Tung Le appeals a decision from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied his petition to open or strike a default judgment in favor of Doung Willis for $86,907.55. Willis claimed that he hired Le for renovation work, paid him $155,000, but that Le ceased work, left projects unfinished, and did not return the funds. Le was served with the complaint in October 2019 but did not respond, leading to a default judgment entered against him in November 2019.
Le filed a petition to open the judgment in June 2021, which was heard on August 19, 2021. At this hearing, only oral arguments were presented; Le did not testify. The court allowed the petition to be amended to include a request to strike the judgment, but ultimately denied both requests.
Le raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. The court distinguishes between petitions to strike and open default judgments, indicating that both are separate legal remedies governed by different standards. The appeal is reviewed de novo for procedural issues and under an abuse of discretion standard for equitable considerations related to opening the judgment. The court concludes that the trial court's decision will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or legal error.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the law is misapplied, the judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or bias is evident. In addressing the Appellant's challenges, it is noted that a petition to strike a judgment serves as a demurrer and must be granted if a fatal defect is present on the record's face. The trial court may only consider the record at the time of judgment entry, and a petition to strike focuses on procedural defects affecting the judgment's validity, not on the merits of the allegations. The standard for identifying defects assesses whether the legal procedures for default judgment were followed.
The Appellant claims fatal defects due to: 1) misidentification of the action as an "action-in-divorce"; 2) failure to serve a copy of the complaint to Appellant; and 3) lack of record of notification regarding the entry of default judgment. Regarding the complaint's caption, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1018 requires a proper caption but states that errors in captioning do not warrant dismissal if the trial court can correct them. However, substantive inadequacies cannot be remedied in this manner. In this case, although the complaint was incorrectly labeled as an "action-in-divorce," it was ultimately recognized as a "civil action complaint," detailing causes of action for breach of contract and fraud. This mislabeling did not mislead or prejudice the Appellant, as the nature of the complaint was clear, indicating that the parties were not involved in a divorce action.
The trial court's ruling that Appellant's claim regarding a fatal defect in the complaint's caption is unfounded is upheld. Appellant also contends he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 402, proper service can occur through personal delivery to the defendant or to an adult at their residence, among other methods. Rule 405 outlines that a return of service must detail the service's date, time, location, and manner, as well as the identity of the person served. The affidavit of service confirms that Appellant was served at his Philadelphia residence on October 9, 2019, at 11:09 a.m., with details including his identity and physical characteristics. As such, the court finds no service defect. Additionally, Appellant argues that the trial court's docket lacks a record of when he was notified of the entry of default judgment. Rule 236 mandates the prothonotary to provide written notice of judgment entries to the defendant and to document this in the docket. The lack of notice does not affect the judgment's lien.
Rule 236(b) mandates that the prothonotary must record the date Rule 236 notice was given on the docket to ensure clarity and timely identification of default judgments for appellate review. In Carr v. Michuck, the court illustrated that the prothonotary can fulfill this requirement by clearly stating the notice date. The trial court docket entry in question indicates that notice was provided, fulfilling the Rule 236 requirements. Consequently, the Appellant's claim of not receiving notice is unsubstantiated. The court found no significant errors in the record justifying the striking of the default judgment.
Regarding the Appellant's petition to open the default judgment, the court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying this petition. The Appellant contended that the judgment was improperly notified under Rule 236. However, the trial court's assessment is that the Appellant did not file the petition promptly nor provide a reasonable explanation for his lack of response to the complaint. The court clarifies that a petition to open a default judgment is assessed for abuse of discretion and can consider evidence beyond the certified record. According to Rule 237.3(b)(2), if a petition is filed within ten days of the judgment and includes a meritorious defense, it must be granted. If filed later, the petitioner must demonstrate promptness, a reasonable excuse for not responding, and a meritorious defense. Failure to meet any of these criteria results in denial of the petition.
In equitable actions to open a default judgment, trial courts must assess all three components of the tripartite test if the petitioner has made a showing regarding each part. Courts have previously refrained from considering all elements when one requirement was not met; however, this contradicts the emphasis on equitable decision-making, which necessitates a holistic evaluation of circumstances and equities involved. A trial court should not treat each prong in isolation but rather consider them collectively to make an equitable determination.
Regarding the timeliness of petitions to open judgments, the measure begins from when the petitioner receives notice of the default judgment. There is no fixed time limit for filing, but delays of less than one month have been deemed prompt and timely in previous rulings. Case law supports that a one-day delay is timely, while delays of 14 and 5 days after judgment entry are also considered timely. Conversely, a delay of 41 days has been ruled untimely, with similar findings for 21 and 37-day delays.
The trial court determined that a petition to open a default judgment is typically considered timely if filed within one month of the judgment's entry. However, Appellant's petition was filed approximately 18 months late. The trial court denied the petition, noting that Appellant failed to provide a valid reason for the delay and did not demonstrate compelling circumstances. Appellant, through counsel, argued he filed promptly after discovering the default judgment but this argument was rejected. The court previously affirmed that Appellant was properly served with the complaint and notice of the default judgment entry.
Willis filed a complaint against Appellant on October 7, 2019, which Appellant was served on October 9, 2019. After failing to respond, a default judgment for $86,907.55 was entered on November 18, 2019, with notice provided the same day. Appellant claimed he was unaware of the judgment until May 27, 2021, and filed his petition on June 2, 2021, conceding it was outside the ten-day period post-judgment.
During the hearing, Appellant's counsel attributed the lack of notice to postal delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the court noted that proper notice was given well before the pandemic. Counsel also stated Appellant learned of the judgment through a title search related to property sales and claimed a meritorious defense based on the absence of a written contract in Willis's complaint. The trial court emphasized that without a timely petition, it was unnecessary to assess the merits of Appellant's reasons or defenses.
Appellant filed a petition to open a default judgment over 18 months after receiving notice of the judgment, which the trial court determined was prompt due to the appellant's claimed lack of notice. The trial court rejected the appellant's argument regarding the lack of notice, affirming that he had indeed received it. Consequently, the court ruled the petition untimely based solely on the elapsed time since the notice. However, the trial court did not address the remaining two prongs of the tripartite test for equitable considerations, which could have influenced the determination of timeliness. Despite this oversight, the appellate review found no abuse of discretion or legal error in denying the petition. The appellant's assertion of not being served with the complaint was also rejected by the trial court, which concluded that he failed to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay, thus not satisfying the second prong of the tripartite test. Furthermore, the appellant contended that the absence of a copy of the agreement in the complaint constituted a meritorious defense, but the trial court noted that the complaint must comply with Rule 1019 by specifying whether the agreement was written or oral, and if written, attaching it or explaining its unavailability.
The Appellant claimed that the agreement with Willis was oral, contradicting the inference that it was written, as indicated by the lack of a copy attached to the complaint. The Appellant's proposed answer acknowledged an agreement existed but stated it was oral, specifying that there was no price determined before the agreement. Citing precedent, it was noted that while a petitioner must articulate a defense clearly, proving the existence of an oral agreement would only show that Willis failed to label it as such in his complaint, not that the Appellant had a meritorious defense. Furthermore, the Appellant did not challenge the fraud claim in Willis's complaint, failing to meet the requirements of the third prong of the tripartite test for reopening a default judgment. Consequently, the second and third prongs did not support a timely petition to open the judgment. The order was affirmed, and judgment was entered.
