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Beauregard v. Riley
Citation: 443 P.3d 827Docket: No. 77431-0-I consolidated with No. 77501-4-I
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; June 24, 2019; Washington; State Appellate Court
The Beauregards have not demonstrated proximate causation, a crucial element of their negligence, statutory duty, and Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claims, as dictated by the Boguch precedent. Riley, in her cross-appeal, argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that she had a statutory duty under RCW 18.86.030(1)(c) to relay a rental inquiry to the Beauregards. The court agrees with Riley, noting that statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo, focusing on legislative intent through the statute's text, context, and related provisions. RCW 18.86.030(1)(c) mandates that real estate brokers must communicate all written offers and notices timely to all parties involved, regardless of existing contracts. This statute establishes statutory duties distinct from common law fiduciary duties, which it supersedes. The statute defines "real estate brokerage services" as activities requiring a real estate license, which must be conducted for compensation or the expectation of compensation. To determine the extent of Riley's agency, the Listing Agreement is examined, which outlines that "selling" encompasses not only sales but also leasing with an option to purchase. The commission structure in the Listing Agreement specifies that a commission is due if the property is sold or leased under the defined terms. An email from Williams to Riley explicitly inquired about the Beauregards' interest in renting their house, indicating a focus on rental rather than sale. The e-mail communication regarding the rental inquiry does not fall under the 'real estate brokerage services' contracted between the Beauregards and Riley, as it was explicitly stated that the interested party only wanted to rent the property. Riley's agency was limited to selling the property, and thus, there was no expectation of compensation for rental services. Consequently, Riley was not obligated to communicate the rental inquiry as per RCW 18.86.030(1)(c). The court affirmed the dismissal of the Beauregards' claims and reversed the trial court’s finding that Riley had a statutory duty to communicate the rental inquiry and subsequently breached that duty. The e-mail specified the potential renter’s preferences and conditions, but this did not alter Riley's obligations. Additionally, since the court upheld the summary judgment on causation, it deemed Riley’s cross-appeal regarding the consideration of Anderson's expert declaration unnecessary.