Travis Butler appeals his life sentence following convictions for enticing a minor and producing child pornography. He argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable due to the district court's failure to consider mitigation arguments, reliance on improper factors, and an unreasonable assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors. The Eleventh Circuit affirms the sentence, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. Butler was arrested in November 2019 on a five-count indictment related to illicit sexual conduct with a 15-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to two counts, enticement of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) and production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e)). The case stemmed from two Cybertips indicating that Butler had solicited the victim online and received child pornography via Facebook Messenger. Investigations confirmed Butler's prior conviction for sexual offenses and revealed plans to meet the victim in Tennessee for sexual activity. A victim impact statement from the victim's father highlighted the emotional devastation caused by Butler's actions and his betrayal of trust.
The Presentence Investigation (PSI) calculated Butler's Sentencing Guidelines range by grouping Counts One and Two under U.S.S.G. 3D1.2(a) due to their involvement with the same victim and transaction. For Count Two, a base offense level of 32 was assigned under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(a), with two additional levels added for the involvement of a minor aged 12 to 16 (U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(1)(B)) and for multiple occurrences of a sexual relationship (U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(2)(A)). An extra two levels were included for using a cellphone to solicit participation (U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii)), resulting in an adjusted offense level of 38. Additionally, Butler was identified as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors, maintaining the offense level at 38. A two-level reduction was applied for acceptance of responsibility, lowering the total offense level to 36.
Butler's criminal history was initially categorized as IV, based on eight points, primarily from three controlled substance convictions and a two-count conviction in 2006 for lewd and lascivious battery and contributing to the delinquency of a child. The latter conviction involved the sexual assault of a 12-year-old victim, resulting in her pregnancy. The PSI also noted that Butler had previously impregnated another minor but was not charged for that offense. Due to his status as a repeat offender, his criminal history category was raised to V. The final PSI indicated a Guidelines imprisonment range of 292–365 months, which was adjusted to 300–365 months due to a mandatory minimum of 25 years (300 months) associated with Count Two. This calculation was upheld by the district court and is unchallenged on appeal.
At sentencing, Butler requested the minimum sentence of 25 years, arguing that he would be over 70 upon release and citing research on recidivism rates among sexual offenders. He contended that the victim was a willing participant who misrepresented her age and that he confused her with her older sister. Personal information included in the PSI noted that Butler had four children with different mothers, two of whom were minors at the time of conception.
In the sentencing hearing, Butler's argument centered on a 2002 deposition from the victim’s mother, which highlighted perceptions of her daughter’s age. He claimed that his criminal history, including marijuana sales, led to his introduction to minors involved in drug use and sexual activities. Butler contended he was not a predator and asserted a low likelihood of reoffending under supervision.
Conversely, the Government sought a sentence at the upper end of the Guidelines range or beyond, citing the severity of Butler's offenses, including engaging in sexual acts with the victim, enticing her to produce child pornography, and attempting to involve a third party in a violent encounter. The Government referenced Butler's prior convictions for sexual offenses and other crimes, arguing that indefinite incapacitation was necessary to protect the public.
During the hearing, the district court questioned why the Government had not pursued charges under the federal three strikes provision (18 U.S.C. 3559(c)), which could have mandated life imprisonment. The Government indicated uncertainty about its applicability but believed the same sentence could be achieved otherwise. The court expressed that it could have successfully prosecuted under this provision based on the facts presented.
The district court characterized Butler as a dangerous offender, noting a significant history of abusive conduct towards minors. It pointed out an "anomaly" in the Guidelines that prevented the application of U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b) due to Butler’s prior sex offenses, which would have increased his offense level significantly. The court remarked that Butler’s criminal history had not been fully accounted for in the Guidelines range and established a pattern of 18 years of abusive conduct.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that Butler's repeated offenses indicated he had not changed, stating that society could not afford to give him another chance. As a result, it decided to vary from the Guidelines and impose a life sentence, emphasizing that no lesser sentence would adequately protect the community from future sexual crimes against children.
The court determined that the Guidelines calculation and the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence were inadequate for Mr. Butler, primarily to protect the community and deter future offenses. Consequently, Butler was sentenced to life imprisonment on Count One and 50 years on Count Two, to be served concurrently. The court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) without changes and reiterated key considerations such as Butler's history of sex crimes and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. It acknowledged that the facts could have supported a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3559. The court rejected Butler's arguments regarding the willingness of his victims and the absence of child pornography as insufficient to warrant a lesser sentence.
In Butler's appeal regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, the review standard is for abuse of discretion, with emphasis on whether the district court properly weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. A sentence is deemed substantively unreasonable if the court fails to consider relevant factors, improperly weighs irrelevant factors, or shows clear judgment error in its assessment. The sentencing court must impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, and protects the public, while also considering the nature of the offense and the defendant's history to avoid disparities among similarly situated defendants. The discretion in weighing these factors lies with the district court, and appellate courts will not intervene as long as the sentence remains reasonable.
A district court has the discretion to prioritize certain 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when imposing a sentence, with a presumption of reasonableness for sentences within the Guidelines range, but no such presumption for those outside it. When a court opts for a variance from the Guidelines, it must carefully justify the decision, particularly if the sentence is significantly lenient or harsh. Upward variances can be based on uncharged conduct, the defendant's history, and the need for deterrence and public protection. The court has broad discretion in considering a defendant's criminal history when determining if the Guidelines range is insufficient.
In the case discussed, the district court's life sentence for Butler was deemed substantively reasonable. The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to properly weigh relevant factors; it considered Butler’s age, treatment amenability, acceptance of responsibility, and his prior offenses. However, these factors were found to be either aggravating or irrelevant. The court emphasized Butler's long history of sexual abuse, which indicated a lack of deterrence from prior sentences. Butler failed to identify any irrelevant factors that were unduly weighted by the court, as the considerations of his sexual offenses and the need to protect the community were both pertinent and justifiably weighted in his sentencing.
Defense counsel emphasized the importance of community protection during sentencing, asserting it should be the primary consideration. The district court concurred that this factor is significant but concluded it did not favor Butler. Butler failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in weighing the sentencing factors. The court maintained that the discretion to assign weight to each factor under 3553(a) is within its purview, and it did not err in its judgment. The district court accurately calculated the applicable Guidelines range but determined that it inadequately represented Butler's criminal history and the need for public safety, a conclusion supported by Supreme Court precedent allowing variances based on the judge's assessment of the 3553(a) factors. Butler's challenge to the district court's focus on specific sentencing factors was deemed insufficient to prove any unjustified reliance. Consequently, the district court's life sentence for Butler was found to be substantively reasonable, and its judgment was affirmed.
