Supreme Video, Inc. v. Steven Schauz, James Thome, and One or More John Does
Docket: 93-1060
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; February 10, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
Supreme Video, Inc. filed an appeal against Steven Schauz, James Thome, and unidentified defendants regarding the seizure of videotapes under Wisconsin’s obscenity statute (Wis. Stat. Sec. 944.21). Following a previous ruling affirming the statute's constitutionality, an investigation into Supreme Video commenced, initiated by District Attorney Joseph Paulus and Detective Michael Novotny. On April 2, 1991, Schauz purchased three videotapes from Supreme Video, which he summarized in a report that led Paulus to determine probable cause for obscenity violations.
Subsequently, a search warrant was prepared based on Schauz’s affidavit, which failed to disclose that the videotapes were part of series. Judge William Crane signed the warrant without amendments. On April 6, 1991, police executed the warrant, seizing multiple copies of specific videotape volumes and business records from Supreme Video. In response, Supreme Video demanded the return of its records and duplicates, as well as a hearing to contest the seizure. The City returned some records and duplicates but retained single copies of twelve videotapes and did not hold a hearing or file charges against Supreme Video for any violations.
Supreme Video initiated legal action on July 15, 1992, alleging violations of its First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to an unlawful search and seizure conducted by Schauz and Thome. The lawsuit sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants in their personal capacities, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief in their official capacities. The defendants requested summary judgment, asserting that qualified immunity shielded them in their personal capacities and that Supreme Video was not entitled to any other relief.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that qualified immunity applied because it was objectively reasonable for Schauz and Thome to interpret 'copies' as including 'volumes.' Furthermore, the court ruled that Supreme Video could not seek injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities since it had not utilized available state procedures to reclaim the movies, referencing Wis. Stat. Sec. 968.20(1).
Supreme Video is now appealing these determinations. Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, individuals acting under state law can be held personally liable for constitutional rights deprivations, but state officials may claim qualified immunity as a defense. This immunity protects officials from civil damages if their actions were objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.
The Fourth Amendment necessitates that search warrants precisely describe the items to be seized, particularly when the basis involves ideas. Establishing that a constitutional violation occurred requires a detailed, fact-specific analysis rather than broad generalizations. The key issues in this case are whether it was clearly established at the time of seizure that referring to a series title instead of individual volume numbers was insufficiently specific for seizure and whether Schauz's failure to clarify this distinction in his affidavit exposes him to personal liability.
The legal discourse centers on the interpretation of a search warrant executed by Schauz, particularly regarding the terms 'copies' and 'volumes' as they relate to the seizure of video cassettes from the series "Wall to Wall the Way You Like It" and "Home Movie Productions." It posits that while 'copies' and 'volumes' may be distinct, a more pressing issue is whether the warrant's reference to the series titles was sufficiently specific to allow for the seizure of individual volumes. For example, a warrant allowing the seizure of "Rocky" does not extend to "Rocky II" or "Rocky III," as these are distinct titles within a series.
Conversely, the movies in question are titled "Home Movie Productions, Edition 1," "Edition 2," etc., meaning that the warrant's authorization could be interpreted as permitting the seizure of all volumes within that series, as the titles themselves are not standalone but dependent on their volume designation. Schauz's belief that the warrant allowed for the seizure of all related movies was deemed objectively reasonable.
The document also notes that no controlling law at the time of the seizure explicitly prohibited such an inference. A relevant case, Sequoia Books, Inc. v. McDonald, supports this interpretation by upholding the constitutionality of a search warrant that did not specify individual titles, suggesting that warrants do not need to itemize every specific title for lawful execution. This precedent indicates that the arguments made by Supreme Video may not hold under scrutiny, as no legal precedent required the identification of individual volumes in similar circumstances.
Supreme Video contends that probable cause to seize all films in a series requires viewing more than one film from that series. They argue that a judicial officer who reviews an affidavit referencing only a single videotape has not adequately assessed the obscenity of other tapes in the series. However, this assertion is classified as dicta, as the pertinent issue in a Section 1983 action is whether the law was clearly established at the time of the seizure. Supreme Video did not assert that, under existing law at the time, probable cause was absent. They referenced two persuasive cases and one Supreme Court case, Lo-Ji Sales, which invalidated a warrant for seizing materials similar to those described but did not address whether viewing one film in a series constituted sufficient probable cause for seizing all films. The court determined that at the time of the seizure, it was not clearly established that warrants needed to specify each film volume or that viewing one film was inadequate for probable cause regarding the entire series.
The inquiry then shifts to whether Schauz, the officer who obtained the warrant, could face personal liability for not clarifying that his affidavit referred to a series title rather than a specific film title. The distinction between 'copies' and 'volumes' is critical since law enforcement officers are prohibited from intentionally or recklessly misrepresenting material information to magistrates, including through omissions. If Schauz believed that 'copies' encompassed all works in the series, the court must evaluate whether such a belief was objectively unreasonable.
Schauz' assumption regarding the interpretation of "copies" and "volumes" in the affidavit was deemed not objectively unreasonable given the context. While dictionaries typically define "copies" as duplicates and "volumes" as parts of a series, the evaluation hinges on how a reasonable police officer would draft such an affidavit. A reasonable officer could interpret "copies" as indicating multiple movies in each series, akin to requesting several issues of a magazine. Although Schauz should have clarified that the affidavit pertained to two series, the mistake was objectively reasonable, warranting immunity from civil liability for the defendants.
Moreover, in official-capacity suits under Section 1983, the concept of qualified immunity does not apply. The district court's summary judgment for Schauz and Thome was questioned by Supreme Video, particularly regarding whether Schauz had probable cause to seize video cassettes beyond the first volumes of the identified series. The excerpt cites established Supreme Court precedents that allow police to seize single copies of films based on probable cause to preserve evidence, without needing prior determination of obscenity. If police seize more than single copies, fail to preserve films as evidence, lack probable cause, or do not provide a prompt adversarial hearing upon request, Supreme Video is entitled to the return of its seized movies.
Schauz seized multiple copies of videotapes from Supreme Video, but the City returned all duplicates and some originals, meaning Supreme Video is not entitled to an injunction for tapes already in its possession. If Schauz seized the only copy of a tape, the trial court should permit duplication for viewing until an obscenity determination is made, although the record does not confirm if that was the case. Supreme Video has the burden to prove that Schauz seized its only copy, a burden it has not met.
Supreme Video acknowledged that the seizures were for evidentiary purposes related to criminal prosecutions under the Wisconsin obscenity statute, disqualifying it from claiming improper motive as grounds for the return of the tapes. The district court did not address whether probable cause existed for the seizure, but noted that Wisconsin law provides a procedure for the return of seized property. Supreme Video can pursue a Section 1983 action without exhausting state remedies if the tapes were seized without probable cause, which the district court must now determine.
Although Supreme Video requested a prompt adversarial hearing, it did so informally and did not fulfill the requirement to formally move for such a hearing in Circuit Court. The opportunity for this remains available.
Additionally, Supreme Video contests the district court's summary judgment against its request for a declaratory judgment. Qualified immunity does not apply in official-capacity suits, so Supreme Video could be entitled to declaratory relief if it proves Schauz executed an unconstitutional search warrant, regardless of the reasonableness of his actions. To obtain declaratory relief, Supreme Video must also demonstrate a violation of its rights by Schauz and Thome.
The district court did not address the constitutionality of the search warrant or the appropriateness of declaratory relief before granting summary judgment in favor of Schauz and Thome on all claims by Supreme Video, including declaratory relief. As the central issues were unaddressed, Schauz and Thome could not be deemed entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the declaratory relief claim. The court must evaluate whether Schauz executed the warrant constitutionally and whether declaratory relief is appropriate; if so, the request must be granted, and if not, it must be denied. The district court erred by dismissing the request for declaratory relief.
Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed concerning the dismissal of personal capacity claims against all defendants, reversed regarding Supreme Video's request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and remanded for further determination on that request.
The search warrant permitted Detective Schauz to seize specific video cassettes and related documentation, with Supreme Video alleging various constitutional violations, primarily under the Fourth Amendment, including the seizure of property beyond the warrant's scope, misrepresentations in the warrant application, and a lack of prompt judicial review post-seizure. Supreme Video's appeal focuses on the first two claims.
The title of each movie is considered to be "Home Movie Productions," with the edition number not part of the title. A warrant's language must either encompass all movies or none if it lacks specificity. Evidence, including Supreme Video's response, indicates that Detective Schauz did not purchase individual videocassettes with complete titles as they are part of series, each labeled with volume or edition numbers. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a warrant specifying a particular volume prohibits the seizure of other volumes not described in the warrant. In this situation, the warrant referred generally to movie series titles rather than specific volumes, which is a crucial distinction.
Further complicating the case is the fact that Schauz recognized the multi-volume nature of the works when the warrant was issued. Previous cases did not directly resolve whether a warrant identifying a movie series title allows seizure of all series movies. The magistrate judge likely interpreted "copies" in the warrant to mean different volumes in the series. Without a prior obscenity determination, law enforcement may only seize one copy of each movie for evidence, based on probable cause. However, Schauz seized duplicates, which were later returned, yet his belief that "copies" included "volumes" was still reasonable.
Supreme Video contends the district court erred by addressing the qualified immunity issue without first determining if a constitutional right was violated. Relevant case law does not mandate that courts address the violation question before assessing whether the right was clearly established. Finally, the criteria for granting a declaratory judgment require a controversy between parties with adverse legal interests, demonstrating sufficient immediacy and reality.
