Jewel C. v. Dep't of Child Safety

Citation: 418 P.3d 1120Docket: No. 2 CA-JV 2017-0083

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; February 5, 2018; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Jewel C. appeals a juvenile court order that transferred her great-grandchildren's custody from her to their psychological paternal grandmother, Kay. She argues that the court abused its discretion by not adhering to the placement preferences in A.R.S. 8-514(B) and claims the court made findings lacking credible support. The Department of Child Safety (DCS) counters that Jewel lacks jurisdiction as she is not an aggrieved party and the order is not final and appealable. Jurisdiction in juvenile matters is governed by A.R.S. 8-235, which requires that a party must be aggrieved and the order must be final. An aggrieved party is one whose rights are denied or who faces a substantial burden due to the judgment. The evaluation of jurisdiction considers the practical effect of the order on the party's rights. A final order is one that resolves an issue and conclusively defines a party's rights or duties in dependency proceedings. Jewel claims her right to appeal stems from her granted intervention in the case, which Arizona law allows for relatives, provided it meets Rule 24, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Although intervention allows relatives to participate, it does not guarantee custody. Jewel also cites her statutory interest in placement as a relative under A.R.S. 8-514(B)(2) and (3), which prioritizes kinship care. However, prior case law indicates that placement preferences are not mandatory and primarily aim to protect children, not the interests of potential caregivers. The statute does not imply that relatives are beneficiaries of the kinship foster care program.

Under A.R.S. 8-517, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) can withdraw a child from a foster home if it determines such action is necessary for the child's welfare, including placements with relatives under A.R.S. 8-514.02. Great-grandparents or other third parties can petition for placement under A.R.S. 25-409, but they do not have an inherent right to placement under A.R.S. 8-514. Jewel, as a great-grandparent, lacks standing to appeal the placement change because she has no granted third-party rights under A.R.S. 25-409. Additionally, a parent whose rights have been severed cannot appeal a subsequent placement order. 

The court clarified that while orders declaring a child dependent are appealable, mere changes in foster placement do not constitute final appealable orders unless they affect parental rights significantly. Specifically, changes that impact a parent's ability to maintain contact with their child are appealable, as seen in past cases. For third parties without established rights, placement orders do not resolve dependency issues and can be modified, thus remaining non-final. The court concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal brought by Jewel and dismissed it accordingly.

Intervention of right is uncommon in this context, as the interests of the intervening party typically do not satisfy the required standard. However, a potential placement might have grounds for seeking special action relief if a juvenile court fails to consider statutory preferences. Concerns were raised about potential forum shopping if third parties were directed to seek placements under A.R.S. 25-409; yet, proceedings initiated during dependency cases would likely consolidate with juvenile proceedings per A.R.S. 8-202. The juvenile court holds exclusive jurisdiction over custody decisions for juveniles under its wardship. Appeals from children regarding such orders may be handled differently, especially since children involved could understand their rights and responsibilities, thus qualifying as aggrieved parties in adoption cases. Nonetheless, since the children in this instance did not file separate appeals, this issue remains unaddressed.