Hatten v. Quarterman

Citations: 570 F.3d 595; 2009 WL 1549521Docket: 07-70038

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; June 5, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Larry Hatten appeals for a writ of habeas corpus following his capital conviction for the murder of five-year-old Isaac Jackson. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability. The Fifth Circuit, led by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, affirms the lower court's decision, finding no errors regarding claims of juror bias and improper shackling during Hatten's trial.

The case background reveals that on September 19, 1995, Hatten broke into the apartment of Isaac Robinson, intending to retaliate against him for previous altercations related to local drug dealings. Instead of Robinson, Hatten shot his girlfriend, Tabitha Thompson, and fatally shot their son, Isaac Jackson. Hatten was arrested shortly after the incident. He was convicted of capital murder in February 1996 and initially sentenced to death, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later vacated this sentence, affirming the conviction. Hatten did not appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and was resentenced to death by a second jury in December 1998, a decision that was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appeal details the procedural history of Hatten’s state habeas corpus proceedings, which were complicated by the simultaneous processing of direct appeals and post-conviction applications. Hatten's initial habeas application, filed in December 1997, was never ruled on due to the subsequent vacatur of his sentence. His second attorney, Grant Jones, filed a new state habeas petition in 2000, but it did not incorporate claims from the 1997 petition. Consequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief on the 2000 petition without addressing the earlier claims. Hatten later sought federal habeas relief, including claims from both state petitions, but federal proceedings were stayed pending clarification of the status of the 1997 petition in state court, which remains unresolved.

The district court ruled that Hatten's 1997 petition claims were exhausted but denied relief on the merits. It found that Hatten did not exhaust nine claims raised for the first time in his federal petition. A certificate of appealability was granted for all claims. On appeal, Hatten presents four claims, asserting a lack of an impartial jury due to his appearance in shackles, arguing that cause and prejudice justify his failure to exhaust certain claims, and for the first time claiming cumulative error affected his trial.

The review standard indicates that Hatten’s initial claims, not ruled on by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, are considered exhausted despite lacking a final state decision. This necessitates a clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions.

Hatten claims that juror Reginald Hollins was biased, violating his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. He asserts both actual and implied bias, citing that Hollins failed to truthfully respond to voir dire questions that could have warranted a challenge for cause. Hatten outlines specific instances of bias: Hollins' dishonesty about drug use, concealment of his relationship with the victim's father and Hatten's stepfather, and the threat of prosecution that could have influenced his judgment in favor of the prosecution. Claims of juror bias typically require a hearing for the judge to assess the juror's impartiality, and the case law acknowledges certain relationships that may imply bias.

Isaac Robinson informed his lawyer after testifying that he recognized juror Reginald Hollins from previous drug transactions. The state challenged Hollins for cause, but Hatten’s trial counsel did not respond. A hearing was held to assess Hollins's potential bias, during which Robinson testified about recognizing Hollins as a customer from his crack cocaine sales. Robinson also noted that Hollins knew Hatten's stepfather, "Paper Man," and suggested Hollins would have lied on his jury questionnaire regarding drug issues.

The judge appointed counsel for Hollins, expressing concern over possible criminal implications for him. The prosecution offered Hollins immunity concerning past drug transactions and any false statements on the jury questionnaire, provided he was truthful during questioning. The judge underscored that the purpose of the hearing was to uncover the truth, assuring Hollins he would not face prosecution for past actions up to that moment.

During examination, Hollins acknowledged recognizing Robinson but denied purchasing drugs directly from him, claiming his jury questionnaire response was truthful. He stated he knew "Paper Man" for nearly 20 years but did not discuss the shooting with him. Hollins asserted he could remain impartial if Hatten received a death sentence. Despite the availability of two alternate jurors, the court decided to keep Hollins on the jury, citing unspecified issues that would arise from his removal. Hatten’s trial counsel did not pursue objections or a mistrial. Subsequently, Hatten filed a federal habeas petition with an affidavit from Hollins indicating he had not answered truthfully during voir dire due to fear of criminal charges related to his drug dealings.

Hollins acknowledged having a drug problem during the trial, claiming it impaired his judgment. An evidentiary hearing on this issue was held on June 6, 2007, but Hollins failed to appear despite being subpoenaed, and no other witnesses were presented by Hatten. Hatten argued that Hollins was biased for lying on his jury questionnaire about his drug use, but the court found the question vague and subjective, making it unsuitable for the McDonough framework. The district court determined there was no credible basis to find that Hollins had lied regarding his drug involvement.

Hatten further argued that Hollins concealed relationships with Robinson and Hatten's stepfather, Paper Man, and committed perjury regarding these connections. However, Hollins claimed he was unaware of these relationships at the time of the questionnaire, and Hatten provided no evidence to contradict Hollins’s testimony. Even if Hollins had misrepresented his connections, it did not meet the McDonough standard for a challenge for cause, as mere acquaintance with the victim or their family is insufficient under Texas law. The court concluded that Hollins's alleged drug dealings with Robinson did not demonstrate actual bias, nor was his relationship with Robinson significant enough to presume bias, referencing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith v. Phillips concerning juror impartiality.

Hollins's association with the intended victim does not constitute implied bias, as established in prior cases like Anderson v. Collins and Jones v. Butler, where mere acquaintance did not lead to a finding of bias. Hatten argues Hollins was biased due to a threat of prosecution during the trial, comparing it to Brooks v. Dretke, where a juror faced arrest. However, Hollins was not threatened with prosecution unless he lied during voir dire; he was granted immunity for any perjury and prior drug offenses, negating the prosecutorial influence described in Brooks. Despite this, Hollins claimed fear of prosecution affected his judgment, but the trial judge assured him of immunity. 

Hatten also asserts that his due process rights were violated due to being shackled during closing arguments, which could undermine the presumption of innocence. Shackling is only permissible for essential state interests, and if done in error, the state must show it did not affect the verdict. In federal court reviews, a lower standard applies, requiring evidence that an error had a substantial impact on the jury's decision. The evidentiary phase of Hatten's trial ended on February 2, 1996, and he was absent from the jury charge conference the following Monday due to a physical altercation with jail personnel.

Hatten remained uncommunicative with his attorneys while present in the courthouse and did not attend the jury charge conference. Although his counsel suggested proceeding with closing arguments without him, the judge insisted Hatten could only be excused if he voluntarily excluded himself. After a recess, Hatten appeared in court for closing arguments, during which he was shackled, though the exact details of the restraints were unclear. Despite the potential issue of shackling, the district court found that any error would not have prejudiced the jury's verdict, as Hatten's own admissions and strong identification by a witness overwhelmingly supported his guilt for murder. 

Hatten also raised numerous unexhausted claims in his federal habeas petition that were not presented in state proceedings. He contended that the state had waived its exhaustion defense, but the record showed otherwise. Hatten argued that ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal should excuse the exhaustion requirement; however, this claim itself was not exhausted, barring it from review. Attempts to assert a conflict of interest involving his counsel were rejected, as the claimed ineffectiveness should have been raised in state habeas proceedings, and ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel does not excuse procedural defaults. Hatten's cumulative error claim was not considered because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Consequently, the district court's judgment denying relief was affirmed.