United States v. George L. Phelps, Also Known as George L. Phillips, Also Known as Phillip Lee Morris

Citations: 17 F.3d 1334; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3564; 1994 WL 59611Docket: 92-3197

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 28, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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George L. Phelps appealed the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), specifically 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e). He raised two main issues: 1) the district court's alleged error in determining that the United States proved he had three prior violent felonies required for an enhanced sentence, and 2) the constitutionality of Sec. 921(a)(20) of the ACCA, claiming it violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The facts established that Phelps was indicted on December 18, 1991, for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for possession of an unregistered firearm. Prior to sentencing, the United States filed an Information of Previous Convictions, citing five prior convictions: two for second degree burglary, one for kidnapping, one for escape from confinement, and one for carrying a concealed weapon. Phelps pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession charge under a plea agreement.

At sentencing on May 18, 1992, the district court upheld the United States' classification of Phelps' previous convictions as violent felonies and confirmed that he qualified as an armed career criminal, imposing a sentence of 210 months. Phelps' claims were rejected, and the court found no equal protection violation. Following the judgment, Phelps filed a timely appeal, and the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, citing its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

The standard of review for the district court's legal conclusions regarding statute interpretation is de novo, while factual findings are reviewed under a 'clearly erroneous' standard, meaning they can only be overturned if unsupported by the record or if there is a strong conviction that an error occurred. The discussion of Phelps' claims is divided into two parts: first, whether Phelps' prior convictions qualify as violent felonies, which would lead to enhanced punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); second, whether the statutory classifications in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) and § 924(e) violate equal protection. The analysis begins with the plain language of the statute, which is decisive when unambiguous. Section 924(e) defines a "violent felony" as a crime punishable by over one year of imprisonment that involves the use of physical force, or is categorized as burglary, arson, extortion, involves explosives, or poses a serious risk of physical injury.

The statute mandates that individuals convicted of three or more specified offenses receive a minimum sentence of fifteen years without parole. It is established that Section 924(e) is a penalty enhancement statute rather than a creation of a new substantive federal crime, a view supported by various circuit courts. These courts have consistently held that the prosecution does not need to prove each element of the predicate offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; instead, the trial court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was previously convicted of the necessary offenses. The Supreme Court, in Taylor v. United States, clarified that the enhanced sentencing aims to bolster state efforts against career criminals, as these offenders pose a significant potential threat to public safety. The inclusion of burglary as a predicate offense is specifically noted for its inherent potential for harm.

The 1986 amendments to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) did not define specific crimes, leading to potential inconsistencies in applying enhanced sentences due to varying state laws. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in *Taylor*, where it evaluated the definition of burglary for sentencing enhancements. The Eighth Circuit had previously ruled that the term 'burglary' should align with state definitions, but the Supreme Court clarified that federal statutes require federal interpretations independent of state law. The Court emphasized that, unless Congress explicitly indicates otherwise, federal laws should not depend on state law definitions, which could yield inconsistent applications. Consequently, the Supreme Court established that 'burglary' in the context of the statute should use a 'generic' definition rather than the common-law definition. It determined that a conviction qualifies for sentencing enhancement if it involves unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime, regardless of the specific nomenclature. This led to the adoption of the 'categorical approach,' requiring a comparison of state statute elements to the generic definition of burglary established in *Taylor*. If the state statute aligns substantially with this definition, the conviction can be used for enhancement purposes.

The categorical approach, endorsed in this circuit, requires courts to focus on the specific statutory elements of an offense rather than the underlying facts of a conviction. This principle is illustrated in multiple cases, including United States v. Amos and United States v. Permenter. The core inquiry for burglary convictions is whether the defendant's actions involved an unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime, regardless of state definitions. However, if a state statute broadly defines burglary beyond the generic definition established in Taylor, the categorical approach may not be applicable without analyzing the specific facts of the case. In such instances, the prosecution must provide fact-specific evidence to demonstrate that the charged crime meets the generic definition of burglary to allow for sentence enhancement. 

In evaluating Phelps' prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e), the court must determine if the government has proven that Phelps committed three prior violent felonies, particularly noting that his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon does not qualify as a violent felony. The discussion focuses on whether three out of Phelps' four other convictions can support an enhanced sentence. The government presented certified copies of Phelps' prior convictions, and it was concluded that his two burglary convictions and one kidnapping conviction qualify as violent felonies under Sec. 924(e), thus supporting an enhanced sentence.

A 1975 burglary conviction under Missouri Statute Sec. 560.070 qualifies for sentence enhancement, as it aligns with the generic definition of burglary established in Taylor. Although Missouri's statute is broader, the charging document specified that Phelps unlawfully entered a building with intent to steal, fitting the generic definition. Consequently, the district court rightly counted this conviction for enhancement.

Similarly, Phelps' 1981 burglary conviction under the revised Missouri Statute Sec. 564.170 also supports sentence enhancement. Phelps conceded that this statute corresponded to the generic definition of burglary. Even if he had not, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Whitfield determined that the modified statute met the generic definition. Therefore, the district court did not err in counting this conviction.

In contrast, kidnapping is not explicitly listed as a violent felony under Sec. 924(e)(2)(B). Phelps contends that his kidnapping conviction should not enhance his sentence, arguing that the crime is not inherently violent. However, the United States asserts that Missouri's kidnapping statute involves serious potential risk of physical injury since it requires the act to be non-consensual. This interpretation supports the use of the kidnapping conviction for sentence enhancement under Sec. 924(e)(2)(B).

The document addresses the classification of kidnapping as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) for the purposes of sentencing enhancements. It references the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Sherbondy, which established that kidnapping, despite not requiring the use of force, poses a serious potential risk of physical injury, thus qualifying it as a violent felony. This determination is applicable to Missouri's kidnapping statute, which defines the crime as occurring without the victim's consent. The court emphasizes that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) only necessitates a potential risk of injury, not actual injury, supporting the conclusion that Missouri kidnapping warrants enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).

Additionally, the document discusses the appellant Phelps' equal protection argument, claiming that the disparity in state laws regarding the restoration of rights results in unequal treatment under § 924(e). He contends that individuals convicted of the same crime may face different legal consequences based on their state's laws. The United States counters this argument by referencing previous case law where similar equal protection claims were dismissed, asserting that the statute should be reviewed under a rational basis rather than heightened scrutiny. Phelps disagrees, asserting that the statute infringes on his Fifth Amendment rights and should thus be subjected to strict scrutiny.

The constitutional principle of equal protection prohibits legislation that unjustly distinguishes between individuals who are alike in relevant respects. Legislative classifications are generally presumed constitutional unless they warrant heightened scrutiny due to the infringement of a fundamental right or the categorization based on an inherently suspect characteristic. The appellant argues that a specific statute infringes on his liberty under the Fifth Amendment, thus requiring strict scrutiny. In contrast, the appellee contends that the statute only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and does not warrant heightened scrutiny.

The statute in question, the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), does not classify individuals based on impermissible traits like race or religion. The appellant's claim for heightened review relies on the assertion that the statute interferes with his fundamental rights, specifically his liberty. However, it is determined that the statute merely stipulates that the evaluation of whether a conviction affects sentencing is governed by state law, and the connection to the appellant's liberty is deemed too indirect and speculative to justify strict scrutiny.

Ultimately, to uphold the statute's constitutionality as applied to the appellant, it must only be shown to be rationally related to a legitimate government objective. Legislation under rational basis review is presumed constitutional, placing the burden on the appellant to demonstrate that the statute is irrational or arbitrary. The appellant has not succeeded in meeting this burden.

The Ninth Circuit rejected an equal protection challenge related to a statute concerning enhanced sentencing for armed career criminals, affirming that variations in state law do not undermine the statute's rational basis. The court determined that Congress had a legitimate governmental interest in defining the criteria for enhanced sentences, specifically for individuals with multiple serious offenses, recognizing that such offenders pose a greater threat to society. The First Circuit endorsed this reasoning, emphasizing Congress's broad authority under the commerce clause to set sentencing enhancements without violating equal protection principles. The enhanced sentencing provision under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen years for individuals with three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, with no discretion for the sentencing court to avoid this mandate. The document concludes by affirming the district court's judgment, maintaining that the statute's application is consistent with the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause.

The prosecution has broad discretion in seeking enhanced sentences under relevant statutes, but once the necessary conditions are met, trial courts cannot choose to ignore the statutory language in imposing such sentences. The cases of Johnson and Jackson align in this respect. The Fifth Circuit initially viewed Sec. 1202(a) as establishing a separate offense, but later rulings clarified that Sec. 924(e) serves solely as a sentencing enhancement and does not create a new, indictable offense, aligning it with interpretations from other circuits. 

The Supreme Court highlighted the differences in state definitions of burglary, noting that a person with similar criminal records could face different sentencing outcomes based on state law—California's broad definition versus Michigan's lack of a formal burglary offense. The Court advocated for using broader, modern definitions of crimes in federal statutes to prevent offenders from exploiting narrow, outdated common-law definitions. This approach aims to ensure fairness in sentencing enhancements regardless of the state's labeling of offenses. The conclusion drawn allows for an enhanced sentence based on three specific convictions under Sec. 924(e), without needing to assess the status of an additional conviction for escape from custody. The kidnapping charge referenced was based on Missouri's statute, which defines kidnapping in terms of unlawfully removing a person for felony facilitation purposes.

The concept of "equal protection" primarily arises from the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects individuals against discriminatory actions by state governments, not the federal government. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's due process clause to incorporate equal protection principles, thereby extending similar protections against federal discrimination. Key cases, such as Bolling v. Sharpe and Lewis v. United States, affirm that the due process clause applies the equal protection limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to federal actions. 

The excerpt references Phelps' equal protection claim and highlights a historical example from Strauder v. West Virginia, where the Supreme Court struck down a statute that excluded black individuals from jury service based on its facially discriminatory classification. Lastly, it notes that a previous case related to the predecessor of a statute (Sec. 924) does not significantly differentiate the current legal considerations, and expresses agreement with the reasoning applied in that case.