State v. Healer

Citations: 440 P.3d 404; 246 Ariz. 441Docket: Nos. 2 CA-CR 2018-0134; 2 CA-CR 2018-0243-PR (Consolidated)

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; April 11, 2019; Arizona; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Joey Lee Healer appeals his sentences for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, armed robbery, theft by control, resisting arrest, and two counts of criminal damage. He asserts three main arguments: 1) the sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder is illegal; 2) Article II, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution should be interpreted more expansively than the Eighth Amendment regarding juvenile sentencing; and 3) the trial court incorrectly stated it lacked discretion to order that his murder sentence run concurrently with the other sentences. Healer also seeks review of the trial court's partial denial of his post-conviction relief petition, claiming an abuse of discretion for not resentencing him on all counts except for first-degree murder.

In 1994, at age 16, Healer committed robbery and murder against his elderly neighbor, resulting in convictions and a life sentence without parole for murder, along with an additional 13.5 years for other offenses. His convictions were upheld on appeal. In 2013, he sought post-conviction relief citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles. Initially dismissed by the trial court, his case was reviewed, leading to a remand for resentencing based on the retroactive application of Miller as established in Montgomery v. Louisiana. On remand, the state agreed to resentencing, and Healer received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for the murder conviction, while the sentences for other offenses remained unchanged. The court affirmed its jurisdiction under Arizona law.

Healer contends that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first-degree murder is unlawful because no legal framework existed for juvenile sentences at the time of his offense. He claims A.R.S. 13-716 constitutes an ex post facto law, violating both the U.S. and Arizona constitutions. The interpretation of ex post facto laws requires that a law be retrospective and disadvantageous to the offender. A law is deemed retrospective if it alters the legal consequences of actions completed prior to its enactment. In 1994, the available sentences for first-degree murder were death, natural life, or life with potential release after twenty-five years, as prior laws had eliminated parole. Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court rulings established that denying parole eligibility to juveniles not deemed permanently incorrigible is unconstitutional. The 2014 enactment of A.R.S. 13-716 allows juvenile offenders sentenced to life to be eligible for parole after serving a minimum term, which the court has ruled is a remedial measure affecting future events rather than a retroactive law. Healer argues against the precedent set in State v. Vera, which upheld A.R.S. 13-716, but the court declines to revisit this decision, adhering to the principle of stare decisis unless a prior ruling is clearly erroneous or irrelevant due to changed circumstances.

Vera remains the controlling authority, leading to the conclusion that Healer's ex post facto claim fails because he cannot demonstrate that A.R.S. 13-716 is retroactive. Consequently, his arguments regarding the statute's disadvantageous nature need not be considered. Healer's life sentence with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first-degree murder is deemed lawful. He argues for a broader interpretation of Article II, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution compared to the Eighth Amendment, asserting that children tried as adults should not face the same mandatory sentences. Although states can provide broader protections than federal requirements, Arizona courts typically interpret state constitutional provisions similarly to federal ones. Previous case law indicates no compelling reason to interpret Arizona's cruel and unusual punishment provision differently from the Eighth Amendment, and the Arizona Supreme Court has not done so. 

Regarding resentencing, Healer contends the trial court erred by claiming it lacked discretion to run his sentence for one count concurrently with others, as well as in refusing to resentence him on other counts. Sentences are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which was not found in this case. Healer argued that the precedent set in State v. Lambright granted the court discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, a position the state agreed with.

The court rejected the parties' arguments, referencing Lopez v. Kearney and highlighting that the only relevant precedent for Mr. Healer's case was Miller and Montgomery, not Lambright. The trial court vacated Healer's natural life sentence, replacing it with a life sentence eligible for parole after twenty-five years, while reaffirming the sentences for other counts. Key points include: 1) the court interpreted Miller and Montgomery as not granting it authority to modify anything beyond Healer's murder sentence; 2) it did not consider any developments post-1995 sentencing; 3) the other sentences are ordered to run consecutively to the new murder sentence; and 4) it maintained the original concurrent and consecutive terms set by the 1995 judge. The court disagreed with Healer's assertion that Lambright should determine the trial court's discretion regarding concurrent versus consecutive sentences. Unlike Lambright, where the court did not specify sentence relationships, Healer's original sentencing had already clarified these relationships. Healer's cited cases were deemed irrelevant, as they involved different circumstances affecting sentencing. Moreover, Miller and Montgomery pertain specifically to mandatory life sentences for juveniles and do not address the concurrent or consecutive nature of sentences. Montgomery clarified that not all sentences need relitigation, allowing for juvenile offenders to be eligible for parole as a remedy for Miller violations.

The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Valencia emphasized that legislative amendments to A.R.S. 13-716 could eliminate the need for evidentiary and resentencing hearings for juveniles serving life sentences for murder. The court clarified that its limited remand did not extend to reviewing sentences beyond Healer's natural life sentence. For Healer to prove his sentence unconstitutional, he must demonstrate that his crime reflected transient immaturity, which the trial court correctly determined it lacked authority to alter under precedents set by Miller and Montgomery. As a result, the trial court's decision to modify Healer's sentence to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years was affirmed. 

Healer's reference to a federal district court's decision regarding Vera was noted, but it was clarified that Ninth Circuit interpretations do not bind Arizona courts. The court expressed skepticism over Healer's claim that A.R.S. 13-716 disadvantaged him and chose not to find waiver regarding this argument, despite the state's assertion of its untimeliness. Healer's contention that previous cases, such as Davis, prevented the court from addressing state constitutional questions was dismissed, as the court maintained that Davis was not case-specific. The court also addressed Healer's petition for review, stating that the state's failure to file an answering brief typically implies a confession of error, but opted to exercise discretion in addressing Healer's legal issues. Ultimately, the court found no basis for reducing the length of Healer's unchallenged sentences, reaffirming that neither Miller nor Montgomery necessitated such changes.