The opinion is subject to formal revision prior to publication. In the case of Bruce E. Gardner, who appealed a denial of a significant portion of his compensation for guardianship services rendered to Mary Wilson, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings. Gardner, representing himself, had been appointed as Wilson's guardian in July 2016 and sought $9,108.00 for services from July 2018 to July 2019, including $347.78 in costs. The trial court awarded him $6,400.35 in fees and $206.65 in costs, deeming some requests excessive and others noncompensable. Gardner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting his appeal.
Compensation for court-appointed guardians is governed by D.C. Code § 21-2060 and Superior Court Probate Rule 308, which require detailed petitions for fee requests. The court evaluates whether compensation is reasonable, and requests can be reviewed for abuse of discretion. A significant portion of Gardner's request was for travel time to meet Wilson, which the trial court acknowledged as compensable but reduced the travel fee by half, questioning the reasonableness of the hours calculated based on his office location in Bowie, Maryland, compared to a potential District of Columbia office.
The court found that calculating travel time based on an attorney's D.C. office address aligns with the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) guidelines, which state that if travel time from an attorney's home or office exceeds the time from the courthouse, the attorney is entitled only to the lesser of the two. Mr. Gardner contested the trial court's decision to cut his compensation request for travel and mileage by 50%, particularly the reliance on CJA guidelines for guardians’ travel time. He argued that travel should be calculated from his home office in Bowie, asserting several points: his D.C. address is merely a mailing location, previous fee petitions from his Bowie office were granted, Bowie is considered local in various contexts, and traveling from Bowie would be more efficient and cost-effective than from the D.C. address or courthouse.
The court recognized the absence of specific guidelines for guardians and noted that looking to CJA guidelines was not an abuse of discretion, although they do not fully endorse their application in guardianship cases. A remand was mandated for clarification on the trial court's rationale for the 50% reduction in compensation, especially in light of how it determined that travel from Maryland was the "greater" under CJA guidelines. Furthermore, the trial court's inconsistent application of CJA guidelines in different cases involving Mr. Gardner necessitated an explanation to ensure proper exercise of discretion.
The trial court's reliance on potentially inaccurate information regarding Mr. Gardner's office location on Pennsylvania Avenue raises concerns about the validity of its conclusions. Mr. Gardner asserts that while he receives mail at that address, he does not maintain a physical office there; instead, his only functioning office is at home in Bowie. This discrepancy could have influenced the court's ruling, which should be clarified on remand.
Mr. Gardner also contends that the probate court improperly denied him compensation for time spent preparing service summaries and electronically filing documents. His fee petition included 12.8 hours for summaries at $90 per hour, totaling $1,152, with many entries categorized as 'prepared summary of description of services provided to date.' The court deemed these summaries clerical, noncompensable tasks, describing Mr. Gardner's updates as excessive and redundant. Although the court allowed compensation for filing fees associated with electronic filings, it classified the actual filing time as clerical and therefore noncompensable, citing an unpublished case, In re Williams, which supported this position.
Additionally, the court denied compensation for unspecified 'reading notifications,' which Mr. Gardner did not contest on appeal. The Guardianship Act permits guardians to be compensated for services related to guardianships, with broad language indicating that a guardian's work, including appeals for compensation, may be compensated without needing to demonstrate direct benefit to the ward. There is ambiguity regarding reasonable rates for largely administrative tasks, yet the Act supports compensation for such work generally, which conflicts with the requirement for detailed fee petitions under Super. Ct. Prob. R. 308. The court retains discretion to deny or adjust any fee request deemed unreasonable, including for administrative tasks.
The trial court deemed fees for the preparation of summaries and electronic filing as excessive and noncompensable clerical tasks, which it categorically denied. However, since the Guardianship Act allows for compensation for such services, the matter is remanded for the trial court to assess the reasonableness of the requested fees. Mr. Gardner's claim for $54 for taking Ms. Wilson to breakfast was also denied on the grounds that it constituted noncompensable personal services. The court, however, acknowledged that core aspects of a guardian’s duties are interpersonal, and maintaining contact with the ward is essential for understanding their needs. The breakfast, while waiting for an apartment showing, was aligned with Mr. Gardner's statutory obligation to stay acquainted with Ms. Wilson, necessitating reevaluation of the expense's compensability on remand.
Lastly, Mr. Gardner argued that the trial court's fifty-day delay in deciding his fee petition violated the thirty-day requirement under Super. Ct. Prob. R. 308(i)(1), warranting full payment plus pre-award interest. Citing a previous case, In re Goodwin, the court clarified that while the rule sets a deadline, it does not specify consequences for delays, and courts typically do not impose sanctions for such failures. Therefore, Mr. Gardner's requests for both full payment and pre-award interest were denied, as the court found no basis to deviate from established rules regarding fee requests.
D.C. Code § 15-108 mandates that in actions to recover liquidated debts with payable interest, a judgment must include interest from the time the debt was due, at the contractually fixed rate. Mr. Gardner's case does not meet these requirements as he is not pursuing a debt recovery but appealing the denial of a fee petition that needs court approval. He lacks a contract and the Guardianship statute does not allow for interest payments to court-appointed guardians. Additionally, he fails to cite any comparable cases supporting the claim for interest on delayed fee payments. Consequently, the trial court's order is partially reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
