United States v. Vincent Lewis

Citations: 16 F.3d 1222; 1994 WL 47804; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8754Docket: 93-5492

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 14, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Vincent P. Lewis appeals the district court's sentencing following his guilty plea for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. The appeal centers on whether the district court erred in increasing Lewis' base offense level due to the possession of a dangerous weapon, as outlined in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). 

On February 27, 1992, law enforcement received a tip regarding the transportation of cocaine in a vehicle driven by Trinika McFarland, who was later stopped and consented to a search. Police discovered cash, 2.3 kilograms of cocaine, 5.4 kilograms of marijuana, and a Cobray M-11/9 millimeter pistol, along with ammunition clips. McFarland indicated that she and Lewis drove the vehicle from Miami and that Lewis paid her to transport the pistol, although she claimed ignorance about the drugs.

On March 17, 1992, a three-count indictment was filed against Lewis and McFarland. Lewis pled guilty to conspiracy, with the government dismissing the other counts. A presentence report recommended a two-level increase in his offense level due to the firearm, which Lewis contested, arguing it was unlikely an unloaded gun would be involved in the drug offense. The district court upheld the increase and sentenced Lewis to 87 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. The appeal was filed in response to this decision.

Defendant Lewis challenges the application of sentencing Guidelines rather than the district court's factual findings, warranting a de novo review of the record. Under Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines, a defendant's base offense level may be increased by two levels if a dangerous weapon, including a firearm, was possessed. However, it is established that this enhancement does not automatically apply once a dangerous weapon's possession is shown; a two-part analysis is required. 

First, the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant possessed a weapon during the offense. In conspiracy cases, it suffices to show that a co-conspirator possessed the firearm, and such possession was foreseeable to others in the conspiracy. Once this burden is met, a presumption arises that the firearm's possession was connected to the offense, which the defendant can challenge by demonstrating it is improbable that the weapon was related to the crime.

In this case, the government proved that a conspirator, Trinika McFarland, possessed a Cobray M-11/9 millimeter pistol found in her vehicle at the time of arrest, satisfying the element of control necessary for the enhancement. Lewis's argument referencing United States v. Williams is ineffective, as the circumstances differ and the previous case's specifics do not invalidate the current application of Section 2D1.1(b)(1). Moreover, the enhancement is not negated simply because the firearm is unloaded or not immediately accessible.

The government successfully established that Trinika McFarland's possession of a pistol was foreseeable to other members of the conspiracy, including defendant Lewis. Lewis contended that it was not foreseeable for the pistol to be used during the offense since McFarland was unaware she was transporting drugs. However, the relevant legal standard under Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) focuses on whether it was foreseeable that a coconspirator would possess a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, not on whether the firearm was used. The court found it reasonable for Lewis to foresee McFarland possessing a gun, given his knowledge of her transporting it from Miami to Tennessee. 

Lewis failed to counter the presumption established by the government, and the case was distinguishable from United States v. Garner, where the connection between a gun and drug offense was deemed improbable due to the nature of the firearm and its storage. In contrast, the firearm in Lewis’s case was a semiautomatic weapon, typically associated with drug activity, and was found near both ammunition and drugs, reinforcing its connection to the offense. Consequently, enhancing Lewis's base offense level by two levels was deemed appropriate. The district court's judgment was affirmed. Additionally, it was noted that the facts relied upon were from a presentence investigation report, and no disputes regarding these facts were raised by either party.