Court: Oregon Supreme Court; July 18, 2019; Oregon; State Supreme Court
In this juvenile dependency case, the mother sought to terminate the juvenile court's wardship over her child, A, and to vacate a general guardianship established under ORS 419B.366, arguing that the basis for the court's jurisdiction no longer existed. The juvenile court denied the mother's motion without addressing the jurisdictional basis, concluding instead that the mother failed to demonstrate that vacating the guardianship was in A's best interests. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the juvenile court’s judgment, stating that if the mother proved the jurisdictional basis had ended, the juvenile court was obligated to terminate its wardship and could not maintain the guardianship. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for the juvenile court to determine whether the termination of wardship was necessary. A's guardian, Fuller, then petitioned for review, which was granted. The court affirmed that the juvenile court must determine its obligation to terminate wardship, as continued guardianship would not be permissible if the jurisdictional basis was found to be absent. The relevant legal framework stipulates that a juvenile court can assert jurisdiction to protect a child when their welfare is endangered and must establish a permanency plan for the child while they remain under its wardship until specific conditions are met.
DHS petitioned the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over the mother's child, A, due to the mother's controlled substance use, which endangered A. In May 2012, the court granted this petition, making A a ward of the court and placing her in foster care with her aunt, Fuller. Initially, the plan was for A to return to her mother, but as the mother did not make adequate progress, the plan shifted to establishing a guardianship. In November 2013, the court established a general guardianship for A under ORS 419B.366, requiring the court to determine that A could not safely return to her parent in a reasonable time, adoption was not suitable, the proposed guardian was suitable and willing, and that guardianship served A's best interests. These findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A parent can move to vacate a general guardianship, while a permanent guardianship, established under ORS 419B.365, requires clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental rights and cannot be vacated by a parent. In April 2016, the mother filed a motion to vacate the guardianship, claiming that the basis for the court's jurisdiction no longer existed. A and Fuller opposed this motion, and the parties later disagreed on the statutory requirements for terminating a general guardianship, particularly concerning the duration of such guardianships as outlined in ORS 419B.366(6).
Mother contended in juvenile court that guardianship over A should end because the basis for the court's jurisdiction had ceased to exist. She cited Court of Appeals cases affirming that a juvenile court must terminate wardship if the jurisdictional facts are no longer present. Specifically, she referenced ORS 419B.328, which outlines that a ward's status continues until certain conditions are met, including termination of wardship. Mother argued that since the jurisdictional facts were absent, the court must terminate its wardship, which would subsequently nullify the guardianship under ORS 419B.366(6).
Fuller and A acknowledged the lack of jurisdictional facts but argued that mother's motion to terminate the wardship was not valid unless the conditions under ORS 419B.368 were satisfied. This statute allows the court to modify or vacate a guardianship if it serves the ward’s best interests and if specific conditions are met, including the amelioration of circumstances leading to the guardianship and the parent's capability to care for the ward. Fuller and A contended that mother had not demonstrated that terminating the guardianship was in A's best interests, thus failing to meet the criteria outlined in ORS 419B.368(3).
Mother contended that she met the requirements of ORS 419B.368(3) to vacate the guardianship of her child, A. The juvenile court sided with Fuller and denied the motion, stating that vacating the guardianship was not in A's best interest, but did not clarify the status of its jurisdiction over A. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the juvenile court's judgment, noting that it erred by not determining whether it maintained jurisdiction over A, which is necessary for continuing the guardianship under ORS 419B.366. This statute mandates that a guardianship can only persist if the court retains jurisdiction over the child, and jurisdiction cannot be upheld if its basis ceases to exist. The appellate court emphasized that a parent can seek to terminate jurisdiction until their rights are fully terminated, aligning with legislative intentions in juvenile dependency laws. Fuller petitioned for review, arguing that a juvenile court cannot vacate a guardianship if jurisdiction is lost unless the criteria of ORS 419B.368(3) are satisfied, a position supported by DHS. In response, Mother argued that the juvenile court must end its guardianship if jurisdictional bases are absent, referencing ORS 419B.366. She also claimed that Fuller and DHS's interpretation could violate due process by allowing prolonged governmental interference in the parent-child relationship based on insufficient evidentiary standards. The text of ORS 419B.366 indicates that a general guardianship continues until vacated or until specific events terminate the court's jurisdiction, as outlined in ORS 419B.328, establishing that guardianships remain effective as long as the juvenile court's jurisdiction is intact.
ORS 419B.366(6) stipulates that a guardianship remains in effect as long as the ward is under the court's jurisdiction, unless vacated under ORS 419B.368. The term "unless" is interpreted as "except on the condition that," indicating that there are multiple circumstances that can terminate a guardianship. Specifically, the juvenile court can vacate a guardianship if the conditions of ORS 419B.368 are met, but it will continue if the court retains jurisdiction over the ward. Fuller contends that vacating a guardianship requires the court to satisfy three specific criteria outlined in ORS 419B.368(3), arguing that failing to do so would undermine the statute. However, this interpretation conflicts with the text of ORS 419B.366(6), which allows for guardianship to end either through a court order under ORS 419B.368 or when the court's jurisdiction ends per ORS 419B.328. Fuller's reading effectively alters the statute's language, suggesting guardianship continues "until" jurisdiction ends, thereby disregarding the explicit mention of ORS 419B.328. Furthermore, her assertion that the second requirement of ORS 419B.368(3) would render the statute ineffective misinterprets the relationship between the grounds for guardianship and the broader jurisdiction of the court; the reasons for guardianship and those for jurisdiction can differ, allowing for scenarios where guardianship can be vacated even if some jurisdictional bases remain.
A juvenile court may vacate a general guardianship established due to a parent's lack of safe housing once the parent secures housing, while still maintaining jurisdiction if other grounds for jurisdiction exist, such as the need for additional services. The interpretation of ORS 419B.366(6) allows for both ORS 419B.368 and ORS 419B.328 to be applied concurrently, meaning a guardianship continues unless vacated under ORS 419B.368 or the court terminates its jurisdiction under ORS 419B.328(2)(c). Fuller and DHS argue that a guardianship should not be vacated without meeting ORS 419B.368(3) requirements, including the child's best interests, fearing disruption of long-term guardianships. However, a juvenile court can establish a "permanent guardianship" under ORS 419B.365, which is not subject to vacating by a parent, thus providing a more secure placement option. Additionally, if new circumstances arise that threaten the child's safety, the court may reassert jurisdiction based on those changes, even if original grounds for jurisdiction are no longer present. The court retains the authority to amend petitions if necessary.
The juvenile court has the authority to vacate a general guardianship as outlined in ORS 419B.368. If the court does not vacate the guardianship, it remains in effect only while the ward is under the court's jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case to the juvenile court is affirmed, requiring a determination on whether the mother has established grounds for terminating the court's wardship over A. The juvenile court's previous judgment is reversed. DHS was not involved in A's juvenile dependency case during the motion hearing but later participated as amicus curiae in this court. The interpretation of ORS 419B.366(6) relies primarily on its text, as the legislative history is ambiguous and does not clarify the matter. ORS 419B.365(5) similarly indicates that a guardianship continues as long as the ward is under court jurisdiction unless vacated. The possibility of a parent's motion to terminate wardship to vacate a permanent guardianship is acknowledged but not explored, as this case pertains to a general guardianship.
