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Doan v. Banner Health, Inc.
Citation: 442 P.3d 706Docket: Supreme Court No. S-16322
Court: Alaska Supreme Court; May 31, 2019; Alaska; State Supreme Court
A mother, Nixola Doan, whose daughter Tristana died while under medical care, filed a lawsuit against various medical providers for wrongful death and medical malpractice, including a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) due to witnessing her daughter's body after death. The superior court dismissed the NIED claim, asserting that it required evidence demonstrating Doan's contemporaneous understanding that the medical negligence caused her daughter's death. Doan petitioned for review of this dismissal, which was granted. The court determined that a viable bystander claim for NIED does not necessitate the plaintiff's immediate realization that observed injuries were due to negligence. Consequently, the court reversed the superior court's summary judgment, emphasizing that while some NIED claims, particularly those involving blatant malpractice recognizable by laypersons, could be valid, the requirement for a contemporaneous understanding was misapplied in this case. The review process involved an independent assessment of the law concerning summary judgment and the established facts of the case. Doctors assert that the superior court accurately interpreted Alaska law regarding NIED (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) claims. They argue that a claimant cannot recover on an NIED bystander claim unless they contemporaneously perceive the negligent medical treatment causing injury to the victim. This requirement differs from typical negligence claims, where victims might not be aware of the negligence until later investigation. While acknowledging the policy favoring limitations on liability, the doctors contend that their proposed requirement is unreasonable. The NIED cause of action was first acknowledged in Alaska in the case of Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian. In that instance, a father did not realize his daughter was involved in an accident until he returned to the scene after discovering her absence. The court accepted NIED claims and referenced guidelines from Dillon v. Legg, which include proximity to the accident, direct emotional impact from sensory observation, and the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. However, the court rejected a strict interpretation of these guidelines, emphasizing the importance of reasonable foreseeability of emotional harm instead. In Croft ex rel. Croft v. Wicker, the court reiterated its position against strict adherence to the Dillon guidelines. The plaintiffs, who did not witness the assault on their daughter but were nearby and observed her distress, were allowed to proceed with their NIED claim. The court recognized the validity of NIED claims where plaintiffs did not directly observe the tortious event but were present to witness its immediate aftermath. The determination of a defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care hinges on the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. In the discussed case, the Crofts were in close proximity to Wicker and Sarah during the alleged incident, observed Sarah's extreme distress, and raised questions about whether Wicker could reasonably foresee that Sarah's parents might suffer harm from his actions. Consequently, their claim was deemed sufficiently pleaded to proceed to the jury. The superior court clarified that an NIED (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) plaintiff must understand both the physical and legal nature of the victim's injury. This was illustrated through the case of Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, where Mattingly learned of his son's accident while geographically distant from the scene, preventing him from having a contemporaneous shock that could support an NIED claim. The court emphasized that emotional harm arises from witnessing the victim rather than the tortious act itself, which was further supported by the Croft case that rejected the necessity for plaintiffs to observe the tortious act directly. In Beck v. State, Department of Transportation, the court reaffirmed this interpretation, rejecting a stricter standard from California's Dillon test. The mother, who learned of her daughter’s accident and rushed to the scene but was barred from immediate observation, later saw her daughter at the hospital. She sued the State for negligent road maintenance, with the State arguing for adherence to the California standard that had resulted in increasing liability uncertainty. Thing adopted a "bright-line" interpretation of Dillon, mandating that a plaintiff must be "present at the scene of the injury-producing event" and aware that it is causing harm in order to claim for emotional distress. However, in Beck, a more lenient standard was applied, allowing individuals who witness the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event involving a close relative to assert claims for emotional injuries, regardless of whether they directly observed the event itself. In Beck, the mother's emotional distress stemmed from seeing her daughter's injuries shortly after the accident, and it was determined that her injury was foreseeable, warranting her claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) to be presented to a jury. The excerpt critiques the doctors' proposed rule that would require a plaintiff to contemporaneously understand that negligence was causing harm during the event. Previous cases (Kavorkian III, Croft, Mattingly, and Beck) demonstrate that emotional shock can arise without an immediate grasp of the negligent cause of injury. For instance, in Kavorkian III, the father knew of the accident but not its cause; in Croft, the parents recognized their daughter's distress without comprehending its cause; in Mattingly, the father's recovery was denied due to his ability to prepare himself before seeing his son's injuries. The essential factor allowing recovery in Kavorkian III, Croft, and Beck was the immediate sensory observation of a relative's traumatic injuries. The text argues that requiring a simultaneous understanding of negligence is unreasonable, as negligence may not be evident at the moment of trauma. Thus, the emotional impact of witnessing a loved one's injury should suffice for a claim, independent of the plaintiff's awareness of any negligent actions. Recovery in medical malpractice cases may hinge on the plaintiff's sophistication, particularly regarding emotional distress claims. The superior court previously limited recovery to "blatant medical errors obvious to laypersons," implying that a medically knowledgeable plaintiff may have a valid claim, unlike a layperson who suffers similar emotional distress without medical training. This raises questions about the necessary alignment between a plaintiff's understanding of negligence and the evidence presented at trial. The doctors argue that case law does not support recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) by non-patients against medical providers for the treatment of family members. They reference the case of Chizmar v. Mackie, which emphasizes that emotional damages due to negligence should only be recoverable if a preexisting duty exists. However, Chizmar involved a patient’s claim against a physician and did not alter the criteria for bystander recovery established in prior cases. Additionally, in M.A. v. United States, a mother’s NIED claim was dismissed for various reasons unrelated to the current case. In contrast, the current plaintiff, Doan, was closely present during the events leading to her daughter's death and experienced contemporaneous shock upon witnessing the aftermath, which strengthens her claim. The doctors also contend that allowing Doan's NIED claim contradicts legislative policy outlined in AS 09.55.530 and 560 regarding procedural rules for medical malpractice, but these statutes do not specifically address bystander NIED claims. Historical case law has permitted such claims against medical providers without overwhelming the healthcare system. Ultimately, bystander NIED claims remain governed by the principles established in earlier rulings. A plaintiff who experiences emotional shock due to witnessing a loved one's serious injuries is entitled to claim negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) when the emotional injury is foreseeable and closely connected to the accident. The requirement for the plaintiff to contemporaneously understand that the injuries were negligently caused does not apply. The court found that Doan's complaint adequately stated a claim for NIED under a bystander theory, which should have survived summary judgment. The summary judgment against Doan is reversed, and the case is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. The timeline regarding whether Tristana died shortly before or after Doan's last entry into the room does not impact the court's decision. Additionally, when the nature of an injury obscures a plaintiff's ability to discover essential facts for their claim, the discovery rule may toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff reasonably discovers their case. The court highlighted that a reasonable person, upon learning of an airplane crash, should be prompted to investigate potential claims against relevant parties. The discussion also references California cases that recognize the emotional shock experienced by observing the immediate consequences of negligence, affirming that such emotional impact can be as significant as witnessing the accident itself. Emotional distress claims arising from negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) depend on the plaintiff's direct sensory observation of an accident, as opposed to learning about it later from others. Relevant case law highlights the distinction between perceiving negligence and discovering it afterward, particularly in situations involving medical care. The excerpt discusses various cases, indicating that emotional distress damages may not be recoverable if the plaintiff misidentifies the negligent actor or if the plaintiff perceives one party's negligence but later learns of others involved. The excerpt references key cases to illustrate these points, including the bystander and preexisting duty theories, and emphasizes the challenges bystanders face in distinguishing between proper and negligent medical care. Additionally, it notes that other jurisdictions have varied approaches to NIED claims, particularly in medical malpractice contexts, with some states rejecting these claims due to the inability of laypeople to assess the nuances of medical care. The excerpt concludes with alternative arguments raised regarding the wrongful death statute and potential conflicts of interest related to the plaintiff's status, which have not been addressed by the superior court.