Coffee v. Ryan-Touhill

Citations: 445 P.3d 666; 247 Ariz. 68Docket: No. 1 CA-SA 18-0251

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; June 20, 2019; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Parties may invoke Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 42.1(e) to remove a trial judge after obtaining a new evidentiary hearing from an appellate court, even if they have not previously exercised this right. This case follows a prior special action, Coffee v. Ryan-Touhill (Coffee I), where the appellate court found that the superior court had violated Father's due process rights regarding the relocation of his minor son, directing a new evidentiary hearing to reassess the relocation and related child support issues. 

In the current special action, Father sought to change the trial judge before the new hearing but was denied by the superior court, which ruled that Rule 42.1(e) was inapplicable since Coffee I did not reverse the original relocation decision. The appellate court accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, asserting that Father's right to change the judge was renewed following the order for a new hearing.

The factual background reveals that Mother and Father divorced in 2008, sharing joint legal decision-making for their son, with Father as the primary residential parent. After Mother's relocation to Kansas in 2010, they implemented a long-distance parenting plan. In 2018, Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time and support, alleging dangerous behavior by their son and seeking a role reversal in custody. The court denied Mother's emergency motion for temporary orders due to insufficient evidence of irreparable harm but set a limited evidentiary hearing. 

During this hearing, the trial judge referenced undisclosed medical notes from the child's therapist and ultimately ordered the son to move to Kansas, citing safety concerns and a risk analysis without adequately addressing the factors for parenting time or child relocation. The order was characterized as temporary, pending further proceedings, and did not consider Mother's child support request or Father's counter-petition. A follow-up hearing was scheduled.

Father petitioned for special action relief to vacate a superior court ruling on due process grounds and sought the immediate return of Son to Arizona. The court accepted jurisdiction, found that Father was denied due process, and determined that the superior court's order could not stand, requiring a new evidentiary hearing within 60 days that complied with applicable rules. The court also ordered the superior court to consider relevant statutory factors regarding legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support, including the relocation issue. However, the court did not order Son to remain in Arizona, as he had already moved to Kansas.

Following the relief granted in a prior case (Coffee I), Father moved to change the judge, which the superior court denied, asserting that the court of appeals had not mandated a new trial but merely asked for clarification on the temporary relocation order. The superior court indicated it would not hold the required evidentiary hearing within 60 days but sought input from the parties instead. Father subsequently filed another special action petition regarding the denial of his motion to change judges and to compel adherence to the 60-day requirement for the evidentiary hearing.

On November 5, the court stayed all proceedings and later granted relief on November 26, ordering a change of judge and the evidentiary hearing, with a written decision to follow. The superior court expressed concerns about its jurisdiction to conduct the hearing without a mandate from the court of appeals. In response, the court of appeals reaffirmed its orders and lifted the stay, explaining that jurisdiction in special actions does not transfer from the superior court and that it retains authority to review actions or inactions of public officials without affecting the superior court's jurisdiction over the underlying case.

Unless the appellate court issues a stay, the superior court can continue with the underlying action during a special action. Even with a stay, the superior court retains jurisdiction, only limited by the specific terms of the stay order. In this case, the superior court maintained jurisdiction throughout the special action, and any limitations from the stay were lifted once the order was removed. 

Rule 42.1(e) allows a party to request a new trial judge when an appellate court remands a case for a new trial and the requesting party has not previously removed a judge. Since Father had not previously sought a change of judge, the key issue is whether the appellate decision in Coffee I remanded the matter for a new trial under this rule. The review of the denial for a change of judge is based on abuse of discretion, while the interpretation of Rule 42.1(e) is done de novo, focusing on fairness and impartiality.

The rule addresses concerns about judges potentially prejudging issues they have already decided, which may lead to judicial bias. In this instance, the judge's prior decision indicated a clear belief about the case's outcome. Coffee I's ruling revived Father's right to change trial judges since it required the superior court to reassess previously made decisions based on evidence that had not been considered. The superior court previously ruled that Son must reside with Mother in Kansas, but Coffee I reversed that ruling due to Father being denied due process in the initial evidentiary hearing. The appellate court ordered a new hearing where due process must be ensured.

Mother's arguments against applying Rule 42.1(e) were unconvincing. She claimed that Coffee I did not mandate a new trial, noting that the appellate court did not state that the trial court's ruling was unsupported by evidence. However, the court ordered a new hearing due to procedural due process violations, emphasizing that the wording of the appellate decision is not determinative. Instead, the focus is on the superior court's required actions following the appeal. If the superior court only needs to perform a minor task, a change of judge is not warranted. Conversely, if the court must reevaluate its prior decision based on new evidence, the right to change judges is restored. 

Additionally, there is no requirement for proof of actual bias under Rule 42.1(e); the mere potential for bias—whether conscious or subconscious—suffices to justify a change of judge.

The superior court's denial of Father's request for a new trial judge was based on precedence from the Anderson case, where the trial court was required to clarify its orders but not to conduct a new evidentiary hearing. Unlike Anderson, the current case necessitates a complete evidentiary hearing and a reevaluation of previously decided issues. The case of Mitchell serves as a more relevant comparison, as it involved a similar situation where the court of appeals mandated a new trial judge upon remand for redetermining property ownership interests. The court concluded that the superior court should have granted a new judge due to the necessity of reassessing the remanded issues. The ruling clarifies that the term "remand" in Rule 42.1(e) does not restrict the right to change judges after a special action review. The court reversed the superior court's denial of Father's change of judge request, mandating that a new trial judge be assigned and a new evidentiary hearing conducted. Mother's request for attorneys' fees was denied due to insufficient evidence of financial need and the reasonableness of Father's positions. The family court rules, effective January 1, 2019, further specify that the right to change judges is renewed when an appellate decision requires a new trial or contested hearing.