Bobby Stearling Conn v. H. Gary Wells

Citations: 16 F.3d 1218; 1994 WL 28527; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8293Docket: 93-1313

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; January 31, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the appeal of Bobby Stearling Conn, who sought a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted in Michigan for first-degree criminal sexual conduct against a seven-year-old girl. Conn claimed constitutional violations during his trial, specifically: (1) the prosecutor's improper references to "uncontroverted" evidence in closing arguments, (2) the admission of hearsay statements identifying him as the offender, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to inform him of his right to testify.

The court found no grounds warranting federal habeas relief and affirmed the denial of the writ. During the trial, the prosecution asserted multiple times that the evidence against Conn was "uncontroverted," which Conn argued violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by implying his failure to testify. However, he did not object to these statements at the time, leading the Michigan Court of Appeals to conclude that appellate review was barred unless the prosecutor's comments were egregiously prejudicial. Conn had previously pled guilty to being an habitual offender based on a prior manslaughter conviction and was sentenced to 25 to 80 years in prison. His appeal for a new trial was denied, and the Michigan Supreme Court upheld his conviction. The federal habeas petition was subsequently denied, prompting this appeal.

In Conn, the court determined that any improper statements made by the prosecutor were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal, as they could have been remedied by a timely cautionary instruction. Consequently, appellate review of this issue was barred. This decision was upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court. The doctrine of procedural default applies, meaning federal habeas review is precluded unless the petitioner shows cause for not following state procedural rules and resulting prejudice. The petitioner claimed that the Michigan courts had made a substantive constitutional determination regarding the prosecutor's remarks; however, the court maintained that the petitioner still needed to demonstrate cause and prejudice. In a similar case, Paprocki v. Foltz, it was established that affirming a conviction based on procedural defaults does not waive those defaults. The Michigan court's decision in Conn, which stated that the prosecutor's remarks were not so prejudicial as to excuse the procedural bar, mirrors the findings in Paprocki. The petitioner’s argument that inconsistent applications of the contemporaneous objection rule demonstrate cause was found unsubstantiated, as the cited cases did not show inconsistency but rather instances where the court deemed review necessary despite the rule. The court concluded that it would defer to Michigan's application of its procedural rules.

The petitioner argues he should not be required to show cause for failing to object to remarks made during the trial, asserting that the trial court had a duty to provide a corrective instruction on its own. The court disagrees, pointing out that there was no interference with the petitioner's ability to object, nor was there any compounded error by the trial court. The remarks were brief, and the jury instructions explicitly stated that a defendant has the right not to testify and that the jury must not consider the defendant's silence in their deliberations.

Regarding Dr. Scheinfield's testimony, the petitioner presents two arguments: a due process violation due to the admission of her testimony and a confrontation rights violation under the Sixth Amendment, claiming the Michigan Supreme Court improperly supported its ruling by referencing information outside the trial record. Dr. Scheinfield examined the complainant in February 1984, prior to the alleged sexual conduct. The child initially attributed her pelvic pain to a bike accident but later disclosed details of sexual acts, initially naming an 18-year-old babysitter before identifying the petitioner after being encouraged by her mother to tell the truth.

Dr. Scheinfield's testimony was admitted under Rule 803(4) of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, which allows statements made for medical treatment or diagnosis to be exempt from hearsay. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the admission of this testimony, establishing ten factors to assess the trustworthiness of identity statements made to physicians in sexual abuse cases, including the age of the child, the manner of elicitation, the phrasing of statements, and the timing of the examination in relation to the alleged abuse. The court determined that the child's statements to Dr. Scheinfield were sufficiently reliable based on these factors.

The court determined that statements made by Dr. Scheinfield were necessary for the treatment and diagnosis of a child, leading to the alerting of relevant authorities. In the habeas proceeding, the district court found that the petitioner had not raised his issue as a federal constitutional matter in state courts but noted that if he did, it was unlikely to result in relief. The court examined the merits of the case for finality. The Michigan Supreme Court indicated that under the Confrontation Clause, certain evidence might be excluded even if admissible under hearsay exceptions; however, in this case, the admissibility of hearsay statements was justified under MRE 803(4), with trustworthiness established without more stringent requirements than the Confrontation Clause necessitates. 

The petitioner claimed he was denied a fair trial due to the admission of Dr. Scheinfield's testimony, citing concerns about the child's inconsistent statements, but these were effectively addressed during cross-examination without limitations. The state courts treated this as an evidentiary issue, where errors in state law do not equate to constitutional violations unless they compromise fundamental fairness. Given the child's identification of the petitioner at trial and her availability for cross-examination, the testimony was not deemed to undermine the trial's fairness.

Additionally, the petitioner argued that the Michigan Supreme Court violated his confrontation rights by relying on out-of-record evidence regarding the child's statement's trustworthiness, as the trial involved two juries for the petitioner and the child's mother. He contended that the Supreme Court relied on evidence from the mother's trial, which he did not attend. However, the court's conclusions were supported by testimony from the petitioner's trial, where the child explained her change in statement, citing her mother's encouragement to tell the truth, without objection from the petitioner.

A witness testified that she incorrectly identified individuals other than the petitioner as the offender due to influence from her mother. This testimony supports the Michigan Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the petitioner's case. The petitioner claimed a violation of his constitutional rights, arguing that his counsel failed to inform him of his right to testify. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, asserting that the counsel’s decision to keep the petitioner off the stand was a reasonable strategic choice given the petitioner's prior manslaughter conviction. The court found no evidence that the petitioner was unaware of his right to testify or that he would have chosen to testify if given the opportunity. The Michigan Court of Appeals also denied a remand for an evidentiary hearing, stating the petitioner did not indicate what his testimony would entail and found no ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court, in denying habeas relief, emphasized the strong presumption of effective counsel and noted that the petitioner failed to properly assert his claim in state court. The court observed that the petitioner acknowledged his right to testify and waived it after his conviction, supporting the conclusion that he was aware of this right. The district court's judgment was ultimately affirmed.