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Campbell v. Wood
Citations: 18 F.3d 662; 1994 WL 33393Docket: 89-35210
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 8, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Charles Rodman Campbell was convicted in 1982 of three counts of aggravated first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Washington Supreme Court upheld his conviction and sentence. Following the issuance of a death warrant for his execution on March 29, 1985, the execution was stayed to allow Campbell to petition the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on April 29, 1985. A second death warrant was issued for July 25, 1985. Campbell's request for a stay was treated as a personal restraint petition, which was denied on July 18, 1985. Subsequently, Campbell filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court, which initially stayed his execution. He presented 61 claims, 40 of which were deemed unexhausted in state court. After amending his petition to 21 exhausted claims, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the habeas petition on February 12, 1986. This decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on October 6, 1987, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1988. A stay of execution was dissolved on January 25, 1989. A third death warrant was issued for March 30, 1989, but after appealing the scheduling, Campbell filed a second habeas corpus petition, which was denied by the district court on March 28, 1989. Following this, he was granted a stay of execution pending appeal on March 30, 1989. Campbell filed a personal restraint petition with the Washington Supreme Court during his pending appeal, which was denied on March 21, 1991, with a rehearing also denied on May 15, 1991. On August 7, 1991, the court allowed him to submit a third habeas petition, indicating that any appeal from the district court's decision on this petition would be consolidated with his second appeal. Campbell submitted his third habeas corpus petition on September 18, 1991, but the district court dismissed it as successive and an abuse of the writ on March 9, 1992. While this petition was pending, the Washington Attorney General sought a mandamus from the U.S. Supreme Court on October 25, 1991, which was denied. The Supreme Court noted no reasonable explanation for the delay in resolving Campbell's second appeal. Consequently, the appeals were not consolidated. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Campbell's third petition on December 24, 1992. On April 1, 1992, the panel issued its opinion on Campbell's second petition, and rehearing en banc was granted on October 8, 1992. The Ninth Circuit ordered a limited remand on May 1, 1993, for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether hanging as a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment. Following three days of testimony, the district court issued findings on June 1, 1993. Campbell attempted to appeal these findings but was informed on July 23, 1993, that such an appeal was erroneous. In a case background, Campbell had previously assaulted Renae Wicklund in 1974, resulting in a conviction and prison sentence. In 1982, Wicklund, her daughter Shannah, and neighbor Barbara Hendrickson were found murdered in Wicklund's home, with evidence indicating brutal assaults on both Wicklund and her daughter. Wicklund had been beaten, strangled, and sexually assaulted post-mortem, while Shannah had also been strangled and suffered severe neck injuries. Hendrickson was found with a seven-inch cut to her throat, resulting in death from massive hemorrhage. Campbell was charged with three counts of aggravated first-degree murder, with the Washington Supreme Court affirming the convictions due to a strong state case. Witnesses identified Campbell near the crime scene and described a vehicle matching his car parked nearby. Testimonies indicated Campbell had been drinking on the morning of the murders and that a butcher knife was missing from a witness's home. Items seized from Campbell included earrings and a glass with his fingerprint, and divers recovered jewelry linked to the victims. The jury convicted Campbell on November 26, 1982, identifying four aggravating factors related to the murders, including Campbell’s prison status and the victims’ previous testimonies against him. The jury found no mitigating circumstances for leniency, leading to a death sentence. Campbell raised multiple legal questions, including the violation of his rights due to absence at jury empanelment, ineffective assistance of counsel, the constitutionality of the death penalty statute, jury instruction limitations, and issues surrounding his execution. The court held that Campbell validly waived his right to be present during jury empanelment. Due to extensive local publicity surrounding Campbell's charges, the state trial court decided to select the jury at the Spokane County Courthouse, 275 miles from Snohomish County, and transport the jury to Snohomish for the trial. On October 21, 1982, Campbell's attorney requested that Campbell be allowed to waive his presence at the jury selection, citing Campbell's "legitimate fears" regarding his treatment in Spokane and his desire to focus on preparing for the trial. The prosecutor objected, suggesting that Campbell's waiver was a tactic to create an appeal issue. The judge confirmed Campbell's understanding of his constitutional right to be present and warned him about the implications of his absence, including limited contact with his attorneys. Campbell expressed confidence in his lawyers and emphasized the inconvenience of traveling to Spokane, stating that he wished to remain in Snohomish to prepare for the trial. The judge further deliberated on the request, noting that Campbell's waiver would be irrevocable due to the logistics of transport and security concerns. Ultimately, the court found "good cause" to grant Campbell's request, allowing him to prioritize his trial preparation over attending jury selection. Campbell formally executed a written waiver acknowledging his right to be present during jury selection and understanding the implications of his decision. He also orally agreed in court to waive any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to this waiver, which the judge accepted despite the prosecution's preference for a written agreement. A defendant charged with a felony has a constitutional right to be present at all trial stages, including jury selection, stemming from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This right can be waived if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Although the right to presence is considered fundamental, defendants may waive other fundamental rights, such as the right to silence and the right to counsel. In capital cases, Campbell argues that the right to presence is non-waivable, citing two 19th-century Supreme Court cases. However, precedent indicates that the ability to waive this right depends on the defendant's circumstances, distinguishing between custodial and noncustodial defendants. Specifically, the courts have recognized that a defendant in custody or facing capital charges cannot waive this right due to their lack of control over their presence. Conversely, a defendant who is neither in custody nor charged with a capital offense may waive the right by choosing to be absent voluntarily. This understanding was further developed in Snyder v. Massachusetts, which affirmed that the right to presence can be lost through consent or misconduct. In Illinois v. Allen, the Court explicitly rejected earlier dicta suggesting that trials could not proceed in a defendant's absence, affirming instead that such a right could be forfeited by the defendant's actions. Campbell contends that Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1972), establishes that he could not waive his right to be present during jury selection. In Bustamante, the court reversed a decision where a defendant's attorney waived the client’s presence while a tape was replayed, asserting that the defendant, who was in custody for a capital offense, could not waive this right due to his lack of awareness about the replay until nearly a year later. The court found no evidence of an attempted waiver. However, the dicta in Bustamante is not persuasive. The court argues that if it believed the right could not be waived, it would not have analyzed whether a waiver occurred. Recent rulings support the idea that a defendant's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent absence from trial constitutes a waiver of confrontation rights, as established in Brewer v. Raines, 670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982). There is no logical basis for limiting a defendant's ability to waive their right to presence in noncapital cases. The court finds a rational decision to waive such a right through an affirmative petition holds the same weight as a waiver resulting from disruptive behavior. The state trial judge noted that denying Campbell's request could lead to disruptive behavior. A waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458). The determination of a knowing and voluntary waiver involves questions of law and fact reviewed de novo. The court stresses the importance of presuming against the loss of the constitutional right to be present at critical trial stages but concludes that Campbell knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right during jury empaneling. The decision to remain in Snohomish County during jury selection originated with Campbell, and neither his attorneys nor the state prosecutor sought to deny his presence. Despite his attorney's opposition, Campbell discussed and signed a written waiver in open court after being fully informed of the implications of his absence. There is no indication that Campbell was incompetent to execute the waiver, and the waiver's terms are clear. Campbell's waiver of his right to be present during jury empanelling is supported by an express agreement to prioritize personal matters in Snohomish County over his constitutional rights. This waiver, both written and oral, negates his constitutional claim since fundamental rights do not exempt individuals from the consequences of their voluntary decisions. Campbell argues ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his attorneys allowed him to waive his right to be present. However, the prosecutor secured a waiver of any claim regarding counsel's effectiveness in this matter. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, Campbell must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced his defense, using the "reasonably effective assistance" standard. A highly deferential review of counsel's performance is required, avoiding hindsight bias. The court found no evidence of ineffective assistance, noting that trial attorneys Mark Mestel and Anthony Savage testified that Campbell had made an informed choice not to attend jury selection. Mestel, aware of Campbell's strong preference, advised against the waiver but respected Campbell's decision to maintain a professional relationship. Thus, the court concluded that Campbell did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in waiving his right to presence at jury empanelling. The district court found that counsel Mestel's representation of Campbell was effective, driven by a desire to maintain a positive working relationship. Mestel's choices did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and arguing against Campbell's waiver of presence could have jeopardized their relationship further. Campbell contends that Washington's death penalty statute, Wash.Rev.Code 10.95, is unconstitutional for three reasons: it mandates a death sentence formula, lacks reliable standards for sentencing, and improperly restricted jury consideration of mitigating factors. He specifically argues that the statute prevents individualized sentencing by imposing a mandatory death sentence if the jury finds insufficient mitigating circumstances. However, the statute allows the consideration of any relevant factors and provides a non-exclusive list of mitigating circumstances. The requirement for individualized capital sentencing is constitutionally mandated, as established in Woodson v. North Carolina and other cases. Nevertheless, Campbell's assertion that the statute creates a mandatory death penalty formula is unfounded, as the Supreme Court has ruled that allowing juries to consider all relevant mitigating evidence satisfies the individualized sentencing requirement. Campbell's 1989 brief argues that the Washington death penalty statute, Wash.Rev.Code 10.95, is unconstitutional, citing Adamson v. Ricketts, which found similar language unconstitutional for creating a presumption of death and constraining judicial discretion. However, this was overturned by Walton v. Arizona, which upheld that a statute allowing consideration of mitigating factors meets constitutional standards. The court previously ruled that Wash.Rev.Code 10.95 presumes leniency and does not limit sentencing discretion, allowing for individualized sentencing. Campbell contends the statute lacks a reliable standard for death penalty imposition, but the district court deemed this claim barred as it was raised in a prior habeas corpus petition. The relevant legal framework indicates that a claim may be dismissed if it was previously adjudicated on the merits and lacks new grounds for relief. Campbell's current argument, while rephrased, does not constitute a new legal basis, as it still challenges the jury's discretion under the same statute. Additionally, Campbell references State v. Rupe, asserting it represents a change in law warranting a reevaluation of his claim. The court, however, finds no intervening change, as Rupe II rejected claims of jury confusion regarding the statute, and Campbell fails to substantiate how the "ends of justice" would be served by revisiting his constitutional challenge. Campbell contends that jury instructions unconstitutionally restricted the factors the jury could consider in mitigation, specifically arguing that Wash.Rev.Code 10.95.070 limits considerations of mental disturbance to instances deemed "extreme" and impairment due to mental disease or defect to cases where it is "substantial." However, the district court determined that these claims were not new legal grounds, as Campbell had previously challenged the mitigating-factors instruction and could not narrow his argument to specific terms to create a new claim. Additionally, Campbell asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel and meaningful access to the courts during his state and federal habeas proceedings, claiming his attorneys lacked sufficient time for preparation. The district court found that counsel's performance met the standard set in Strickland v. Washington and that Campbell had meaningful access to the courts. Recent Supreme Court rulings, specifically Pennsylvania v. Finley and Murray v. Giarratano, clarify that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state habeas proceedings, reaffirming that meaningful access does not necessitate appointed counsel. Since these decisions occurred after Campbell's conviction became final in 1985, the applicability of Teague v. Lane is considered, which prohibits retroactive application of new constitutional rules established after direct review is complete. The Court in Finley emphasized that the right to counsel does not extend to post-conviction challenges, confirming that the right to appointed counsel is limited to the first appeal of right, without extending to discretionary appeals or collateral attacks on final convictions. The Court's decision in Finley is firmly rooted in its prior rulings, particularly Ross v. Moffitt, which it cited as a basis for dismissing constitutional claims related to the right to counsel. Finley's rule is a straightforward application of precedent, applicable retroactively. The Giarratano case reaffirmed Finley, clarifying that its principles apply equally to both capital and noncapital cases, and dismissed arguments regarding the right to meaningful access to courts, as articulated in Bounds v. Smith. The Court reasoned that Giarratano merely clarified existing law and did not create a new constitutional rule. Campbell's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is rejected based on Finley and Giarratano, establishing that he had no right to counsel in his post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, he could not claim deprivation of effective assistance. Furthermore, Giarratano addressed Campbell's assertion that meaningful access required the appointment of counsel, which was also dismissed. Campbell's second argument focused on the adequacy of time provided to counsel for preparing post-conviction petitions. After his initial state personal restraint petition was filed on July 11, 1985, the Washington Supreme Court's prompt denial on July 18, 1985, left little time before his execution. Although his attorneys filed a federal habeas petition, it was dismissed due to unexhausted claims, leading to an amended petition that only included exhausted claims. Campbell did not pursue a concurrent state petition for his unexhausted claims until late 1988, after his federal petition was denied and the appellate review concluded in 1987. Campbell contends that the Washington Supreme Court did not provide his counsel sufficient time for preparation during his state collateral review efforts. However, the court imposed a strict filing deadline only for his second personal restraint petition. In August 1988, nearly a year after the district court denied habeas relief, Campbell requested the appointment of counsel to assist with unexhausted claims in a second petition. The court appointed counsel and required a memorandum demonstrating the merit of those claims within five working days. Campbell argues this deadline hindered his access to the courts. However, the Supreme Court established that while indigent defendants must have a fair opportunity to present claims, Campbell's counsel was given a reasonable chance to represent him, especially since the claims were previously identified by earlier counsel in the first federal habeas petition. Campbell had three years to prepare, as the appellate review concluded in 1987, and was aware he could raise these claims in state court. Therefore, the five-day limit did not deny him meaningful access. Additionally, Campbell asserts that the district court failed to provide an adequate evidentiary hearing for his claims in the second petition and erred in denying a stay. These assertions are unfounded. An evidentiary hearing is mandated only when a petitioner's claims, if substantiated, could lead to relief. Such hearings are unnecessary for conclusory claims or those resolvable via the state court record. Campbell was granted an evidentiary hearing by the district court. On March 23, 1989, the Washington Supreme Court denied Campbell's personal restraint petition and motion for a stay of execution. Following this, on March 24, the federal district court convened a status conference regarding Campbell's plans to file for a stay and a habeas corpus petition, with the execution set for March 30. Campbell's counsel indicated they would file the necessary documents on March 27, and the court requested Campbell's presence for an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing took place on March 27, where testimony was provided by Campbell's state trial and appellate counsel, alongside three other witnesses. Campbell contended that the hearing was insufficient; however, the court found that his attorneys adequately established the record on issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court did not impose restrictions on presenting evidence, and expedited procedures were deemed permissible. The district court was noted for its prompt handling of the case, issuing a decision shortly after the hearing. It was determined that Campbell was not prejudiced by the expedited schedule, as he had waived his right to be present during jury empaneling, negating further evidence on his absence's impact on the trial. Campbell also claimed he lacked the opportunity to present evidence regarding judicial hanging. However, the record indicated that the court did not deny him this opportunity. The court's decision to grant a limited remand for further hearings ensured a comprehensive factual record. Campbell's claim that the district court erred in denying his stay of execution was addressed, affirming that after such a denial with a certificate of probable cause, the petitioner must be allowed to pursue the merits of the appeal. To facilitate this, an indefinite stay of execution was granted pending the appeal. Additionally, Campbell challenged the constitutionality of hanging under the Washington death penalty statute, which allows for execution by hanging or, at the defendant's choice, lethal injection. Campbell presents three legal questions regarding judicial hanging under Washington statute: (1) whether hanging constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; (2) whether the requirement for hanging unless the condemned opts for lethal injection is also cruel and unusual; and (3) whether this requirement infringes on Campbell's First Amendment rights by compelling him to participate in his execution to avoid hanging. The State contends that these claims are non-justiciable, suggesting that Campbell's ability to choose lethal injection renders the controversy moot. However, the court rejects this argument, emphasizing that justiciable controversies must be definite and substantial, rather than hypothetical or moot. The court argues that the State's reasoning is flawed, as mootness arises from an act rather than the anticipation of a potential act. Additionally, the court highlights precedents where unconstitutional conditions were reviewed despite the existence of a choice, establishing that Campbell's refusal to choose lethal injection keeps the dispute active. Thus, the case involves a legitimate conflict between opposing parties based on concrete circumstances. Campbell's claims regarding execution by hanging are considered justiciable, asserting that this method violates the Eighth Amendment. The case has been remanded to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim, with factual findings subject to being overturned only if clearly erroneous. Mixed questions of fact and law will be reviewed de novo, as will questions of law. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," a principle rooted in historical reactions against barbaric punishments. It has been historically interpreted to forbid torturous punishments, such as disembowelment and burning at the stake, but the Supreme Court has seldom addressed the constitutionality of specific execution methods. The last direct discussion of judicial hanging by the Court was in 1878, distinguishing it from more torturous punishments. Recent jurisprudence has focused on whether punishments align with historical definitions of cruelty and evolving societal standards. While execution by hanging was deemed acceptable at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, its current constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment remains to be determined through the evidentiary hearing. Determining whether hanging aligns with contemporary standards of decency involves examining whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. No legal precedents have established that hanging is inherently cruel or unusual. The analysis relies on objective factors, including statutes enacted by legislatures, which are presumed constitutionally valid. It is not required for legislatures to select the least severe punishment, provided the method is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate. Campbell argues that the decline in states using hanging in favor of lethal injection indicates its unconstitutionality, referencing cases like Coker and Enmund. However, these cases pertain to the proportionality of the death penalty related to specific crimes rather than the execution method itself. The distinction is crucial; proportionality involves legislative and jury actions reflecting societal standards, while methodology focuses on the pain associated with the execution method. The mere number of states employing hanging does not provide insight into the actual pain involved. The document asserts that hanging does not equate to cruel and unusual punishment simply due to its lethal outcome or potential pain. Cruelty is characterized by torture or prolonged suffering, and the constitutional definition of cruelty involves inhumanity intrinsic to the punishment method, rather than the unavoidable suffering associated with any humane method of execution. Campbell is entitled to an execution free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, as established in Gregg v. Georgia. He does not contest the proportionality of the death penalty for his crimes, so the focus is on the execution method's pain levels. The court concludes that death by hanging does not involve such infliction of pain. Judicial hanging in Washington follows a detailed protocol derived from military execution procedures. The rope must be between three-quarters and one-and-one-quarter inches in diameter, boiled to reduce elasticity, and lubricated for smooth use. The "long-drop" technique is employed, with drop distance tailored to the condemned's weight to optimize forces for rapid unconsciousness and death. Expert testimony from pathologists addressed the mechanisms by which death occurs during judicial hanging, noting various factors such as drop length, rope elasticity, and knot placement. They identified mechanisms leading to death, including occlusion of carotid arteries and spinal cord trauma, among others, highlighting that these mechanisms often occur together rather than following a single pathway. For instance, occlusion of the carotid arteries can cause unconsciousness within six to ten seconds, and severe spinal cord trauma can result in immediate loss of consciousness. Overall, the evidence suggests that the execution method leads to prompt unconsciousness and death without unnecessary pain. Occlusion of the airway can allow consciousness to persist for over a minute, with Dr. Deryk Ryk James estimating that asphyxiation-induced unconsciousness occurs within one to two minutes. While predicting the exact mechanism of unconsciousness and death during hanging is challenging, certain methods can enhance the likelihood of rapid unconsciousness and a painless death, primarily through the drop length. Historical practices of judicial hanging evolved from no-drop methods in the eleventh century to various drop lengths, with the long-drop method, developed by the Irish, being deemed more humane in the 1880s after studies comparing short and long drops. Critical to humane execution is the appropriate drop length relative to the weight of the condemned; a drop too short may lead to asphyxiation, while a drop too long may cause decapitation. Ideal drop lengths are likely to result in death through a combination of vascular, spinal, and nervous mechanisms, ensuring quick unconsciousness and rapid death. The Washington Field Instruction outlines specific drop lengths based on weight for optimal outcomes. Additionally, the choice and treatment of the rope are vital; a thicker rope reduces skin breakage risk, while reducing elasticity ensures kinetic energy effectively impacts the neck structures. Treatments that minimize surface friction allow the rope to tighten effectively, with witnesses emphasizing the importance of even pressure around the neck for rapid unconsciousness. Lastly, the positioning of the knot below the left ear is specified in the Washington protocol to facilitate effective energy transfer to the spinal structures and occlusion of critical arteries. Placing the knot below the chin during a hanging can transfer energy to spinal structures. Washington executed Westley Allan Dodd on January 5, 1993, following established procedures. Dr. William Brady, who witnessed the execution, observed minimal physical activity from Dodd after the drop, noting only slight efforts to breathe. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Reay determined Dodd's cause of death as massive hemorrhaging at the base of the brain and spinal shock, concluding he became unconscious seconds after the drop. Campbell contested several evidentiary rulings by the district court, which were reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court excluded evidence intended to demonstrate past failures in judicial hangings, including photographs of a decapitation and accounts of asphyxiation. The exclusion was based on Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 401 regarding relevance and Rule 403 concerning the potential for prejudice or confusion. The court determined that the evidence presented could not be reliably compared to Washington's specific hanging protocol. Campbell argued that some excluded evidence could be assessed; however, the court's decisions were upheld as appropriate in the context of evaluating whether Washington's method constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The district court was not obligated to consider evidence of hangings that had marginal relevance to the Washington protocol. Even if the evidence had been admitted, the court believed its findings would remain unchanged. Campbell contended that the burden of proof was excessively high due to a lack of evidence meeting the court's criteria, arguing he was left with only the Dodd execution to prove that hanging is excessively painful. The court rejected this claim, stating that the State's failure to conduct autopsies does not equate to evidence spoliation, as the State was not on notice regarding the relevance of those records. Consequently, Campbell could not shift the burden of proof to the state officials. Moreover, Campbell was able to present evidence that challenged the state's assertion that death by asphyxiation or decapitation is unlikely under the Washington protocol, placing both him and the state on equal footing regarding proof of the method's effectiveness. Campbell also argued that the district court erred by admitting Dr. Reay's testimony on the "carotid sleeper hold," claiming it was irrelevant. However, the court allowed the testimony to demonstrate how long a subject remains conscious when the carotid arteries are occluded, and the court did not find this to be an abuse of discretion. Additionally, Campbell claimed the court erred by excluding evidence related to lethal injection. The court determined that the evidentiary hearing was specifically limited to whether hanging constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, rendering the merits of lethal injection irrelevant to that inquiry. Ultimately, the district court concluded that judicial hanging, as per the Washington protocol, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The court concluded that judicial hanging results in rapid unconsciousness and death, with death occurring shortly after unconsciousness without lingering effects, mutilation, or unnecessary pain. The court rejected Campbell's assertion that judicial hanging poses an unacceptable risk of asphyxiation or decapitation, finding no substantial evidence to support a significant risk of either outcome. The court emphasized that Campbell is not entitled to a painless execution but only to one that is free from intentional cruelty, affirming that a slight risk of accidents does not violate constitutional standards. Additionally, Campbell's claims regarding violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights due to a statutory provision allowing him to choose lethal injection over hanging were also dismissed. The court ruled that there is no infringement on Campbell's religious beliefs as he is not compelled to select a method of execution and may remain silent regarding the choice. Furthermore, the court determined that the existence of the lethal injection option does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, as Campbell has not claimed that lethal injection is unconstitutional nor has he opted for it. The document addresses the legality and procedural aspects of judicial hanging as a method of execution in Washington State, specifically regarding the qualifications of personnel to perform such executions. It states that the existence of an option for condemned prisoners to choose lethal injection is not inhumane, as the choice may provide relief to some prisoners while imposing emotional costs on others. Campbell argues that no qualified personnel exist to carry out judicial hangings, referencing a prior case that confirmed the lack of trained hangers in Washington and the U.S. However, the adoption of the Field Instruction negates the need for a specifically trained individual, as it permits the Superintendent to appoint personnel to implement the execution process without requiring their participation. The court found Campbell's claim moot and affirmed the district court's denial of his second habeas corpus petition. The latter part discusses Campbell's request to waive his presence during jury selection due to stress and concerns about his treatment in Spokane. The court is hesitant to grant this waiver, noting the importance of the jury selection stage in a death penalty case, and expresses skepticism about the request, suggesting it may be a tactic by the defendant. The prosecutor also questions the propriety of the waiver in writing, emphasizing the unusual nature of Campbell's request at this critical juncture. Change is generally resisted, and any request that deviates from standard procedure raises concerns about appellate review and potential reversibility, particularly regarding expense and manpower. The uniqueness of the situation does not inherently warrant a denial. The court plans to engage with Mr. Campbell to verify his understanding of the implications of his choices, possibly requiring a written waiver. The court will reflect on the matter overnight and may allow for discussion the following day to explore any constitutional issues that could arise from the waiver. During questioning, Mr. Campbell acknowledges his preference to remain in Snohomish County during jury selection in Spokane County and confirms his awareness of his right to be present. The court reiterates that typically, defendants must be present unless they voluntarily waive that right. Mr. Campbell understands that by not attending, he forfeits any influence in the jury selection process, including the ability to suggest questions or evaluate jurors. Despite recognizing the significant implications of his decision, he expresses his willingness to waive his right to be present during jury selection. The court seeks input from Mr. Roche about any additional questions for Mr. Campbell but notes the need for further contemplation on the matter. Mr. Campbell wishes to express his reasons for his decision, indicating confidence in the process. Mr. Campbell expresses confidence in his attorneys, Mr. Mestel and Mr. Savage, but feels that traveling to Spokane for jury selection would be inconvenient and hinder his ability to prepare for the trial. He emphasizes the impact of being away from his current work and the limited contact he would have with his attorneys during the jury selection process. The court acknowledges Campbell's concerns, explaining that if he waives his right to be present during jury selection, he might not be able to change his mind later due to practical difficulties in arranging his presence. Campbell confirms his willingness to waive this right, understanding the irrevocable nature of his decision. The court also addresses a logistical issue raised by Mr. Roche regarding how the trial will proceed with an absent defendant, indicating that standard practices will be followed, including reading a list of absent witnesses. Jurors must be inquired whether they know the defendant, Mr. Campbell, by name or face. It is noted that, while unlikely, a juror could recognize him by face but not by name. Photographs of Mr. Campbell are available, and it is argued that due to his long absence from Spokane, personal acquaintance is improbable. The court considers asking jurors to view a photograph to mitigate this risk. The court acknowledges the challenges of ensuring an unbiased jury, particularly concerning potential changes in the defendant's appearance over time. Mr. Campbell has requested to waive his right to be present during jury selection, citing more pressing trial preparation needs and the complexities involved in his transport and security. The court agrees to this waiver, recognizing Mr. Campbell's justification. However, concerns arise regarding potential claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as Court Rule 3.4 mandates the defendant's presence during jury impaneling, especially in a capital case. The prosecution suggests that Mr. Campbell should explicitly waive any future objections regarding counsel's competence related to this waiver, anticipating that new attorneys may challenge the previous representation's effectiveness. Mr. Campbell confirms his understanding and agrees to waive any claims of incompetency regarding this specific waiver, limited to the jury selection process. The court deems a formal written waiver unnecessary. Circuit Judge Reinhardt, joined by Circuit Judges Browning, Tang, and D.W. Nelson, expresses both concurrence and dissent regarding the constitutionality of hanging as a method of execution. The judges argue that contemporary standards of decency have evolved significantly since the late 19th century, when even supporters of capital punishment recognized hanging as a "barbarous" practice. They note that most states have abandoned hanging in favor of more humane alternatives like lethal injection, yet the majority opinion erroneously contends that hanging does not constitute "unnecessary pain" under the Eighth Amendment. Reinhardt criticizes the majority for narrowing the interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, asserting that barbaric punishments should be prohibited regardless of the pain they cause. He emphasizes that the continued use of hanging is incompatible with modern societal values and inflicts unnecessary physical and emotional suffering on condemned individuals. The dissent argues that this view aligns with both evolving standards of decency and the historical context of the Eighth Amendment, rejecting the majority's conclusion that hanging remains constitutional in the 1990s. The Supreme Court has largely applied both elements of the cruel and unusual punishment standard in recent cases, with one notable exception. The current majority, however, refrains from applying this established test, effectively removing judicial constraints on extreme punishments central to the Eighth Amendment. The majority's narrow focus on whether methods of punishment inflict unnecessary pain overlooks judicial precedents and the foundational principles of the Eighth Amendment, allowing even the most barbaric forms of punishment, as long as they do not cause excessive pain. The majority also supports the district court's conclusion that hanging does not involve unnecessary pain, despite a lack of evidence to substantiate this claim. The risks associated with hanging inherently include potential for severe pain, and evidence was presented that lethal injection poses significantly less risk. However, the district court excluded this comparative evidence, thus failing to properly assess whether the risks of hanging are necessary. Furthermore, the majority incorrectly asserts that the district court did not err in finding that Washington's hanging protocol minimizes pain and risk of decapitation. The majority's analysis rests on selective testimony that downplays significant risks. Evidence indicates that the Washington protocol is largely derived from an outdated military manual and lacks contemporary medical input, rendering it similar to past procedures that have resulted in severe pain and mutilation. The district court's findings are therefore deemed clearly erroneous based on the comprehensive expert testimony presented. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision is criticized for endorsing a method of punishment deemed cruel and unusual, which contradicts the Eighth Amendment's intent to prohibit savage punishments. This amendment aims to ensure that state-imposed penalties align with civilized societal standards. Historically, the Eighth Amendment was established to eliminate extreme punishments such as beheading and burning alive. Its interpretation has evolved, recognizing that its protections are not static but should reflect contemporary societal values, as emphasized in the Supreme Court's rulings. The Court has expanded the scope of the Eighth Amendment beyond just barbarous punishments to include proportionality of penalties and humane conditions of confinement. Despite these adaptations, the core purpose remains: to determine if a punishment is uncivilized and barbaric, with any punishment causing unnecessary pain violating the Eighth Amendment. Punishments deemed incompatible with the evolving standards of decency in a developing society or those that involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violate the Eighth Amendment, as established in *Hudson v. McMillian* and *Estelle v. Gamble*. Both cases highlight the importance of assessing whether a punishment aligns with contemporary societal values. The Supreme Court's two-part analysis, while somewhat artificial, serves as a framework for evaluating Eighth Amendment cases, focusing first on evolving standards of decency and then on the infliction of unnecessary pain, although courts may address either aspect first. In assessing whether a punishment is inconsistent with these standards, courts consider objective indicators of public sentiment, primarily through the statutes enacted by elected representatives. A significant "degree of national consensus" against a punishment, evidenced by legislative trends, can render it unconstitutional. While the threshold for consensus is not explicitly defined, when a substantial number of state legislatures reject a punishment, it can no longer be considered acceptable within societal standards, regardless of individual judicial perspectives. Coker v. Georgia invalidated Georgia's death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, citing its uniqueness as the only state enforcing such a penalty and highlighting a lack of consensus among states regarding capital punishment for rape. Ford v. Wainwright established that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing insane individuals, emphasizing the need for proper hearings on sanity. The Supreme Court asserts that legislative decisions alone cannot define Eighth Amendment standards without general agreement on a punishment's repudiation. In the absence of such consensus, courts must assess objective public attitudes and factors surrounding the punishment, including its dehumanizing nature and historical associations with tyranny. The determination of whether a punishment aligns with human dignity involves judicial analysis informed by philosophy, religion, logic, and history, leveraging judges' unique training and experience, untainted by political pressures. The evidence indicates that hanging has been largely rejected by contemporary society, with its use nearly abolished, particularly in the United States. Historically, hanging was the predominant execution method, but it has since been abandoned in most states, which now prefer methods deemed less brutal, such as electrocution and lethal gas. As of 1981, only a few jurisdictions, including Washington and Montana, continued to employ hanging, with a significant trend away from its use established since 1853. Thirty-nine states have discontinued hanging as a method of execution, opting for alternatives deemed more humane, while seven states abolished the death penalty altogether at a time when hanging was still in use. The U.S. Army ceased using hanging in 1986, as did other military services, with only Washington and Montana retaining it as a legal execution method. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remains the sole jurisdiction upholding the constitutionality of hanging, despite the widespread abandonment of this form of punishment across the nation. No federal case has ever validated hanging as a method of execution, and the Supreme Court has determined that society has rejected various forms of punishment based on significantly less evidence than the current consensus against hanging. In **Enmund v. Florida**, the Court ruled that the death penalty for vicarious felony murder violated the Eighth Amendment due to societal rejection, noting that only about a third of jurisdictions would permit such a sentence. Similarly, in **Thompson v. Oklahoma**, the Court found that executing individuals under 16 years of age was unconstitutional, highlighting that the majority of states have established minimum age requirements, with no state affirmatively endorsing the execution of 15-year-olds. The evidence against the constitutionality of hanging, given its rejection by a larger number of states, is even more compelling under the precedents set in **Enmund** and **Thompson**. Hanging as a method of execution has been largely abandoned by states, with only Washington and Montana retaining it, while a significant number have adopted alternative methods deemed less barbaric. This trend began with New York's abandonment of hanging in 1888, leading to a widespread legislative shift influenced by Eighth Amendment concerns. State legislatures view hanging as a "barbarous" punishment, opting for alternatives such as electrocution, lethal gas, lethal injection, and the firing squad, all considered more humane. Historical judicial opinions support this transition, highlighting that newer methods were designed to be "swift and painless." The collective movement away from hanging reflects a strong national consensus on the unconstitutionality of this execution method based on evolving standards of decency within a civilized society. Hanging, although still legally recognized in two jurisdictions, has effectively been abolished in practice, with no lawful hangings occurring since 1963 for those asserting Eighth Amendment rights. The only recent execution by hanging was of Westley Allan Dodd in Washington, who waived these rights. This rarity suggests that hanging is incompatible with contemporary societal decency standards. Since 1966, judicial hangings have been virtually nonexistent in the English-speaking world, with the exception of South Africa and a few Caribbean states. Legislatures in 46 states, and possibly in the two that never adopted hanging, have deemed it an inhumane method of execution, aligning with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court posits that it should respect this legislative consensus, which reflects public attitudes against hanging. The overwhelming evidence indicates that hanging is rejected as a form of execution, making further judicial inquiry unnecessary. Moreover, the practice of judicial hanging is viewed as incompatible with human dignity; it is characterized as a brutal and outdated method of execution that inflicts undue violence and humiliation. Those who accept capital punishment generally agree that hanging is particularly savage and dehumanizing, likening it to a relic of less civilized times. The procedure itself is described as excessively violent, causing significant fear and degradation, which further underscores its inappropriateness in a modern judicial context. Decapitation is a recognized consequence of the Washington state execution protocol, with expert witnesses acknowledging its occurrence. The protocol's requirement to eliminate rope elasticity increases the risk of decapitation by maximizing the force applied to the neck. This method of execution, associated with historical violence and societal brutality, evokes negative imagery linked to lynching and harsh justice. The practice of hanging is viewed as an outdated and barbaric form of punishment, rejected as cruel and unusual. While capital punishment is seen as a necessary evil for addressing violent crime, there is a consensus that executions should occur in the least painful and most dignified manner possible. The Constitution mandates that executions respect human dignity, prohibiting not only painful methods but also degrading post-mortem treatment of the body. These principles align with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, emphasizing that indignities can exist even in the absence of pain. The Constitution mandates that the death penalty be executed in a civilized and non-brutal manner, emphasizing the dignity of both the individual and society. The document argues for the adoption of scientifically developed and approved execution methods, such as lethal injection, which are more humane compared to outdated and brutal practices like hanging. It criticizes the majority's approach that dismisses considerations of savagery and cruelty in evaluating execution methods, asserting that this undermines the Eighth Amendment. The majority is accused of neglecting traditional factors used to assess the constitutionality of punishments and failing to provide a rational basis for its decisions, which diverge from longstanding legal precedents. The critique highlights that the abandonment of comprehensive standards in favor of a narrow focus on unnecessary pain undermines the federal courts' role in ensuring that state-administered punishments align with minimum civilized standards. Limiting federal courts' review to the pain caused by punishments undermines the Eighth Amendment and could permit the continuation of inhumane practices, provided they do not exceed a certain pain threshold. The majority opinion erroneously asserts that the Eighth Amendment requires only that punishments avoid unnecessary pain, neglecting other crucial factors relevant to the constitutionality of execution methods. This view contradicts established legal precedent and fails to consider the historical context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which was intended to prevent torturous punishments. The majority's distinction between proportionality and methodology reviews lacks legal foundation and misinterprets past cases, leading to a misguided conclusion. The Eighth Amendment's protections against inhumane punishment are vital and should be evaluated under the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" test, yet the majority provides insufficient rationale for its position and inconsistently applies legal standards. Before applying the principle that unnecessary pain is the sole factor to consider, the majority introduces two conflicting rules without disavowing them, ultimately ignoring their implications. The analysis begins with the consensus that unconstitutionality of hanging should be assessed using objective factors, referencing the established Stanford rule, which emphasizes the importance of statutes enacted by elected representatives as indicators of public sentiment. Acknowledging that the Stanford rule would suggest hanging is unconstitutional, the majority rephrases it by omitting critical language and introduces a new analytical framework termed "methodology review." This framework, created for this case, shifts focus to the objective evidence of pain involved in the execution method. However, the majority quickly deviates from its prior analyses and resolves the case using a standard that contradicts Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, claiming that "methodology review" exclusively examines unnecessary pain. The majority fails to substantiate this approach and cites a dissent from Justice Brennan in Glass v. Louisiana, misrepresenting his stance by isolating one sentence from its context. Brennan argued for a broader interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that extends beyond mere unnecessary pain to include the dignity of the condemned, emphasizing the need to minimize physical violence and avoid mutilation during executions. This interpretation underscores the complexity of Eighth Amendment protections, which the majority's ruling overlooks. The majority opinion improperly relies on selective quotations from prior cases, such as Trop, Gregg, and Stanford, to support its conclusions, disregarding critical context and contradicting evidence presented within those cases. This method of citation undermines the integrity of judicial decision-making regarding fundamental constitutional rights. The majority introduces a novel "unnecessary infliction of pain" standard for Eighth Amendment challenges, which has not been suggested by any previous court in over two centuries and appears to have been created solely for this case. Eighth Amendment analysis should focus on whether punishments align with contemporary societal standards of decency, which encompass more than just the infliction of pain. Even painless punishments can violate human dignity, exemplified by the guillotine, which, despite its lack of pain, would be deemed inconsistent with modern standards due to its barbaric nature. Courts have historically required that punishments not inflict unnecessary pain or violate evolving standards of decency. The majority's approach, which limits protections of the Eighth Amendment, deviates from established judicial precedent, as seen in cases like Gray v. Lucas, where a comprehensive examination of evolving standards was employed. Contemporary standards of decency, as reflected in modern legislation, dictate that denial of medical care to prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as established in Gamble. In this context, the Gray court affirmed the constitutionality of execution by lethal gas, citing evolving standards of decency. Similarly, in Hill v. Lockhart, the court rejected a claim against lethal injection, acknowledging it as the most humane execution method currently available, with most states having abandoned other methods. The courts have examined various punishments against societal standards, as illustrated by the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Jackson v. Bishop, which deemed the use of corporal punishment (the strap) unconstitutional for being degrading and contrary to public opinion. The Jackson decision emphasized the need for a broader constitutional analysis beyond just the infliction of unnecessary pain, asserting that the strap's use is inconsistent with the dignity expected in modern society. The majority's ruling, which limits analysis to the necessity of pain inflicted, undermines the fundamental principles of the Eighth Amendment, which historically aimed to protect against barbaric punishments. This decision has broader implications, suggesting that previously rejected punitive methods could be deemed constitutional if classified as necessary for penological purposes, thus eroding the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment in the Ninth Circuit. The text critiques the majority's decision regarding the constitutionality of hanging as a method of execution, emphasizing the importance of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It argues that the majority fails to acknowledge the evolving standards of decency in society, which should inform the legality of punishment methods. The author contends that hanging is inherently brutal and incompatible with human dignity, as it poses a significant risk of unnecessary pain, including the potential for strangulation or decapitation. Historical context is provided, noting that even with modern techniques, the risk of a painful execution persists. The text asserts that the district court had an obligation to explore alternative execution methods that could minimize the likelihood of inflicting pain, as the current Washington state hanging protocol mirrors those that have historically led to inhumane outcomes. The conclusion stresses that, despite the majority's stance, the prohibition against judicial hanging remains valid outside the Ninth Circuit. Thirty-nine state legislatures have concluded that alternative execution methods are more humane and less painful than hanging, with only one other state alongside Washington still allowing hanging as a punishment. The district court failed to assess evidence showing that lethal injection mitigates the risk of pain associated with hanging. A proper analysis would reveal that hangings can cause unnecessary pain and carry a significant risk thereof, potentially leading to a ruling that hanging is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Legal standards established by the Supreme Court dictate that any punishment inflicting unnecessary and wanton pain violates the Eighth Amendment. Key rulings emphasize that if an execution method causes more pain than an available alternative, it is unconstitutional. The Court has recognized that a punishment lacks justification if it serves the same goals as a less painful alternative. In death penalty cases, execution methods must minimize pain and avoid torture or prolonged suffering. The Supreme Court supports capital punishment for its goals of incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence but asserts that the state cannot inflict excessive pain beyond what is necessary for death, deeming it a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Constitution protects against cruelty inherent in the punishment method, necessitating a comparative analysis of pain levels among execution methods to determine constitutionality. A court must evaluate whether a method of execution is among the least cruel available. Justice Powell's dissent in *Furman v. Georgia* emphasizes that no method should be approved if it inflicts unnecessary cruelty compared to existing alternatives. A method can be deemed unnecessarily cruel even if it does not cause pain every time it is used; for instance, if a method results in painful strangulation in one out of five cases while an alternative only causes pain in one out of twenty-five cases, the former is considered unnecessarily cruel. This assessment considers both the risk of pain in individual cases and the broader implications for all cases, recognizing that a higher risk of physical pain increases psychological suffering for the condemned individual. If a state opts for execution, it must choose a method that minimizes the risk of unnecessary pain to comply with the Eighth Amendment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that the Washington judicial hanging protocol effectively prevents tortured or lingering deaths and unnecessary pain. However, these findings contradict the evidence presented, which indicated that hanging carries a significant risk of slow, painful strangulation, similar to historical protocols. As such, the District Court's findings are deemed clearly erroneous and necessitate reversal, particularly because the court failed to assess the necessity of the risk of painful death associated with hanging in Washington. The district court improperly excluded testimony from Campbell regarding the effects of hanging and ignored evidence demonstrating that lethal injection poses significantly fewer risks. This oversight led to an unfounded conclusion that hanging in Washington does not create unnecessary pain. The court's findings lacked factual and legal support, highlighted by a claim that no judicial hanging under Army regulations resulted in severe outcomes like decapitation, which is inaccurate as the Army has never conducted such an execution. The court's flawed reasoning raises serious concerns, especially in a death penalty case. Further, there is substantial evidence indicating that hanging carries a risk of delayed, painful death due to strangulation or asphyxiation, which can take minutes. Although such outcomes are rare, the inherent risk exists in every hanging. The process of death via hanging can occur through various mechanisms, complicating the ability to predict which will be fatal. The district court erroneously asserted that hanging typically results in immediate unconsciousness or death, suggesting occlusion of the carotid arteries within 6 to 12 seconds, a claim that is factually incorrect. Arterial occlusion is identified as the most probable cause of near-immediate unconsciousness during a hanging; however, it is also the least likely outcome under Washington's execution protocol. Medical evidence indicates that death may occur through a prolonged and painful asphyxiation process, rather than the quick and painless arterial occlusion. The inherent risk of a torturous death in hanging practices raises serious psychological concerns for condemned inmates, violating the Eighth Amendment. Jurisdictions that have employed hanging understand the potential for painful deaths, often allowing prisoners to dangle for 8 to 14 minutes before death is pronounced, with additional time before the body is cut down to ensure death certainty. During the evidentiary hearing, the district court excluded critical evidence showing past incidents of slow and painful strangulations, despite its relevance to understanding the risks of hanging. This exclusion was deemed an abuse of discretion. The court's reliance on the only hanging in the last thirty years, that of Westley Alan Dodd, to draw conclusions about the painlessness of hanging further compromised Campbell's right to a fair proceeding. The state’s control over information regarding Dodd's execution, including limiting access and restricting autopsy procedures, exacerbated these issues. The court also denied Campbell's request to videotape Dodd's hanging, limiting transparency and accountability in the execution process. The district court determined that taping, which would have allowed Campbell to create a more equitable record, infringed on Dodd's privacy rights, despite Dodd never objecting to it. The state was the sole objector. Consequently, there is no logical basis to conclude that the evidence from Dodd's hanging indicates that hanging avoids causing unnecessary pain. While it is acknowledged that hanging typically results in rapid unconsciousness and death, there remains a significant risk of slow, painful asphyxiation in every hanging. The district court's contrary conclusion disregarded substantial testimony from the evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the Washington judicial hanging protocol, known as the Field Instruction, does little to mitigate this risk, as it closely resembles previous hanging procedures that resulted in painful deaths. Contrary to the majority opinion suggesting that the protocol includes comprehensive instructions for minimizing risks, the evidence shows it is merely a 12-page set of guidelines lacking scientific backing. It focuses on administrative matters related to executions rather than execution methods. Critical aspects of the protocol were derived from a 1959 military manual that is no longer in use, and the state failed to consult medical experts in its development or assess the military's methodology for its earlier procedures. Recent advancements in forensic pathology indicate that the mechanisms of death in judicial hangings differ from previous beliefs held in 1959. Evidence presented at the hearing revealed that prison authorities are unable to identify specific strangulation risks linked to individual prisoners' physical traits and cannot effectively modify execution protocols accordingly. This limitation arises from employing inadequately trained physician's assistants for medical inspections, as critical physical characteristics affecting strangulation risks are often undetectable even by skilled medical personnel. Consequently, the existing protocol fails to mitigate the likelihood of slow strangulation, which the majority's reliance on the document fails to acknowledge as a significant error. Furthermore, the district court improperly disregarded evidence regarding alternative execution methods. Confronted with the clear risk of a slow and painful death by hanging, the court was obligated to evaluate whether such risk was necessary and to consider the potential benefits of alternative methods. However, it refused to entertain evidence about methods other than hanging, including live testimony demonstrating that lethal injection does not carry the same risks of decapitation and prolonged suffering. This refusal effectively barred Campbell from proving that lethal injection is less painful than hanging, undermining the argument that the pain caused by hanging is avoidable. Unrefuted deposition testimony indicated that lethal injection significantly reduces the risk of a painful death, as it begins with a sedative that typically ensures immediate loss of consciousness. In contrast, hanging can lead to immediate spinal cord damage without guaranteeing quick unconsciousness, resulting in potential prolonged suffering. The ability to eliminate the risk of extended pain through lethal injection underscores the unnecessary nature of subjecting prisoners to the risks associated with hanging. Hanging is deemed unconstitutional primarily due to the unnecessary pain it inflicts, as evidenced by modern medical research. Expert testimonies from Dr. Longstreth and Dr. Graney indicate that no ethical scientific body would authorize euthanizing animals through hanging due to the associated risks of pain, paralysis, and lack of immediate unconsciousness. In contrast, lethal injection, which involves administering a sedative first, is considered ethically acceptable. The district court's dismissal of this critical evidence led to a flawed legal conclusion regarding the risks of hanging. The majority's assertion that the relative merits of lethal injection are irrelevant to the constitutionality of hanging is challenged, as understanding the pain risks of alternative execution methods is essential to assessing hanging’s constitutionality. The argument is made that lethal injection presents significantly less risk of pain than hanging, demonstrating that hanging causes more suffering than necessary. Hanging is characterized as a violent and barbaric method that has been rejected by modern society for over a century. It is argued that hanging violates the dignity of individuals, which is a core principle of the Eighth Amendment. Descriptions of the process reveal its gruesome nature, including the potential for decapitation and excruciating death, further emphasizing the inhumanity of this method. Witnesses observe that during executions, individuals experience involuntary urination and defecation, and some witnesses faint or require assistance. The text argues that hanging is undeniably cruel and unusual, both in common understanding and under constitutional standards, especially in 1994, when most states and countries have abandoned such methods. It criticizes a judicial circuit for allowing this outdated practice to continue, highlighting that the focus should be on the method of execution rather than the act itself. The dissent expresses frustration with the majority's disregard for relevant Supreme Court precedents and emphasizes that the Constitution is meant to evolve towards greater decency. The dissenting opinion asserts that hanging poses significant risks of decapitation and asphyxiation, and that the Washington state hanging protocol fails to mitigate these risks. The findings of the district court are deemed erroneous in light of the evidence presented, particularly regarding the historical evolution of hanging methods, which initially involved minimal drops. The dissent concludes that hanging violates the Eighth Amendment, urging for a reconsideration of the decision to avoid damaging the circuit's reputation. A hanging procedure used in Washington involves determining the drop length based on the prisoner's weight, referencing a table similar to one used by the British post-19th Century. The British had previously abandoned the short drop method due to its association with painful suffocation and opted for the long drop, which, while more effective in ensuring a quick death, posed a risk of decapitation. A Royal Committee concluded that if a choice had to be made, the risk of decapitation was preferable to the prolonged suffering associated with strangulation. This rationale applies to Washington's method, as it employs a long drop, raising concerns about the potential for decapitation. Expert testimony confirmed the existence of this risk, yet the district court found that there was no credible evidence of significant decapitation risk, contradicting Campbell's presentation of strong evidence from experts knowledgeable in the mechanics of judicial hanging. The state's witnesses lacked familiarity with the protocol and historical precedents, leading to their unsupported conclusions about the absence of risk. The state's experts acknowledged an increased risk of decapitation associated with the Washington hanging protocol after being presented with new information. It was determined that the state failed to provide convincing evidence to counter this risk, leading to the conclusion that the district court's findings were erroneous. Dr. Deryk James, a forensic pathology expert, indicated that if the protocol were implemented regularly over the next decade or two, decapitation incidents were likely. He based this assertion on comparisons with historical hanging practices that resulted in decapitation, noting that variations in drop height and rope thickness would elevate this risk. Dr. Allen F. Tencer, a biomechanics specialist, supported Dr. James's conclusions, emphasizing that the Washington protocol's requirement for a non-elastic rope increases the risk of decapitation. He explained that a stiffer rope transmits more energy and force to the spine, which could lead to the head detaching from the body during a hanging. Tencer highlighted the delicate balance needed between exerting sufficient force to achieve death while avoiding excessive force that could cause decapitation. He concluded that the parameters set forth in the Washington protocol do not adequately maintain this balance. In contrast to the detailed and credible testimonies of Doctors James and Tencer, the state's experts' testimony was deemed not credible. Dr. Ross Zumwalt, New Mexico's chief medical examiner, expressed skepticism regarding the likelihood of decapitation during judicial hangings, stating it was not "absolutely impossible" but unlikely based on the specific drop length and noose diameter used in Washington state’s execution protocol. However, he failed to provide a rationale for his conclusion about the drop length and noose diameter. During cross-examination, Zumwalt acknowledged that his assessment of decapitation's rarity was influenced by his experiences with decapitated automobile accident victims, yet he conceded that this experience did not provide insight into the forces involved in judicial hangings. He did not investigate historical instances of decapitation in hangings and only adjusted his opinion after viewing photographs related to the decapitation of Black Jack Ketchum, which involved similar conditions to the Washington protocol. Dr. Donald Reay, chief medical examiner for King County, also testified about the Washington execution protocol, asserting that decapitation was unlikely if the protocol was followed correctly. He acknowledged that while decapitation could occur under certain circumstances, he believed the specified drop lengths would not likely result in decapitation. Reay provided no substantial explanation or evidence to support his assertions, leading to questions about whether he had adequately reviewed the execution protocol or researched the effects of drop lengths on various body weights. Dr. Reay did not prepare adequately for his testimony regarding the risks associated with the Washington state hanging protocol, admitting he had not reviewed relevant drop lengths or conducted any research on the correlation between body weight and drop length in judicial hangings. Consequently, he lacked a foundation for his assertion that the protocol would not risk decapitation. Dr. Boyd Stephens, the San Francisco medical examiner, acknowledged having reviewed some medical literature but provided uncertain testimony, incorrectly believing that the Washington protocol allowed for variations in drop length based on the prisoner's anatomy. His opinion on the improbability of decapitation was later revealed to be based on a misunderstanding. The district court erred in excluding photographs of Black Jack Ketchum's 1901 execution, which showed decapitation. The court ruled that the photographs' relevance was outweighed by concerns of prejudice and confusion due to the lack of precise details about the execution's drop length and rope width. However, the evidence presented by Campbell indicated procedural similarities between the Ketchum hanging and Washington's current practices. The court's exclusion of these photographs prevented a potential comparison that could have illustrated the risks inherent in the Washington hanging protocol, particularly the significant risk of decapitation. The limited existing evidence on past hangings further demonstrated that the court abused its discretion by not admitting the photographs, as the overall testimony suggested a considerable risk of decapitation with the hanging method used in Washington. The state's testimony lacked substantial support and credibility in this context. The district court asserted that the Washington hanging protocol would lead to occlusion of the carotid arteries, resulting in unconsciousness within 6 to 12 seconds and a quick, painless death. However, this conclusion overlooked compelling, unrefuted testimony indicating that the protocol may not consistently produce sufficient arterial occlusion for immediate unconsciousness. Testimony highlighted the risk of asphyxiation, potentially prolonging death by several minutes. The court's timeline was based on experiments by Dr. Reay, which involved the carotid sleeper hold—a technique that effectively occludes both carotid arteries. For the district court's conclusion to hold, it would require that hanging under the Washington protocol reliably induces complete occlusion of both arteries, which Dr. James disputed. The protocol's knot placement primarily affects one side of the neck, making rapid occlusion of both carotids unlikely. Consequently, occlusion of only one artery may not induce immediate unconsciousness, as compensatory blood flow from the other arteries would persist. Furthermore, there’s a risk of spinal injury that could leave the prisoner conscious while leading to death through asphyxiation, resulting in potential suffering for up to two minutes. The district court's finding of rapid unconsciousness and death was therefore erroneous. Lastly, reliance on the autopsy of Westley Alan Dodd was criticized, as it cannot be generalized to predict outcomes of future hangings. The multitude of potential death pathways and the numerous variables influencing each case prevent the use of any single execution case, such as Westley Alan Dodd's, as a reliable predictor for others, including Charles Campbell's. The state's expert, Dr. Stephens, testified that Dodd died quickly and painlessly, but this does not ensure similar outcomes for other prisoners. There are concerns about the manipulation of evidence by the state, which controlled all information about Dodd’s execution and limited access to independent experts. As a result, Campbell was unable to develop his own evidence, notably when the district judge denied his request to videotape Dodd's hanging, which the state opposed. Historically, the state of Washington had laws preventing the publication of execution details from 1909 to 1982, leading to a significant lack of information regarding hangings. Additionally, no autopsies had been conducted on hanged inmates prior to Dodd, further restricting available evidence. The district court's exclusion of evidence from two past hangings that resulted in prolonged deaths was a misuse of discretion, as it was relevant in demonstrating the risk of lingering death even with the long drop method. Lastly, the district court erroneously relied on the Washington hanging protocol, which primarily addresses administrative matters rather than execution outcomes, to conclude that hanging procedures would avoid historical risks of strangulation and decapitation. This reliance reflects a lack of comprehensive understanding of the procedure's implications. The Field Instruction for hanging condemned inmates is inadequately detailed, comprising less than two and a half pages, with only three specific instructions related to the risk of decapitation: the drop length chart, the specifications for the rope, and the placement of the knot. These instructions were directly extracted from a 1959 military execution manual, without any additional research into hanging procedures or prior executions in Washington, and without consulting medical professionals. Superintendent Wood, who oversaw the drafting of these instructions, admitted to relying on the outdated military manual despite its lack of clarity regarding its development or application. The military procedures, created in 1959, reflect outdated understandings of biomechanics related to judicial hanging, which have evolved significantly since then. Current research indicates that death from hanging is not predominantly due to neck breaking, contrary to the previous belief that dictated the design of hanging procedures aimed at achieving that outcome. Consequently, the Washington procedures fail to incorporate modern scientific insights that could reduce the risk of decapitation. Although the district court noted the prison staff conducts rehearsals of the hanging procedure, these rehearsals do not effectively mitigate the risk of decapitation. Rehearsals for the Dodd execution were primarily focused on facilitating the procedural requirements of a government agency rather than on minimizing the risk of prisoner mutilation. These rehearsals included positioning witnesses and law enforcement, timing the prisoner’s walk to the death chamber, and practicing execution logistics such as curtain operations and securing doors. A significant component involved practicing the application of restraints and conducting a mock hanging with a sandbag, yet these practices did not effectively assess or mitigate the risk of decapitation, as they could not account for the unique anatomical characteristics of the prisoner. The district court's assertion that the Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary possessed the authority to modify the hanging protocol based on medical advice was questioned. Superintendent Wood indicated that the drop length would be strictly adhered to according to established guidelines and that the protocol did not allow for modifications based on the prisoner's physical attributes. Although she suggested the potential for some discretion, the court overlooked substantial evidence indicating that the state would struggle to identify individual characteristics that could predispose a prisoner to decapitation. Dr. Tencer provided unchallenged testimony highlighting that beyond height, weight, and vein condition, factors such as vertebrae size, bone density, and lifestyle significantly influence the likelihood of decapitation, yet these could not be adequately assessed in a standard medical examination. Even if the Superintendent had the authority to adjust the execution protocol, it would not effectively reduce the risk of decapitation. Additionally, the court failed to recognize that the state’s method of treating the execution rope to eliminate elasticity, which was touted as a measure to ensure rapid death, paradoxically increased the risk of decapitation. This reflects a broader tradeoff between the risks of decapitation and asphyxiation inherent in the execution method. The district court's reliance on the state's treatment of the rope in determining that death will be rapid, while asserting that the protocol minimizes the risk of decapitation, is criticized as inconsistent. The court received compelling, unrefuted evidence indicating that the protocol actually increases the risk of decapitation, rendering the court's findings clearly erroneous. The document also provides a historical overview of states that have abandoned hanging as a method of execution, listing specific states and the years they transitioned to other methods, such as electrocution or lethal gas. Key examples include Alabama (1923), California (1937), and Louisiana (1940), where the legislative changes were justified on the grounds of achieving a more humane execution method. Additionally, it notes that several states, including Alaska and Hawaii, have not employed the death penalty since statehood, while Kansas has not authorized capital punishment for any offenses. William Williams' 1906 hanging in Minnesota, which took 14.5 minutes, triggered a six-year legislative movement to abolish the death penalty, culminating in its abolition in 1911. Various states transitioned from hanging to other execution methods: Mississippi (1940) to electrocution, Missouri (1937) to lethal gas, Nebraska (1913) to electrocution, Nevada (1921) to lethal gas, New Hampshire (1986) to lethal injection, New Jersey (1906) to electrocution, New Mexico (1929) to electrocution, New York (1888) to electrocution, North Carolina (1909) to electrocution, North Dakota (1973) abolished capital punishment, Ohio (1896) to electrocution, Oklahoma (1913) to electrocution, Oregon (1937) to lethal gas, Pennsylvania (1913) to electrocution, Rhode Island (1973) to lethal gas, South Carolina (1912) to electrocution, South Dakota (1939) to electrocution, Tennessee (1913) to electrocution, and Texas (1923) to electrocution. Montana has not executed anyone since 1943 and sought to hang Dewey Coleman in 1976, but the court reversed the death penalty in Coleman v. McCormick (1989). The document highlights the issues surrounding the use of hanging as a method of execution in various states, noting that this practice often causes significant public disturbance and is considered outdated. Many states have transitioned to more humane methods such as electrocution or lethal injection. Specific legislative changes are referenced, including Utah's shift from hanging to an option between shooting and lethal injection, and West Virginia's move from hanging to electrocution. The U.S. military abandoned hanging in 1986, and Congress ceased its use for federal executions in 1937, with many states adopting alternative methods. A dissenting opinion from Circuit Judge Poole argues that hanging constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, procedural details regarding a defendant, Campbell, indicate he waived his right to be present during jury selection, with limitations on future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to this waiver. The court accepted his waiver without requiring written documentation. Justice White authored a plurality opinion with four justices regarding the issue of sentencer discretion and its relation to the Eighth Amendment, while Justice Scalia concurred, asserting that claims of unlawful restriction on a sentencer's discretion do not constitute an Eighth Amendment challenge. The court largely adopted the opinion of a previous three-judge panel. Campbell argued that the state's termination of its contract with Evergreen Legal Services prior to his execution warranted an evidentiary hearing on potential interference with his right to counsel; however, the claim was deemed meritless as he had no right to counsel. The Washington Supreme Court appointed counsel for Campbell during his first state post-conviction petition but initially denied counsel for a second petition filed over three years later. After an amicus request, the court appointed counsel shortly before his execution. In Campbell's first personal restraint petition, no strict filing deadline existed. Although Evergreen Legal Services had been contracted to represent him, the contract ended one month before his execution, and the Washington Appellate Defender Association was promptly appointed with no deadline set for filing. Consequently, the court did not address Campbell's argument regarding insufficient preparation time for his first petition. The document references significant cases concerning the death penalty's proportionality, noting that in Coker, the Supreme Court found it disproportionate for the crime of rape, and in Enmund, for aiding and abetting murder. Additionally, it cites Gregg's two-pronged analysis of punishment excessiveness and discusses the evolving standards of decency pertaining to prison conditions and medical care for inmates, indicating that deliberate indifference to medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, while distinguishing it from issues of proportionality. Finally, it mentions academic work on cervical fractures related to judicial hangings. James and Nasmyth-Jones examined the cervical spines of 34 executed criminals from 1882 to 1945 in Great Britain, discovering fractures in six cases (19%); four were minor, crack-like fractures likely causing minimal displacement and no spinal cord injury, while two involved odontoid process separation, which is more likely to result in cord injury. Dr. Reay's research on the "carotid sleeper hold" indicated that occlusion of the carotid arteries could lead to unconsciousness within 15 to 30 seconds, with pressure on a single artery possibly allowing consciousness due to compensation from other arteries, but pressure on multiple arteries leads to unconsciousness. Campbell's reliance on Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures was deemed inappropriate as that case concerned antitrust issues and allowed for circumstantial evidence of damages, which is not applicable here. The expert testimony did not provide a reliable estimate of the risks of decapitation or asphyxiation, though it was accepted that such risks exist; however, they have been minimized with the implementation of Field Instruction. Additionally, there is dissent regarding the necessity of a "trained hanger," and the discussion around the constitutional implications of execution methods was addressed. Finally, dissent was noted concerning the majority's decision to bar Campbell from raising a vagueness challenge related to sentencing procedures, as this claim was not previously raised in his earlier petition. A challenge was raised against Washington's capital sentencing statute, specifically Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.070, which is distinct from previously addressed challenges. The en banc court opted to address this issue sua sponte, as the panel had not adjudicated the claim's merits and mistakenly identified a procedural bar. The author recommends remanding the issue for a substantive resolution, noting that the claim is serious, drawing parallels to instructions invalidated in Stringer v. Black. The excerpt critiques the majority opinion for narrowly focusing on "unnecessary and wanton pain" standards in Eighth Amendment cases, neglecting other relevant factors such as evolving standards of decency and proportionality. The majority's analysis is deemed insufficient, as it fails to consider broader Eighth Amendment implications and dedicates most of its discussion to the pain aspect. Ultimately, the majority concludes that Washington's method of judicial hanging does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, citing a lack of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. The author emphasizes the existence of specialized Eighth Amendment doctrines, including "deliberate indifference," proportionality, and the need for reliable capital sentencing procedures. Specialized doctrines related to the Eighth Amendment focus on whether government actions align with evolving standards of decency. A high reliability standard is required to determine if the death penalty is appropriate in specific cases. The case Hoptowit v. Ray emphasizes that prison conditions must be assessed based on public perceptions of decency. Notably, Alaska and Hawaii have not practiced capital punishment since joining the Union, and an appendix details when 46 states discontinued hanging, citing its inhumanity. The majority opinion incorrectly claims that no decisions have deemed hanging cruel and unusual; this absence arises because most states have abolished hanging, reflecting a societal consensus against it. The rarity of judicial review on this matter does not weaken the argument against hanging, but rather reinforces the notion that it contradicts contemporary standards of decency. The Supreme Court's decision in Stanford upholding the death penalty for 16- and 17-year-olds is criticized for misapplying precedents regarding proportionality versus execution methods. The majority's assertion that hanging is compatible with evolving standards is challenged, arguing that legislative actions against it highlight fundamental Eighth Amendment issues. Nearly all states have rejected a certain method of punishment due to its perceived inhumanity, indicating it contradicts contemporary societal standards of decency. While the courts must carefully evaluate constitutional challenges to punishment methods to protect individual rights, they should defer to legislative judgments when those judgments reflect societal views on acceptable punishment. The dissent also references historical accounts of public hangings, illustrating the gruesome spectacle associated with such executions and highlighting the shift in societal attitudes towards them. Notably, Montana and Washington are the only states that still allow hanging, though Montana has not carried out such executions in the last 50 years. The dissent emphasizes the importance of legislative intent and societal norms in assessing the constitutionality of punishments, as well as the need for a comprehensive understanding of the context and history surrounding the issue. Justice Brennan's dissent argues that the majority's limitations on the Eighth Amendment standard are fundamentally flawed and misleading. The majority cites Gregg v. Georgia to support its position, but Brennan contends that this citation misrepresents the context of Gregg, which asserts that "excessiveness" is only one aspect of Eighth Amendment analysis. He emphasizes that courts must consider societal attitudes and the dignity of individuals when evaluating punishments, as articulated in the Gregg plurality opinion. Brennan references historical concerns from figures like Patrick Henry and George Mason during the Constitution's ratification, pointing to the broader implications of decency in modern American society as pivotal in Eighth Amendment inquiries. He critiques the majority for introducing "methodology review" as a distinct category in Eighth Amendment analysis, noting that this term has never appeared in judicial opinions on the topic before, except in a non-related Arkansas case. Ultimately, Brennan argues that if the majority were to fully consider his dissent, it would have to conclude that judicial hanging is unconstitutional due to its inconsistency with civilized standards and human dignity, as the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is rooted in evolving societal standards. Justice Brennan's dissent in Glass contradicts the majority's stance on capital punishment, emphasizing that legislative decisions on execution methods, like electrocution, require deference but are not conclusive when there is no consensus against them. He urges courts to consider factors such as unnecessary pain and indignity in evaluating the constitutionality of execution methods. The dissent highlights that the evolving standards of decency are crucial in assessing government actions related to the death penalty and prison conditions, referencing cases that illustrate a focus on reliability, proportionality, and deliberate indifference. The text also notes a trend among states moving away from gas chamber executions in favor of lethal injection, with the number of states using gas declining from ten to three. Additionally, despite the exclusion of certain evidence regarding the effects of hanging, there remains sufficient evidence indicating that hanging can lead to painful deaths, supported by historical findings from a British Royal Committee. The primary distinction between the Washington and British execution procedures lies in their drop charts, with Washington's shorter drop lengths at lower weights and longer at higher weights. When a prisoner contests actions that do not reflect the official penalty, an assessment of the officials' mindset becomes necessary to establish whether the inflicted pain is wanton, as established in Wilson v. Seiter. Conversely, if a prisoner demonstrates that the formally imposed punishment results in unnecessary pain, the adoption of a needlessly painful execution method meets the wantonness requirement. The majority's reference to Resweber, claiming it entitles Campbell to an execution free of purposeful cruelty, misinterprets the ruling. Resweber clarified that unforeseeable accidents during execution do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but it also emphasized that unnecessary pain in execution is unconstitutional. Where foreseeable risks of pain exist in a specific execution method, Resweber prohibits its use unless such risks are inherent in any life-taking method. Justice Brennan's dissent in Glass, which the en banc court heavily relies on, asserts that courts should evaluate whether a death penalty method is "barbaric" and unnecessary considering available alternatives. He maintained that the Eighth Amendment requires methods of execution to minimize unnecessary pain and violence. While multiple execution methods may comply with the Eighth Amendment, those with significantly higher risks than alternatives are unconstitutional. The excerpt further critiques the district court's findings and stresses that six to twelve seconds could be an excruciating duration for a conscious prisoner subjected to severe trauma during execution. The district court failed to assess whether alternative execution methods could reduce pain, despite allowing the state to assert Dodd's right to privacy while denying any next friend the ability to raise Dodd's constitutional rights against unlawful execution. This inconsistency in the judge's conduct, permitting the state to further its interests while hindering Dodd's rights, contrasts with other district judges who have ruled that future execution subjects have the right to videotape executions to gather evidence on their impact. Citing precedents like *Fierro v. Gomez* and a federal case in Maryland, the text emphasizes the necessity for thorough evidence evaluation regarding execution methods, as articulated by Justice Brennan's standards for "methodology review." While acknowledging the potential pain associated with lethal injection, the commentary criticizes the majority opinion's interpretation of the remand order as inaccurate and insists that Campbell is entitled to an Eighth Amendment review that considers whether hanging unnecessarily inflicts pain in relation to alternative methods. The district court's handling of Campbell's constitutional claim has been flawed, either due to a misunderstanding of the remand order or because it was improperly prevented from conducting a necessary constitutional inquiry. The majority opinion inaccurately states that the Royal Committee concluded a long drop hanging was more humane without acknowledging that this determination was based on the belief that decapitation is preferable to strangulation. Current standards of decency challenge the notion of a long drop being humane, especially when methods exist that eliminate the risk of decapitation or strangulation. Dr. Tencer's testimony demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of Washington's hanging protocol, contrasting sharply with the state's experts, who provided vague, unsubstantiated claims that hanging would not cause harm. Notably, Dr. Donald Reay, whose testimony was significant for the district court, admitted he had not analyzed the state’s drop length table or researched the relationship between drop length and body weight. Additionally, expert opinions regarding the force necessary for decapitation were inconclusive, as one expert acknowledged the impossibility of calculating the force required to cause decapitation based on variables such as speed and mass. Despite recognizing the limitations of his knowledge, another expert, Dr. Zumwalt, reverted to his earlier unsupported assertion that the protocol's force would not result in decapitation. Dr. Zumwalt's credibility is questioned due to his previous admission of uncertainty regarding the force necessary for decapitation and his lack of study on prior decapitations from hangings. Dr. Reay similarly admitted to not conducting research on judicial hangings and did not review relevant materials provided by counsel. Upon being shown photographs of a decapitation case during the hearing, Dr. Reay revised his assessment of decapitation risks, acknowledging a possibility based on the images. He indicated that while the protocol for hanging minimizes the likelihood of decapitation, it cannot be deemed impossible due to uncontrolled variables. Both Drs. James and Tencer argued that medical personnel cannot adequately assess a prisoner’s anatomical differences to fully prevent decapitation risks. They noted that two of the four arteries supplying blood to the brain must be occluded to induce unconsciousness, with the carotid arteries being more accessible to occlusion than the vertebral arteries. In a specific case, Westley Alan Dodd, evidence suggested that arterial occlusion did not lead to unconsciousness or death, as indicated by the autopsy findings which were disputed among experts. Dr. Reay claimed Dodd died quickly, while Dr. Zumwalt could not confirm immediate unconsciousness. Additionally, the drop length in hangings is determined solely by the prisoner's weight. The chart delineates specific drop lengths corresponding to various weights, ranging from 120 pounds with an 8-inch drop to 220 pounds and over with a 5-inch drop. Notably, the medical professionals consulted by the Superintendent are primarily physician's assistants rather than doctors. Dr. James provided testimony highlighting the significance of experience in adjusting drop lengths, emphasizing that even slight variations can drastically impact outcomes. Prior to the Dodd execution, Washington lacked an experienced executioner, and the current executioner has only the Dodd hanging as their reference. This inexperience raises concerns about their ability to make necessary adjustments to prevent decapitation. The Washington protocol allows for some variation in drop lengths based on individual characteristics, but evidence suggests it resembles a process described in Brendan Behan's play "The Quare Fellow," where the hangman assesses the prisoner's physical attributes to determine the appropriate drop, illustrating the critical need for accurate judgment to avoid fatal errors.