Diaz v. Bernini

Citation: 419 P.3d 950Docket: No. 2 CA-SA 2017-0081

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; April 12, 2018; Arizona; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Alexis Diaz challenged the ruling of a respondent judge that reversed the Tucson City Court's order to suppress breath evidence obtained after her DUI arrest. The court found that the arresting officer complied with statutory requirements for obtaining the breath test, leading to the denial of Diaz's request for relief. Following her DUI arrest, Diaz received an admonition explaining Arizona's implied consent laws, which state that operating a vehicle implies consent to testing for alcohol or drugs. Diaz consented to the tests but later filed a motion to suppress the results, arguing her consent was not voluntary under the Fourth Amendment. The state countered that the "search incident to arrest" exception negated the need for voluntary consent and asserted that the admonition was not coercive, referencing the case State v. Valenzuela. The city court granted Diaz's motion, ruling her consent was coerced and questioning the officer's good faith. The state appealed, and the superior court determined that while the consent was involuntary, the good-faith exception applied, reversing the city court's decision. Diaz subsequently filed a petition for special action, which was accepted based on the absence of adequate remedy by appeal and the importance of the issues involved.

The court affirms that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate the suppression of breath-test results obtained without a warrant, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Birchfield v. North Dakota, which permits warrantless breath tests as a search incident to a lawful DUI arrest. Diaz's challenge to the admissibility of her breath test results is dismissed since her arrest was lawful, and the results are admissible irrespective of the voluntariness of her consent. The court emphasizes that questions regarding consent's voluntariness are resolved under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Additionally, Arizona's Constitution, under article II, § 8, does not offer greater protection against warrantless breath tests than the Fourth Amendment. The court notes prior rulings confirming that non-invasive breath tests for DUI arrestees do not require a warrant when incident to a lawful arrest.

The remaining issue pertains to whether the Arizona implied consent statute, A.R.S. 28-1321, necessitates suppression of the test results. Diaz contends that the admonition she received did not accurately reflect the statute, asserting that Arizona law prohibits warrantless breath tests without voluntary consent. The statute states that individuals operating vehicles in Arizona implicitly consent to alcohol or drug testing if arrested for DUI-related offenses, with specific provisions regarding the administration of tests and consequences for refusal. A refusal to submit to a test, unless backed by a search warrant, results in the suspension of the individual's driving privileges.

The officer's admonition to Diaz referenced Arizona law but did not clarify her right to refuse a search. Diaz argued that the phrasing suggested she was compelled to submit to testing, rendering the admonition coercive. She cited A.R.S. 28-1321 and A.R.S. 28-1388, asserting that Arizona law prohibits warrantless breath tests without voluntary consent. While A.R.S. 28-1321 requires an "express agreement" for testing, it does not define "voluntary consent" as a prerequisite for administering a breath test. Arizona courts interpret the statutes as granting drivers the power to refuse testing, but not a legal right to do so, as established in Campbell v. Superior Court (1971). If a driver refuses, they face statutory penalties, a point acknowledged by the supreme court in Valenzuela. The court emphasized that any agreement to testing must be voluntary; historical case law indicates a refusal must be intelligent and knowing. Definitions from legal dictionaries support that "agree" and "consent" imply voluntary action. The conclusion is that the required agreement under A.R.S. 28-1321 must be voluntary; otherwise, any obtained sample would be unlawful. However, the Valenzuela ruling clarified that officers must inform arrestees about legal requirements and consequences for refusal but can seek voluntary consent without initially advising of penalties if the person agrees to the test. If refusal occurs, the officer must explain the consequences and ask for consent again.

The officer's conduct in obtaining a breath test from Diaz was deemed to have secured a voluntary agreement. He did not inform her that submission was mandatory but instead conveyed the consequences of refusal in accordance with the applicable statutes, A.R.S. 28-1321 and A.R.S. 28-1388. The court emphasized that a violator's agreement or refusal occurs within a framework where state law presumes consent to testing, subject to administrative penalties for refusal. Consequently, the officer's accurate advisement of this consent could not be construed as coercive. Although Diaz suggested that the officer's procedure was flawed, the court clarified that the Valenzuela case did not impose an obligation for the officer to first request and be denied consent before providing the consequences of refusal. The procedure followed by the officer was consistent with legal standards, as he accurately informed Diaz of her rights and the implications of her decision. The court concluded that Diaz's agreement to the test was voluntary, making the results admissible at trial, and found that the city court had erred in its contrary conclusion. Additionally, the state argued that the precedent established in Hays regarding voluntary refusal is outdated, citing a statutory amendment and the Carrillo decision, which focused on the manifestation of agreement rather than the necessity of voluntary consent. Ultimately, the court denied relief, affirming that Diaz's consent was valid under the law.

The document addresses the standard for assessing voluntariness in the context of a statute relating to testing for blood or breath. It clarifies that the statutory standard is not more stringent than Fourth Amendment principles, referencing the supreme court's conclusions in Valenzuela. The terminology used to describe a violator's choice regarding testing is defined as "agreeing" or "refusing to agree," to prevent confusion with the separate legal assumption of consent to testing and the constitutional right to refuse consent to searches. The discussion acknowledges the semantic overlap between "agree" and "consent." It notes that the affidavit in question was created before the Valenzuela opinion and was subsequently replaced, thus the officer's failure to follow prior suggestions is not unexpected. Furthermore, the document does not evaluate whether the affidavit used to obtain a blood draw infringes on an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights, recognizing that certain statements under state law may be considered coercive in this context. The city court's ruling indicates that the officer was in uniform but did not display his weapon, and it found no elements of coercion present during the 25 minutes that Diaz was detained before she consented to the test.