Court: Wyoming Supreme Court; August 3, 2018; Wyoming; State Supreme Court
Charles Hutton appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting inadequate credit for time served. The court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further proceedings. Hutton presents two key issues: whether he is entitled to credit for participation in both residential and non-residential programs at an adult community corrections facility, and whether he received full credit for confinement related to a second probation revocation.
On January 19, 2008, Hutton was involved in a serious incident resulting in felony property destruction and aggravated burglary charges. He was arrested on January 22, pled guilty to felony property destruction, and was sentenced on September 26, 2008, to three to seven years in prison, suspended in favor of seven years of supervised probation and a one-year adult community corrections program. He was credited with 251 days for the 249 days he spent in confinement prior to sentencing.
Hutton entered the residential phase of the Volunteers of America program on November 21, 2008, completing it on August 26, 2009, followed by the non-residential phase, which he completed on November 25, 2009. He served a total of 370 days in the program, with 279 days in residential confinement.
Hutton faced probation revocations, first arrested on June 3, 2010, and credited with 442 days against his sentence. After a second probation revocation on July 15, 2014, he was credited with 473 days. Following his guilty plea to a new charge of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, Hutton remained incarcerated until his sentencing on March 4, 2015. By that time, his cumulative confinement totaled 773 days, but the court awarded him 658 days of credit.
Hutton was released to an inpatient substance abuse program on May 5, 2015, and completed it by July 22, 2015, with his periods of confinement detailed as 62 days and 78 days.
Hutton was arrested on February 26, 2016, due to a third probation revocation petition, leading to the district court revoking his probation and imposing previously suspended sentences on March 16. This resulted in an additional 20 days of credit, totaling 933 days, although the court initially calculated only 680 days of credit. Hutton did not appeal this decision but filed a motion on June 12, 2017, asserting he was owed an additional 444 days of credit. The State later calculated he should have received 922 days, which the court adopted in a nunc pro tunc order. Subsequently, Hutton filed another motion seeking 175 more days of credit, related primarily to time spent in a nonresidential program and additional confinement. This motion was denied on October 24, 2017, and Hutton appealed.
In his appeal, Hutton argued for an additional 209 days of credit, stemming from his participation in the Volunteers of America program and confinement between July 15, 2014, and July 22, 2015. The State revised its accounting, now asserting Hutton is due 934 days of credit. The legal issue at hand is whether Hutton's sentence is illegal due to improper credit for confinement before sentencing, a question subject to de novo review. The court recognizes that defendants are entitled to credit for time spent in custody during probation revocation proceedings and while in community corrections facilities. In contrast, time spent in inpatient substance abuse treatment typically does not count as credit unless specified by the court as official detention. The precise interpretation of these conditions is critical, as it determines credit eligibility under the law.
The Court included time Hutton spent in an inpatient substance abuse program in its credit calculation based on the State’s argument and the district court's agreement. The calculation accounted for all periods of alleged presentence confinement, even those lacking documentation, except for Hutton's nonresident participation in the Volunteers of America program. Hutton failed to justify the nearly 200 days of additional credit he claimed beyond the Court's calculations, not identifying any further confinement periods or providing supporting records. His claims were vague and inconsistent with the credits already granted.
The Court then examined whether Hutton was entitled to credit for the nonresident portion of the Volunteers of America program. The relevant statute only allows credit for individuals residing in community corrections facilities, specifically those subject to escape charges. The language of the statute applies to those under specific confinement conditions, and Hutton did not convincingly argue why it should extend to probationers residing at home with limited facility contact. Such an interpretation would equate his situation with that of probationers on intensive supervision or house arrest, who are not entitled to credit. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of credit for the nonresident portion but reversed the denial concerning an 11-day shortfall in the total credit owed to Hutton.
The Court affirms the district court's decision to deny Hutton credit for the nonresidential portion of his participation in the Volunteers of America program. However, it reverses the order that denied him a total of 933 days of presentencing confinement credit and remands the case for the entry of this credit. The record lacks clarity regarding Hutton's initial arrest following medical treatment for injuries sustained at the victim's trailer, and while the State provided relevant dates, there are no supporting documents. The Court calculates an additional 32 days of confinement, resulting in a cumulative total of 572 days, excluding any credit for the Volunteers of America program. Including an additional 90 days of confinement raises the total to 662 days. The Court notes that any credits for his inpatient drug treatment program are not substantiated in the record, but if acknowledged, could increase the total to 913 days. The discrepancy of one day in the final tally is attributed to the State double-counting a day. The Court emphasizes that while a defendant may not be entitled to credit in certain situations, district courts have discretion to award it.
