Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; September 19, 2018; Arizona; State Appellate Court
Bobby Carter Jr. was convicted after a jury trial on multiple charges, including aggravated assault, burglary, theft, vehicle theft, robbery, and criminal damage, stemming from a crime spree on January 10, 2015. The trial court determined that Carter had two or more prior felony convictions, classifying him as a category three repetitive offender, and imposed a total sentence of 60.75 years in prison, consisting of both concurrent and consecutive terms. Following the trial, Carter's counsel submitted an Anders brief indicating no viable legal issues for appeal but provided a comprehensive case history. Carter did not submit a supplemental brief.
During the review, the court identified potential double jeopardy issues raised by Carter regarding multiple punishments for five counts. The court requested additional briefing on whether these convictions violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The factual background revealed that Carter's criminal actions included carjacking a vehicle, burglarizing properties, and stealing items of significant value. The evidence presented was deemed sufficient to uphold the jury's verdicts, but the court recognized the need to evaluate potential double jeopardy implications regarding some of the convictions. The court affirmed certain convictions and vacated others based on this analysis.
The Double Jeopardy Clauses in the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions prohibit a second prosecution after acquittal or conviction, as well as multiple punishments for the same offense. The primary focus of these protections is to prevent the State from repeatedly attempting to convict an individual, which can lead to increased anxiety and the risk of erroneous convictions. Specifically, the protection against multiple punishments aims to confine a defendant's penalties to those intended by the legislature.
To evaluate whether multiple convictions and sentences for offenses from a single trial are constitutional, the key question is whether the legislature intended to allow separate punishments for distinct statutory violations. Courts typically presume that the legislature does not intend to punish the same offense under different statutes without explicit evidence of contrary intent.
The determination of whether multiple statutory provisions address the same offense relies on the Blockburger test, which assesses whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. For instance, a defendant cannot be convicted of both an offense and its lesser included offense, as they are deemed the same offense concerning double jeopardy.
In the context of multiple punishments following a single trial, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the Blockburger test is a method of statutory interpretation aimed at discerning legislative intent. This test should not override explicit legislative authorization for cumulative punishments under different statutes, even if the statutes address the same conduct. Courts are tasked with statutory interpretation only up to the point where legislative intent is clear. If the Blockburger test suggests cumulative punishment is allowed, this presumption can be countered by legislative history indicating otherwise.
Carter argues that his convictions for vehicle theft and armed robbery constitute double jeopardy, relying on the case State v. Garcia, where the court ruled that vehicle theft is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery. The Garcia court used deductive reasoning based on prior rulings that categorized theft as a lesser-included offense of robbery, which in turn is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery. The court rejected the state's argument that vehicle theft was not a lesser-included offense due to its specific elements, noting the broad definition of property under Arizona law. While acknowledging a variance in intent requirements between vehicle theft and theft, the Garcia court chose not to resolve this issue, as the state did not argue that these differences created an analytical distinction.
Decisions from coordinate courts are generally viewed as persuasive and binding unless they are based on clearly erroneous principles. Arizona's Supreme Court has established that theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery, and convictions for both theft and vehicle theft from a single incident violate double jeopardy. However, this analysis concludes that vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery or armed robbery regarding double jeopardy.
The distinction arises from the classification of the offenses; the current case involves class-4-felony robbery, which the state argues is a lesser offense compared to class-3-felony theft of a vehicle. The court rejects this argument, emphasizing that an included offense is determined by whether all its elements are present in the charged offense, regardless of comparative penalties. Citing prior case law, the court clarifies that an offense can be considered lesser if it has fewer elements, even if it carries a higher penalty than the greater offense. This principle aligns with the Blockburger test, which focuses solely on the number of elements in each offense.
The state's argument that felony classifications should preclude consideration of double jeopardy in Carter's case is rejected. Factors determining penalty classifications do not necessarily represent elements of an offense for double-jeopardy analysis. The court addresses Garcia's conclusion that vehicle theft is a form of theft, recognizing that if theft is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery, then vehicle theft should also be, but it ultimately finds that Garcia does not sufficiently establish vehicle theft as a lesser-included offense of theft. The Garcia court noted similarities between the theft and vehicle theft statutes but failed to analyze whether vehicle theft's elements are a subset of theft's elements. It cited the unified nature of theft as defined in A.R.S. 13-1802 but did not clarify its implications in light of the 1998 enactment of A.R.S. 13-1814, which specifically addresses vehicle theft. Prior to 1998, theft of a motor vehicle was included in A.R.S. 13-1802, but only as part of the classification for theft offenses. The Tramble case recognized the legislative intent to create a single crime of theft under A.R.S. 13-1802, indicating that the statute's classification does not define distinct crimes but rather varies the degree of theft based on the value and circumstances of the property stolen.
Before 1998, theft of a motor vehicle was classified under A.R.S. 13-1802 as a form of theft, primarily affecting penalty classification. Arizona courts still view A.R.S. 13-1802 as a "single unified offense." However, the enactment of A.R.S. 13-1814 suggests that vehicle theft is treated as a distinct offense, not merely a classification under A.R.S. 13-1802. Legislative intent indicates that separate statutes for theft and vehicle theft were created to reflect different levels of intent required for each offense.
The elements of theft under A.R.S. 13-1802 involve unlawfully controlling another's property with the intent to deprive them of it. In contrast, vehicle theft under A.R.S. 13-1814 requires unlawfully controlling a means of transportation with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of it. This distinction implies that each statute requires proof of different facts. Specifically, vehicle theft necessitates proof that the property is a means of transportation and that the intent to deprive is permanent, which are not required under A.R.S. 13-1802. Therefore, the legislature likely did not intend for both offenses to result in cumulative punishments for the same act, as the distinct elements of each statute indicate separate violations.
Carter’s convictions for both theft and vehicle theft, stemming from the same incidents involving an SUV and a tractor, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause as theft is a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft. The Blockburger test identifies vehicle theft as the "greater" offense due to its additional elements. Consequently, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents convictions for both offenses based on the same transaction.
Carter also contends that theft and vehicle theft are lesser-included offenses of robbery, arguing that only one of these convictions should be upheld concerning the SUV. While it is acknowledged that theft of the SUV under A.R.S. 13-1802 is a lesser-included offense of robbery, the legal reasoning in Garcia—which posits that vehicle theft is equivalent to or a lesser offense of general theft—fails because theft is actually a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft.
The distinction between the greater offenses of robbery and vehicle theft is maintained, as each requires proof of an element not found in the other. Robbery does not necessitate intent to permanently deprive the victim of transportation, whereas vehicle theft does not involve force or the threat of force. Furthermore, the legislative history supports the conclusion that there is no clear indication of contrary legislative intent that would counteract the presumptions established by the same-elements test.
H.B. 2185 establishes a new crime, "theft of means of transportation," differentiating it from ordinary theft by creating a separate penalty framework. The bill classifies most instances of depriving someone of their means of transportation as a class 3 felony, while temporarily taking a vehicle without intent to permanently deprive the owner is classified as a class 5 felony. Previously, vehicle theft penalties ranged from class 6 to class 2 felonies based on the vehicle's value. The legislature intended that a defendant cannot be punished under both A.R.S. 13-1802 (general theft) and A.R.S. 13-1814 (vehicle theft) for the same act, affirming that a defendant can only be convicted under one of these statutes per theft incident.
In contrast, the legislature did not express an intent against cumulative punishment for vehicle theft and robbery, allowing for separate penalties for these offenses arising from the same incident. The review considered whether the theft and vehicle theft statutes could be viewed as in pari materia, suggesting they might be interpreted together. However, the court recognized the specific requirement under A.R.S. 13-1814(A)(1) that the offender must intend to permanently deprive the owner of their means of transportation, suggesting a distinction in their legislative treatment.
Legislative intent regarding culpable mental states in defining crimes can affect the prosecution's burden of proof. In the case of A.R.S. 13-1814(A)(1), the legislature initially included a mens rea requirement of "intent to permanently or temporarily deprive," but this was amended to require "the intent to permanently deprive," indicating a deliberate change. This mental state is essential for determining guilt and cannot be overlooked when assessing whether vehicle theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery. Therefore, the court found that Carter’s convictions for theft and vehicle theft for two vehicles constituted impermissible multiple punishments. Additionally, theft is recognized as a lesser-included offense of robbery; thus, convictions for both offenses arising from the same incident are also impermissible. However, vehicle theft is not a lesser-included offense of robbery, allowing for both convictions without violating double jeopardy protections. Ultimately, Carter's convictions for theft and vehicle theft from single transactions, as well as the theft and robbery convictions, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, necessitating vacating the lesser penalty conviction.
Carter's convictions and sentences for count five (theft of C.L.'s SUV) and count nine (theft of E.A.'s tractor) are vacated due to double-jeopardy violations. The remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. The original offenses were filed under three separate causes in Cochise County, with counts renumbered for jury presentation based on the victims involved. The Double Jeopardy Clause in both the U.S. and Arizona constitutions prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense, a principle upheld in case law. Concurrent sentences for multiple convictions can still constitute multiple punishments if they arise from the same offense. The ruling cites relevant Supreme Court decisions clarifying that separate convictions under different statutory provisions can lead to unauthorized punishment when the legislature did not intend for a single offense to be prosecuted separately. The concept of a "lesser-included offense" is defined, emphasizing that it consists of some elements of a greater crime. The court also references prior cases that discuss the incorrect classification of certain theft offenses, indicating that such determinations may affect retrial decisions.
The court clarified that the issue at hand is distinct from the lesser-included offense issue, as noted in Garcia. The state acknowledges that the memorandum decision in Espinoza lacks precedential value, being only persuasive if issued post-January 1, 2015, when no opinion adequately addresses the court's issue. The state referenced Siddle's suggestion that lesser and greater offenses could be differentiated by felony classification in double-jeopardy analysis, supported by the assertion that a lesser-included offense can have equal or lesser penalties than the greater offense. This principle traces back to Caudillo, as cited in previous cases. The court concluded that Caudillo's ruling was not a restriction on applying the same-elements test but was context-specific. The commentary in Siddle about felony classification was deemed dictum preceding the application of the same-elements test, which did not consider comparative penalties. The court stated that theft is always a lesser-included offense of robbery and determined that theft is a lesser-included offense of vehicle theft, as vehicle theft necessitates proof of all theft elements plus an additional element. Legislative amendments to penalties and classifications were noted, with distinctions between elements and classification factors emphasized. The court referenced prior rulings that indicated classification schemes are relevant only for punishment computation, not for guilt determination, underscoring that the value of stolen property is not a distinguishing element between greater and lesser theft offenses.
Possession of marijuana for sale exceeding four pounds is considered a lesser-included offense of transportation of marijuana for sale weighing two pounds or more, despite differences in weight affecting penalty classifications. The weight does not determine the defendant's guilt or innocence or apply to the same-elements test. The definition of "deprive" under A.R.S. 13-1801(A)(4) encompasses withholding property permanently or for a significant time, with intent to restore only upon compensation or to dispose in a way that makes recovery unlikely. The court clarified that robbery, while carrying a lower felony classification than theft or vehicle theft, can still be evaluated as a greater offense for double jeopardy considerations. In Celaya, the supreme court ruled that theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery based on the shared mens rea of intent to deprive. However, the court found Garcia's reliance on this conclusion insufficient regarding the requirement of intent to permanently deprive under A.R.S. 13-1814(A)(1). The court referenced State v. Yarbrough, noting that robbery inherently involves control over property, yet it does not necessarily imply the greater intent to permanently deprive. The classification of theft may still result in a conviction despite the vehicle being stolen, and if a lesser offense carries a more severe penalty, the court may vacate the conviction for the greater offense. The unlawful use of transportation statute does not require proof of intent to permanently deprive as an element, but serves to differentiate it from theft.
The enactment of Arizona Revised Statute 13-1803 in 1977 removed the requirement of intent to temporarily deprive the owner of a vehicle, which previously prevented joyriding from being classified as a lesser included offense of auto theft. By 1998, the legislature was aware that the intent to deprive, as outlined in 13-1802(A)(1), effectively differentiated unlawful use under 13-1803 from the vehicle theft statute. Consequently, any implications from the Garcia decision suggesting otherwise do not reflect the true legislative intent behind the requirement in 13-1814(A)(1) for an intent to permanently deprive. The legislature is presumed to consider existing laws when enacting new ones to prevent double-jeopardy issues. The document confirms that convictions and sentences for robbery (a class four felony) and vehicle theft (a class three felony) related to C.L. remain valid. Additionally, Carter's conviction for theft of property valued over $25,000, categorized as a class two felony, is upheld due to its higher severity, despite theft being a lesser included offense of vehicle theft for double-jeopardy considerations.
