United States v. Julio Cesar Urias

Citations: 15 F.3d 1094; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6837; 1994 WL 32619Docket: 92-10069

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 2, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 states that non-published dispositions should not be cited except under specific legal doctrines. In the case of United States v. Julio Cesar Urias, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine, while the jury acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute. Testimonies from DEA informant Rudy Lopez, Urias's cousin Elizabeth Frisby, and surveillance officers formed the basis of the prosecution's case. Lopez asserted that Urias participated in negotiating a cocaine sale and assisted Frisby during a transaction. Frisby contradicted herself by stating that she received the cocaine from Urias and paid him a portion of the proceeds. Surveillance officers observed Urias engaging in suspicious activities outside the hotel during the sale.

Urias challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of his prior felony conviction. The court analyzed whether sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction, stating that any rational jury could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. To establish conspiracy, the government needed to demonstrate overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Urias argued that the evidence presented was insufficient, claiming that Frisby's testimony was undermined by his acquittal on the possession charge and that Lopez lacked credibility. He also contended that his behavior outside the hotel was merely indicative of proximity to illegal activity rather than active involvement in the conspiracy, referencing prior case law to support his argument.

Defendant contends that prior case law is distinguishable from his situation, as he did not possess weapons or touch contraband, nor did he exhibit significant financial involvement or make incriminating statements. He argues the surveillance officers' testimony should be deemed incredible. The prosecution counters that a defendant's mere presence can imply an overt act when considered with other evidence, and that conspiracy can be established through circumstantial evidence, requiring only a slight connection to the conspiracy. The prosecution likens Defendant to the individual in United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, where the evidence was deemed sufficient due to the defendant's proximity to drug transactions and his association with a ringleader. The court favors the prosecution's argument, asserting that the testimonies supporting the conviction must be taken in the government's favor, leaving credibility assessments to the jury. The court concludes that even if the jury doubted Defendant's direct possession of cocaine, other evidence sufficiently links him to the conspiracy.

Regarding the admission of prior drug conviction evidence, the court reviews it for plain error due to Defendant's failure to object, noting that such error must significantly affect substantial rights. Although Defendant does not challenge the purpose of the prior conviction's admission—showing knowledge and intent—he argues it is appropriate only when those elements are material to the case, positing that his lack of testimony removes those issues from contention. Additionally, he claims that the prejudicial impact of the prior conviction outweighed its probative value, given that other testimonies addressed intent and knowledge.

Appellee asserts that Defendant's failure to object to the admission of a prior conviction bars any appeal on the matter, referencing Luce v. United States and United States v. Williams to support this claim. Appellee argues that issues not raised during the trial are typically not considered on appeal, and no exceptions apply here. Alternatively, Appellee contends the prior conviction was admissible under Rule 404(b) to demonstrate Defendant's intent and knowledge, citing precedent from United States v. McKoy and further clarifying that intent is always at issue in specific intent crimes, per United States v. Hadley and United States v. Spillone. The admission of the conviction was justified as it provided relevant context regarding Defendant's understanding of drug sales, and the court had issued an appropriate limiting instruction under Rule 403. The jury's acquittal on one count suggests that the conviction did not unduly influence their decision-making. Consequently, the admission of evidence was deemed not to constitute plain error. The court affirmed the decision, noting the case's submission without oral argument and restricting its citation as per circuit rules.