Geyer, L. v. Austin-Young, K.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 1133 MDA 2021

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; July 8, 2022; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Kiley Austin-Young appeals three orders issued under the Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act, prohibiting him from contacting family members Lesley, John, and Devon Geyer for one year. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the orders due to insufficient evidence and an incorrect burden of proof. The Geyers filed their PFA petitions on July 13 and 15, 2021, alleging that Kiley threatened them through text messages and social media, entered their home without permission, and made violent threats, including references to a "Ruby Ridge Situation." Lesley Geyer noted that Kiley has a pending terroristic threats case and an arrest warrant for assault. John Geyer claimed that Kiley threatened him with an index lien and advised him to invest in firearms. Devon Geyer described a pattern of threatening behavior from Kiley, including unauthorized entry onto her property and assertions of having firearms. Temporary PFA orders were issued on July 15, 2021, followed by a final hearing on July 22, 2021, where evidence of Kiley's alleged substance abuse and emotional disorders was presented. The court affirmed the orders based on the presented evidence.

Lesley testified that the Appellant has a history of hospitalization for psychiatric issues and substance abuse. She described Appellant as aggressive and violent when drinking, causing her to fear for her safety. In 2015, he broke into her house while under the influence. Although Appellant did not directly threaten Lesley with violence, she interpreted his statement about making her life miserable as threatening. John Geyer recounted receiving a letter from Appellant implying threats regarding firearms and property invasion, which John felt posed a risk of personal injury given Appellant's history of assaults. John also noted Appellant's provocative comments on social media. Devon Geyer stopped communicating with Appellant after witnessing his intoxication and received a text from him stating he was on her property, heightening her fear of injury when he was using substances. Appellant claimed the issues stemmed from a property dispute and denied making threats of bodily harm. The court ultimately issued final Protection from Abuse (PFA) orders against Appellant for Lesley, John, and Devon. Appellant appealed, questioning whether it was erroneous to issue the PFA orders given the testimonies indicating a lack of direct threats and the alleged misapplication of the "perceived fear" standard. The review of PFA orders involves assessing the trial court's legal conclusions for errors or abuse of discretion, requiring evidence of abuse to be established by a preponderance rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is reviewed favorably to the petitioner to determine if it supports the court's conclusions.

The Court defers to the trial court's credibility determinations regarding witnesses. Under the PFA Act, "abuse" encompasses actions that instill reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury and engaging in conduct that causes such fear. The Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by focusing solely on perceived abuse and the fear generated in the petitioners, contending that the court overlooked the statutory requirement for fear to be "reasonable" and "imminent." He asserts that the petitioners, by continuously engaging with his social media posts, did not demonstrate reasonable fear. Additionally, he points out that the petitioners testified they were not previously afraid of him and had interacted with him despite his violent criminal history. 

Specifically, the Appellant challenges the testimony of Lesley, who purportedly provided expert insights into his emotional state and referenced hearsay about his treatment, arguing it should not have influenced the court. He also highlights that neither Lesley nor John reported direct threats from him, and his comments about guns were made indirectly and on social media. Regarding Devon, he notes her choice to buy property in proximity to him undermines her claims of fear. 

In rejecting the sufficiency challenge, the trial court considered the Appellant's past crimes, the anxious demeanor of the petitioners during testimony, and the circumstances of the Appellant's presence in their home at night. The court found that the Appellant's belief that a direct threat was necessary for a PFA was misguided and noted that he did not deny the complaints against him. The court accepted the petitioners' fear as credible, linking it to the Appellant's history of violence and inappropriate communications, ultimately concluding that his past behavior created a reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury for the petitioners.

No abuse of discretion was found in the court's decision regarding the appellant's behavior toward the petitioners. The appellant acknowledged making repeated threatening remarks, including suggestions of violence and intrusion into the petitioners' home and property. Testimonies indicated that the appellant has substance abuse issues, emotional problems, and a history of violence, including prior assaults. The court considered the collective impact of the appellant's actions on all three petitioners, who were all aware of his threats and conduct toward one another, which contributed to their reasonable fear of bodily injury. The evidence was viewed favorably toward the petitioners, supporting the court's finding that they were in reasonable fear as defined under Pennsylvania law. The appellant's argument that the court focused too much on perceived abuse rather than direct threats was countered by the court's acknowledgment that past instances of abuse are relevant in understanding the fear generated by the appellant's communications. The appellant also contended that the court applied an incorrect standard of proof, asserting that the statute requires a determination of reasonable fear, rather than perceived fear.

The appellant has waived the issue of the court's application of the standard of proof in assessing the sufficiency of evidence for Protection from Abuse (PFA) orders by failing to include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). The order served to notify the appellant of this requirement, making any issues not properly included in the timely filed statement waived. The trial court's order triggers the appellant's obligation to raise issues on appeal. Since the appellant did not allege an incorrect standard of proof in his Rule 1925(b) statement, this claim is not available for review. Furthermore, even if the claim were not waived, the court's comments indicate that it properly assessed the petitioners' reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury, supported by evidence of texts, trespass, and past violence. Therefore, the claim regarding the incorrect standard of proof is deemed meritless. The court's orders are affirmed, and judgment is entered.