State v. Blueback

Citations: 422 P.3d 385; 291 Or. App. 779Docket: A160091

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; May 16, 2018; Oregon; State Appellate Court

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Defendant appeals a conviction for driving while suspended, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The stop occurred after an officer observed defendant's pickup truck, which had a rear Oregon license plate but lacked a front plate, leading the officer to believe this violated ORS 803.540. The defendant contended that the absence of a front license plate did not constitute a violation of any law. 

The trial court ruled that ORS 803.540 required the display of a front license plate, thereby affirming the officer's probable cause for the stop. Under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, a police officer must have probable cause to initiate a stop. This necessitates both a subjective belief that a violation occurred and an objective reasonableness of that belief. The court reviewed whether the officer's belief was legally justified based on the elements of a traffic infraction.

The relevant statute, ORS 803.540, specifies that vehicles must display registration plates in a manner that adheres to certain guidelines, including the requirement for front and rear plates if two plates are assigned. The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the officer's belief in a violation was justified, thus upholding the denial of the suppression motion.

Defendant contends that not displaying a front license plate does not breach ORS 803.540(1)(b) because that statute only mandates the display of both front and rear plates if there is a requirement for two plates. The defendant argues that neither ORS 803.540(1)(b) nor any other statute imposes such a requirement. Conversely, the state argues that ORS 803.525 mandates the issuance of two registration plates for most vehicles, which includes the defendant's pickup truck. The state asserts that since ORS 803.525 establishes that two plates are required, ORS 803.540(1)(b) obligates the defendant to display both plates.

To resolve the dispute, the court aims to interpret ORS 803.540(1)(b) by analyzing its text, context, and relevant legislative history. The term "require" indicates an externally imposed obligation, suggesting that a violation of ORS 803.540(1)(b) necessitates a specific legal obligation to display two plates. While the defendant's interpretation aligns with this definition, the state contends that ORS 803.525 provides the necessary legal basis for the requirement. It states that the Department of Transportation must issue two plates for registered vehicles, which must remain with the vehicle and be displayed in public view as per ORS 803.540(1)(c). Therefore, the state concludes that the legislative intent behind ORS 803.525 inherently establishes the obligation under ORS 803.540(1)(b) to display two plates. The court agrees with the state's interpretation.

The interpretation of ORS 803.540 suggests that the legislature intended for the statute to be read in a way that gives effect to all its provisions, as supported by ORS 174.010. This statute requires that any interpretation must not insert omitted provisions or disregard existing ones. Since ORS 803.540 does not specify when "two plates are required," it implies that another statute, ORS 803.525, provides the necessary context. Without referencing ORS 803.525, ORS 803.540(1)(b) would lack meaning, as there would be no scenario in which two plates would be mandated. The court agrees with the state's interpretation that when the Department of Transportation issues two plates for a vehicle, it constitutes a requirement for the vehicle to display both plates. Consequently, the officer's observation of the defendant operating a pickup truck without a front license plate met the criteria for a traffic infraction, making the officer's belief reasonable. The trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to suppress evidence was affirmed. Amendments to ORS 811.182 and ORS 803.530 post-incident do not alter this analysis. The defendant's claim under the Fourth Amendment was not elaborated upon and, therefore, was not considered. Lastly, the defendant did not argue that exceptions to the rules under ORS 803.525 or ORS 803.530 were applicable to his situation, and the legislative history of ORS 803.540 was found unhelpful for this case.