CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, INC. and HERBERT SIMPSON v. THE CITY OF DANIA BEACH, FLORIDA, BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, and DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, LLC
Docket: 21-1306
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 13, 2022; Florida; State Appellate Court
Appellants Citizens for Responsible Development, Inc. and Herbert Simpson appealed a final judgment from the Circuit Court challenging the approval procedures of the City of Dania Beach regarding development agreements for the expansion of the Dania Jai Alai pari-mutuel facility by Dania Entertainment Center, LLC. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against both the City and Broward County for alleged violations of the required review process. The trial court ruled that the appellants lacked standing, citing their failure to demonstrate special damages as required under the precedent established in Renard v. Dade County. However, the appellate court disagreed, asserting that since the appellants were contesting the process of enacting the development agreements rather than the agreements themselves, they were not obligated to show special damages to establish standing. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's final judgment. The case stems from a series of development agreements beginning in 2006, when the City entered into a contract with Aragon Group, Inc., which included plans for renovating the Jai Alai facility and constructing a new gaming venue. In 2007, Broward County approved the site for a substantial gaming facility and additional residential and park developments. In 2011, Dania Entertainment Center sought to amend the existing agreement to incorporate new features, including a marina and hotels, with legal counsel suggesting the facility was exempt from city regulations. Prior to the city commission meeting on the proposed amendments, a letter from the Broward County Planning Council indicated that the city did not need to allocate land use intensities under the relevant land use designation.
Mr. Sniezek's letter indicates that the proposed hotel and marina are situated on land classified as a pari-mutuel by the State of Florida. According to Florida Statute 550.155(2), this proposed use qualifies as a "capital improvement" associated with a licensed permitholder at a pari-mutuel facility established prior to June 23, 1981. The Planning Council staff, after consulting with legal advisors, concluded that these proposed uses do not require land use intensity allocations under the permitted uses of the Regional Activity Center (RAC), pending review by the City of Dania Beach and compliance with other relevant Florida statutes.
The referenced statute allows for the approval of capital improvements by permitholders unless a local government demonstrates that the improvement poses a significant health or safety risk to residents, provided the permitholder covers building permit costs and meets specified criteria regarding regional impact and site contiguity.
In August 2011, during a city commission meeting, city staff recommended the approval of an amended development agreement with DEC, which was unanimously approved following public comments. There were no further public meetings or development code reviews prior to the agreement, which affirmed the absence of immediate health hazards related to the proposed improvements. The county did not participate in this agreement.
Litigation commenced in 2011 when Citizens for Responsible Development (CFRD) and Herbert Simpson filed a lawsuit against the city, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. CFRD claims to represent affected residents, while Simpson, a legally blind individual residing nearby, contended that the amended development agreement was invalid due to the city’s failure to adhere to the Florida Local Government Development Agreement Act.
Plaintiffs requested an injunction to compel city compliance with the Act, and DEC intervened. During the pending lawsuit, the county approved two amendments to the Dania Jai-Alai Plat in 2011 and 2012. The 2011 amendment introduced multiple approved uses, including an additional 15 acres for a pari-mutuel facility with the potential for 500 hotel rooms, 60 marina slips, and 45,000 square feet of commercial space, while eliminating 54 dwelling units and a park. The planning council determined that, according to Chapter 550.155 of Florida Statutes, the new pari-mutuel uses were exempt from the Dania Beach Regional Activity Center regulations. The 2012 amendment aligned with Florida Department of Transportation’s conditions from the 2011 amendment. In 2014, DEC proposed a 'second amended agreement' adding a multi-story parking garage and a banquet hall, which was approved after public hearings where community concerns, particularly about traffic, were voiced. CFRD’s counsel objected to a hearing as improperly noticed, attempting to present evidence of potential hazards related to the development, but this evidence was rejected. Following approval of the second amended agreement, CFRD and Simpson amended their complaint, asserting that the city disregarded three sets of development laws, including the Development Agreement Act and local codes, and that city hearings in 2011 and 2014 violated public participation requirements. They claimed the development conflicted with city codes and alleged the city improperly granted DEC excessive leeway under section 550.155(2). Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments to declare that section 550.155 did not apply and that both the 2011 and 2014 agreements were void, as well as a declaration deeming section 550.155 unconstitutional. Additionally, they sought injunctive relief to nullify the approval of the development agreements due to failure to adhere to public notice and hearing requirements, compelling the city to comply with section 163.3225.
Plaintiffs included the county as a defendant, alleging it misinterpreted section 550.155 of Florida Statutes, mistakenly believing it exempted existing pari-mutuels from local land use regulations. They claimed the county failed to investigate compliance of the Dania Jai Alai facility with this statute. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment regarding the county's reliance on section 550.155 in relation to the 2011 and 2014 development agreements, arguing the county either misapplied the statute or neglected to enforce its land use code. Defendants countered with several defenses, including the plaintiffs' lack of standing. Cross-motions for summary judgment ensued, with the trial court ultimately ruling in favor of the defendants, stating the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an "injury-in-fact" necessary for standing. The court also found that CFRD did not establish associational standing, as it did not show that a substantial number of its members were significantly affected by the redevelopment approval. Citing the case Renard v. Dade County, the court emphasized that plaintiffs must show special damages to enforce zoning ordinances. Both CFRD and Simpson appealed, with the appellate review standard being de novo. The trial court correctly referenced Renard, which outlined the standing requirements for various zoning ordinance challenges. Specifically, it maintained that special damages are necessary to enforce a valid zoning ordinance, while a legally recognizable interest adversely affected by zoning actions grants standing to challenge such ordinances. Affected residents or property owners have standing to contest an improperly enacted ordinance.
A party seeking redress for alleged violations of municipal zoning ordinances must demonstrate special damages unique to them, rather than general damages experienced by the community. Citing case law, including Rhodes v. City of Homestead, the document emphasizes that individuals can challenge zoning decisions without proving special damages if they claim the actions were illegal or not properly enacted per local charter requirements. This principle allows plaintiffs to contest the legality of development agreements based on procedural inadequacies, such as inadequate notice, rather than substantive zoning issues.
The plaintiffs assert that the city failed to adhere to their land use code and the Local Government Development Agreement Act, which provides grounds for their challenge. They must show they are "affected" by the ordinance, a lesser burden than proving special damages. Specific plaintiffs, including a legally blind resident facing traffic dangers and a non-profit organization with members impacted by the development, establish standing based on their proximity and interests in responsible development. Additionally, the plaintiffs have standing under Florida Statutes section 163.3243, allowing aggrieved parties to seek injunctive relief regarding development agreements, as defined in section 163.3215(2).
Adverse interests must surpass the general community interest to establish standing under section 163.3215, which aims to address governmental non-compliance with comprehensive plans rather than individual damages. This statute broadens standing requirements, allowing citizens adversely affected by local actions to enforce comprehensive plans, as seen in cases like Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel and Parker v. Leon Cnty. Unlike the Renard standard, which necessitates a showing of special damages, section 163.3215 only requires proof of an adverse effect exceeding the common interest. The legislative intent favors enforcement by those affected, exemplified by plaintiff Simpson, whose legal blindness heightens his risk from increased traffic due to facility expansion. In contrast, a non-profit corporation was denied standing in Imhof v. Walton County because it failed to demonstrate an interest beyond that of the general public, reaffirming the statute's focus on compliance with comprehensive plans rather than individual plaintiff damages.
Standing under the statute is determined by the significance of the party's interest rather than its distinctiveness. A party can establish standing by demonstrating that their activities related to a protected interest surpass those of the general public, as highlighted in the case of Willis. The court found that a corporation acting as a watchdog had standing due to its heightened interest compared to the average public member. Additionally, an organization has a greater interest when its purpose includes protecting an adversely affected interest, which supports CFRD's standing in asserting Chapter 163 claims.
The county argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because it was not a party to the development agreements, claiming no redressable injury resulted from its actions. However, the plaintiffs contended that the county failed to conduct the necessary review process for development applications, improperly exempting them under section 550.155. This procedural argument was deemed sufficient for standing. The county also suggested a lack of adversity between the parties, but this issue was not addressed on appeal since the trial court's focus was solely on standing. The trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs lacked standing was deemed erroneous, leading to a reversal and remand for further proceedings.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on three main arguments: the inapplicability of section 550.155 to the Dania Jai Alai expansion, the invalidity of the development agreements due to noncompliance with local zoning ordinances, and the unconstitutional nature of section 550.155. They claimed that the county did not assess compliance with section 550.155. The Dania Entertainment Center and the City of Dania contended that section 550.155 did apply and exempted the expansion from zoning ordinances, while Broward County claimed it had no involvement in the development agreements.
Litigants must establish standing to access the court's power, which requires demonstrating a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy with a legally cognizable interest affected by the litigation's outcome. The Florida Supreme Court outlines three standing requirements: (1) injury in fact, which must be concrete and imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the alleged conduct; and (3) a substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the injury. In this case, the trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet these requirements, citing a lack of 'special injury' related to increased traffic that did not pertain to the individual plaintiff’s property. The court noted that the plaintiffs' argument conflated development agreements with zoning ordinances, which the majority's focus on the Renard case failed to address accurately. The plaintiffs alleged that the City neglected state law requirements regarding a proposed mega-expansion, arguing that the planned uses were not permitted under applicable zoning regulations. This claim aligns with Renard’s discussion on standing to enforce zoning ordinances, necessitating a demonstration of 'special injury,' which the plaintiffs did not provide.
A development agreement is characterized as a contract between a local government and a property developer, granting vested rights by freezing zoning regulations in exchange for public benefits. Zoning ordinances, however, are local legislative actions and not contractual agreements. The plaintiffs' request to enforce zoning ordinances on development agreements requires demonstrating special injury under the Renard standard, which the plaintiffs failed to establish. The individual plaintiff, who is legally blind, claimed increased traffic from a development caused an injury-in-fact; however, this claim was deemed conjectural and not a concrete injury. Increased traffic is considered a general inconvenience shared by the community, not a special injury. Additionally, for the association plaintiff to prove standing, it must show a significant portion of its members are impacted by the rule, that the issue aligns with the association's interests, and that the requested relief is appropriate for the association. The trial court found no evidence of a substantial impact on its members, leading to the conclusion that both the individual and association plaintiffs lack standing.
The majority opinion asserts that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated sufficient standing to challenge the ordinance or development agreements. The individual plaintiff's claim of being affected by increased traffic, due to living three-quarters of a mile away and being legally blind, fails to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement established in previous cases (J.P. and Renard). The association representing the plaintiffs also did not prove that any of its members experienced a significant injury distinct from the general community.
Regarding standing under Section 163.3243, the majority finds that it provides no greater standing than general rules. This statute allows "aggrieved or adversely affected" parties to seek injunctive relief but requires that any adverse effect must exceed the general interest shared by the community. The plaintiffs have not shown an injury that is more severe than that of the public at large. The court references Coastal Development of North Florida, which emphasizes that an affected party must allege a specific injury when contesting a zoning decision. The individual plaintiff's assertion of increased traffic does not constitute a significant injury, particularly since he has not experienced any actual or imminent harm.
Additionally, the County contends it is not involved with the development agreements and lacks control over the City’s decisions, thereby asserting it has no standing under Section 163.3243. Overall, the conclusion is that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims.
The plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief against the County, rendering the relevant statute inapplicable. They also failed to satisfy the "special injury" or "injury in fact" requirement necessary for standing, which includes causal connection and redressability. The County cites DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, where the plaintiffs’ claims against state officials were dismissed due to insufficient causation and redressability, as local school districts had discretion over in-person learning decisions. Similarly, the County is not responsible for the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, which stem from the City’s approval of development agreements. The Developmental Environmental Committee (DEC) and the City, not the County, were the relevant parties responsible for any alleged harm. The plaintiffs’ reliance on the 2011 Sniezek Opinion is misplaced, as it was issued by the Planning Council, a separate entity over which the County had no control. The development agreements do not indicate that the Sniezek Opinion dictated the City’s actions. An adverse ruling against the County would not remedy the plaintiffs’ injuries since the County lacks authority over the City, DEC, or the development agreements. Therefore, the plaintiffs lack standing to sue the County. Furthermore, the trial court only addressed the standing issue, leaving other raised issues unexamined. However, the defendants also sought summary judgment based on the proper approval of the development agreements under section 550.155, which warrants exploration under the Tipsy Coachman rule, allowing affirmation of the trial court's decision based on alternate, properly raised reasons. Section 550.155(2) presumes approval of capital improvements for pari-mutuel facilities with specific conditions.
A capital improvement proposed by a licensed permitholder at a pari-mutuel facility existing since June 23, 1981, requires municipal or county approval unless it poses a justifiable and immediate hazard to local residents’ health and safety. Approval is contingent upon the permitholder paying for a building permit and meeting specific criteria: the improvement must not qualify as a development of regional impact and must be contiguous to or within the existing facility. The City and County did not assert that the proposed improvement posed such a hazard, nor did it qualify as a development of regional impact, therefore the improvement was subject to approval under section 550.155(2).
Plaintiffs claimed that section 550.155(2) is unconstitutional as a special law improperly enacted as a general law, but this challenge is invalid unless it directly affects the plaintiffs' rights. The constitutional challenge is also time-barred due to a four-year statute of limitations and the statute's enactment over twenty years ago. The standing of a resident living three-quarters of a mile from the facility is questioned, as they do not have a direct property interest affected by the law. The perspective on the case is noted to differ from the majority opinion, suggesting an affirmation of the ruling, pending any timely filed motion for rehearing.
