abuse of discretion, as it relied on the jury's deliberative process, which CRE 606(b) forbids investigating. Johnson claimed that Ranals' statement constituted 'extraneous prejudicial information,' referencing Colorado case law. However, the court found his citations misapplied, clarifying that the term ‘extraneous’ does not apply to information presented during the trial itself. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of Johnson's motion for a new trial.

Johnson's conviction for witness retaliation under section 18-8-706 is vacated, while his other convictions are affirmed. The court notes that Johnson was acquitted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and various intimidation and retaliation charges. His remaining convictions include two counts of reckless endangerment, two counts of child abuse (no injury), illegal discharge of a weapon, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, criminal mischief, and five counts of habitual criminal. Additionally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of People v. Maestas regarding related issues. The original statute for witness retaliation defined the offense based on intentional harm to witnesses, but subsequent amendments altered the wording and scope, including the removal of "intentionally" and the definition of potential witnesses. Under CRE 606(b), juror testimony is limited to specific matters, excluding juror affidavits on issues they cannot testify about; thus, the court disagreed that a statement made by Ranals during the trial qualifies as extraneous evidence.