Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 13, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
Kroening appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to conspiracy to manufacture and possess methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He claims legal innocence and asserts his plea was insufficient under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the district court's decision.
In February 1991, Kroening and co-defendant Marvin Evans engaged in discussions about manufacturing methamphetamine with a confidential informant, which was recorded. The informant later delivered ephedrine to their residence, and Evans subsequently provided methamphetamine to the informant. Kroening was arrested in May 1991 and initially pleaded not guilty before entering a plea agreement in September 1991, pleading guilty to conspiracy while the government dismissed a possession charge.
During the plea hearing, the district judge questioned Kroening about his understanding of the offense, the waiver of constitutional rights, and the implications of his plea. Kroening affirmed his guilt and acknowledged having no valid defense. His sentencing was postponed multiple times, and he attempted to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing on May 4, 1992, which the district court denied.
The district court may allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn before sentencing if the defendant shows "any fair and just reason." However, there is no right to withdraw a plea, and post-sentencing withdrawals require a showing of "manifest injustice." The court's denial of the plea withdrawal is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Kroening contends that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea due to his claim of legal innocence, asserting that the only evidence against him was an audio recording in which he discussed methamphetamine manufacturing. He argues the remaining evidence was insufficient. However, he presented no new evidence of innocence or intervening circumstances, other than dissatisfaction with his proposed sentence. Established case law indicates that a mere assertion of innocence, without substantial supporting evidence, is insufficient to overturn a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Additionally, a defendant cannot withdraw a guilty plea simply based on a change of heart or the severity of the sentence.
In this case, Kroening waited nearly eight months to file his motion to withdraw, during which his co-defendants were sentenced. This delay led the district court to reasonably conclude that his request was not genuine. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion based on his tardy assertion of innocence and disappointment with the sentence.
Kroening also challenged the district court's reliance on United States v. Carr as a guideline for evaluating his motion, claiming it was inappropriate. However, the court considered a range of cases from various circuits, including those cited by Kroening, and did not base its decision solely on Carr. Furthermore, Kroening argued that his guilty plea was insufficient under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, contending that his admission of participation in only the taped conversation did not legally constitute a guilty plea to the conspiracy charge.
Kroening argues for the application of Nevarez-Diaz v. United States, where the court reversed a guilty plea withdrawal due to the defendant's lack of understanding stemming from language barriers and limited education. However, the district court distinguishes Kroening's case, noting his higher education level (high school diploma and advanced training), familiarity with the criminal justice system from prior convictions, and his clear acknowledgment of understanding the charge and his guilt. At the plea hearing, the district court adhered to Rule 11 requirements, ensuring Kroening comprehended the charge, which is intended to guarantee that defendants fully understand the implications of their pleas. Granting Kroening's motion to withdraw based solely on a change of mind would undermine the purpose of Rule 11 and render plea proceedings ineffective. Additionally, Kroening's assertion that withdrawal would not prejudice the government is deemed insufficient without further justification. He did not file his withdrawal motion until after his co-defendants were sentenced and after reviewing his presentence report. Kroening failed to demonstrate "manifest injustice" or provide a fair justification for his request. Consequently, the district court’s denial of the motion is affirmed, with the ruling not intended for publication or citation in the circuit.
