State v. Nazier D. Goldsmith (085636) (Camden County & Statewide)

Citation: Not availableDocket: A-77-20

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; July 5, 2022; New Jersey; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The court addressed whether reasonable and articulable suspicion justified the investigatory stop of Nazier Goldsmith by Officer Joseph Goonan. On January 15, 2019, while patrolling a Camden area known for crime, the officers observed Goldsmith exiting a walkway adjacent to a vacant house, which they suspected was linked to drug and weapon sales. Upon approaching Goldsmith, the officers noted his nervous behavior, including sweating and shaking, and he indicated his identification was in his jacket pocket. When Goldsmith requested not to be patted down, Goonan's suspicions intensified, leading to a pat down that revealed a handgun, resulting in Goldsmith's arrest and the recovery of drugs and cash.

Goldsmith contested the legality of the stop and frisk. The trial court deemed the stop lawful but the frisk unlawful. The Appellate Division reversed this, finding the frisk reasonable but not addressing the stop's legality. The Court ultimately concluded that the officers lacked sufficient specific and particularized suspicion to justify the stop, thereby necessitating the suppression of the evidence obtained. The ruling emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on concrete facts rather than mere hunches, and the assessment of such suspicion requires a thorough examination of the surrounding circumstances while balancing law enforcement interests against individual rights.

The inquiry evaluates multiple factors, including the experience and knowledge of the officers involved. It establishes that mere furtive movements by a suspect are insufficient for reasonable and articulable suspicion. The reputation of a high-crime area does not diminish the constitutional protections of its residents against random police stops. The Court determines that the investigatory stop began when officers blocked the defendant's path and initiated questioning, making it clear that he was not free to leave. 

Officer Goonan testified he did not observe the defendant engaged in any transaction with two men who left the scene, contradicting the trial court’s finding that they were involved with the defendant. The Court emphasizes that while the history of crime in an area can inform reasonable suspicion, the State must provide concrete evidence rather than rely on the term "high-crime area" without substantiation. Goonan's vague testimony failed to adequately support the characterization of the area as high-crime.

Even if more information about the crime rate had been provided, it would not have justified the stop, as the factors considered were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The officers relied on general information that could apply to anyone in the area at any time, with Goonan’s hunch not meeting the standard for an investigatory stop. Consequently, the Court ruled the stop unlawful and did not assess the legality of the subsequent frisk, reversing the decision and remanding for reinstatement of the suppression order. 

Justice Solomon dissented, advocating for deference to the trial court’s determination of when the investigative detention occurred, arguing that the trial court had key evidence missing from the appellate record. He contended that the majority's interpretation of the officers blocking the defendant's path is unsupported and that the trial court’s finding about the point of seizure was not clearly erroneous. Chief Justice Rabner, Justice Albin, and Judge Fuentes joined Justice Pierre-Louis's opinion, while Justice Solomon was joined by Justice Patterson in dissent.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey is reviewing the case of State of New Jersey v. Nazier D. Goldsmith, focusing on the legality of an investigatory stop performed by police officers. Officers, patrolling a high-crime area in Camden known for drug and weapon activity, observed Goldsmith exiting a walkway by a vacant house where two others were present. Their suspicions were heightened due to Goldsmith's presence and behavior, as he appeared nervous when approached. Officer Joseph Goonan, drawing from his two decades of experience, believed Goldsmith was involved in drug dealing. After Goldsmith's nervous reaction and request to avoid a pat down, Goonan conducted a search and found a handgun in Goldsmith's jacket. This led to Goldsmith's arrest, with police also recovering drugs and currency from him. Goldsmith was subsequently indicted on multiple weapon and drug charges, but he sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop and frisk were unlawful. The trial court ruled the stop was lawful.

The court determined that the initial request for the defendant's identification transitioned from a field inquiry to an investigatory stop, necessitating reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This suspicion was supported by several factors: the defendant was seen conversing with two individuals who fled upon seeing the officers, he displayed nervous behaviors such as furtive glances and excessive sweating in a high-crime area, and the context suggested potential drug-related activity. While recognizing that mere presence in a high-crime neighborhood is not sufficient for suspicion, the court noted that this factor, combined with the defendant's nervousness and behavior, contributed to reasonable suspicion.

However, the court also ruled that the officers lacked an objective basis to conduct a frisk. They found no evidence indicating that the defendant was armed or dangerous, as he did not exhibit threatening behavior, there were no visible weapons, and the alleged drug offense was not inherently weapon-related. The court emphasized that asserting the right against a frisk does not imply possession of a weapon. Consequently, the court suppressed all evidence obtained from the unlawful frisk, including a gun, drugs, and money.

The State appealed this decision, contending that the trial court misapplied the standard for investigatory frisks, arguing that the same reasonable suspicion that justified the stop could also support a frisk. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s suppression order, asserting that the totality of the circumstances—including the defendant's presence in a high-crime area, his behavior, and the officers' belief in recent drug sales—made the frisk objectively reasonable. The appellate court concluded that, given the officers' training and the situation, they had sufficient grounds to believe they might be in danger, thus justifying the frisk. The Appellate Division did not address the legality of the initial stop, as that determination was not contested in the State's appeal.

Defendant's motion for leave to appeal was granted, contesting the legality of his stop and frisk. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and Dr. Jeffrey Fagan were permitted to participate as amici curiae. The defendant argues that the Appellate Division improperly overturned the trial court’s suppression order by asserting reasonable suspicion based solely on his race as a Black man in a police-identified "high-crime area." He claims this designation stems from racial bias and stereotypes rather than actual criminal activity. The defendant maintains that there was no articulable suspicion of him being armed or dangerous and criticizes the Appellate Division for misapplying legal standards concerning reasonable suspicion and drug offenses.

Dr. Fagan supports the defendant's position, stressing that designations of "high-crime areas" often correlate with racial demographics rather than crime statistics, thereby leading to over-policing. The ACLU argues that the police unlawfully seized the defendant before requesting his identification, asserting that the seizure violated constitutional protections.

In contrast, the State defends the legality of the stop and frisk, asserting that Officer Goonan had reasonable suspicion even without evidence linking the defendant to the high-crime area. The State contends that the officer's belief that the defendant was about to engage in criminal activity justified the stop. Furthermore, the State argues that the trial court misapplied the frisk standard by focusing on the potential for a gun rather than the overall threat to officer safety.

The standard of review for suppression motions is deferential, upholding the trial court's factual findings if supported by credible evidence. However, legal conclusions and the implications of established facts are reviewed de novo. Searches and seizures without warrants based on probable cause are generally considered unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and New Jersey’s Constitution, emphasizing that individuals have the right to move freely without government interference unless particularized suspicion exists.

The State must prove by a preponderance of evidence that a warrantless search or seizure falls under recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, specifically an investigative stop or Terry stop, which involves a brief detention that restricts a person's movement. Such stops are constitutionally permissible when based on specific, articulable facts that, along with rational inferences, create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Although reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, it cannot be based on vague hunches or an officer's subjective belief. The determination of reasonable suspicion requires a fact-intensive examination of the totality of circumstances, balancing law enforcement interests against individual rights. An investigatory stop lacking reasonable suspicion constitutes an unlawful seizure, rendering any evidence obtained inadmissible. Factors influencing this determination include the officer's experience and the nature of the encounter. However, mere furtive movements, nervousness, or presence in a high-crime area do not alone establish reasonable suspicion. Courts emphasize that the designation of an area as "high crime" should not be a blanket justification for stops, as it does not diminish constitutional protections for residents. The analysis must remain context-dependent, requiring more than just the characteristics of a location to justify police action.

The court determined that the officers did not possess reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop of the defendant at the moment of detention. The investigation began when officers blocked the defendant's path as he exited a walkway, creating a situation where a reasonable person would feel compelled to stop. Officer Goonan's testimony acknowledged that the officers' presence and questioning indicated that the defendant was not free to leave, effectively making it an investigatory stop. The trial court supported this view, noting that the encounter escalated when the officers asked for identification, confirming that the defendant could not walk away without perceiving potential consequences.

Prior to the stop, the officers had observed two men fleeing from a vacant house upon seeing them approach, and the defendant emerged simultaneously. Officer Goonan testified that he did not see the defendant interact with those men. Despite this, the trial court maintained that the stop was valid, suggesting that the defendant's proximity to the fleeing individuals in a high-crime area contributed to the officers' reasonable suspicion, even though there was no direct evidence of criminal activity involving the defendant.

Officer Goonan observed the defendant exit a walkway towards two unidentified individuals, who then walked away, with no evidence of interaction between them. The State acknowledged that Officer Goonan did not testify that the defendant approached or spoke to the individuals. The trial court's findings, which supported the conclusion of reasonable suspicion for stopping the defendant, were not well-supported by credible evidence and thus not entitled to deference. The court emphasized that merely being present in a high-crime area does not justify a stop without further evidence of criminal activity. While the existence of prior crimes in an area is a factor in assessing reasonable suspicion, it does not diminish the constitutional rights of residents. Simply claiming an area is high-crime is insufficient for justifying investigative stops; Officer Goonan's generalized statements regarding the crime rate in the area lacked specific factual support. His testimony indicated a history of weapons offenses and drug activity in the 1600 block of Holcaine but did not provide a substantive basis for claiming reasonable suspicion in this instance.

Officer Goonan testified to observing five to ten drug sales in a high-crime neighborhood over his 20 years of policing, noting the area is known for weapons, shootings, and drug activities. However, he failed to provide specific timelines or numbers regarding these incidents or his past arrests of fugitives, which diminishes the probative value of his testimony. The law requires that while crime characteristics can contribute to reasonable suspicion, they cannot solely justify a stop without additional evidence. In this case, even if Goonan had more detailed information about crime prevalence, it would not sufficiently justify stopping the defendant, as other relied-upon factors were also inadequate. Goonan's suspicion was based on the defendant exiting a walkway near a vacant property associated with drug and weapon sales, alongside his general belief that criminal activity was occurring in the area. However, these non-specific factors did not meet the constitutional requirement for individualized suspicion against this defendant. Notably, the defendant's nervous behavior observed after the stop cannot retroactively validate the officers' initial suspicion, as reasonable suspicion must exist prior to a stop. Ultimately, the information available to Goonan before the stop could apply to any individual in that area, reflecting a mere hunch rather than a justified investigative basis.

Officers lacked objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the defendant, rendering the detention unlawful. Consequently, the court does not address the issue of whether the officers had sufficient grounds to frisk the defendant. The Appellate Division's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court to reinstate the suppression order in accordance with this ruling. The opinion is joined by Chief Justice Rabner, Justice Albin, and Judge Fuentes. Justice Solomon dissents, joined by Justice Patterson, emphasizing the trial court's advantage in assessing witness credibility and evidence firsthand. Solomon notes that critical evidence relevant to the suppression motion was presented at the trial court but not included in the appellate record, underscoring the importance of preserving the record for accurate appellate review. During the suppression hearing, Officer Goonan's testimony acknowledged that he and his partner approached the defendant without instructing him to stop, and a photograph of the area, which was admitted in court, depicted the layout where the encounter occurred, further complicating the assessment of the investigatory detention.

Defense counsel questioned Officer Goonan about the distance between him and Mr. Goldsmith during a confrontation. Goonan confirmed he was within a few feet but clarified it was not at arm’s length. When asked to demonstrate the distance, Goonan indicated a chair two chairs away from him. Defense counsel attempted to characterize this distance as approximately two to two and a half feet, which the prosecutor objected to. The court ruled that it could not accept the characterization of the distance without further testimony, suggesting that a measuring tape might be used for clarity. 

The document also outlines the appellate court's standard of review, emphasizing deference to the trial judge's findings, particularly those influenced by the judge's firsthand observation of witnesses. It states that appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings unless they are clearly mistaken, particularly regarding suppression motions related to alleged constitutional violations. Trial judges are recognized for their expertise in evaluating these matters, and their conclusions based on video or documentary evidence are also subject to this deferential standard.

The threshold issue in this appeal is pinpointing the moment officers initiated a Terry stop, assessed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person regarding their freedom of movement. Case law indicates that when police obstruct an individual's path, it constitutes an investigative detention. Determining the exact initiation of a Terry stop involves a fact-sensitive analysis, considering factors such as the distance and positioning of officers relative to the individual, their demeanor, weapon presence, and the environmental context, none of which are solely determinative; instead, the totality of circumstances is crucial. 

In this case, the trial court did not find that the officers explicitly blocked the defendant's path or displayed weapons prior to their request for identification, which the court viewed as the moment the seizure began. The majority disagreed with the trial court's findings regarding the defendant's interaction with others and the characterization of the area as high-crime, stating these elements were insufficient to determine the start of the investigative stop. The key facts relevant to this determination are the officers' locations, their distance from the defendant, and the surrounding circumstances. 

The trial court concluded that the Terry stop commenced when officers asked for identification, aligning with precedent that such an inquiry indicates an investigative detention. However, the majority contended that the officers' positioning blocked the defendant's forward movement, which Officer Goonan acknowledged. Thus, the majority held that the officers exerted sufficient authority to suggest to an objectively reasonable person that they were required to stop and engage with the officers.

The record challenges the majority's conclusion regarding the defendant's movement during the encounter with law enforcement. Goonan’s statements about the defendant's potential to retreat and his position near the alley do not sufficiently clarify whether the defendant was free to move or if the officers obstructed his exit. Goonan's testimony lacks clarity on their exact locations and the geography of the scene, complicating appellate review. Attempts by defense counsel to clarify the officers' positions using a photograph indicated that the officers were in front of the house, not blocking the defendant’s path. Furthermore, Goonan denied being within arm's reach of the defendant, suggesting a distance that complicates assertions of obstruction. The majority's interpretation appears to contradict the trial judge's firsthand assessment of the scene and the witnesses. The opinion stresses the importance of trial courts' factual findings, cautioning against appellate courts substituting their interpretations for those of the trial court, as this could undermine judicial legitimacy and encourage unnecessary appeals. Additionally, the text acknowledges the inherent dangers faced by law enforcement, emphasizing the need to consider these risks in assessing the constitutionality of police actions, particularly in situations lacking probable cause for arrest.

Law enforcement officers face significant risks of violence, often becoming victims themselves, as highlighted in State v. Radel, where the circumstances officers encounter are described as "dynamic and uncertain." In 2021, there was a notable increase in felonious deaths of officers, rising from 46 in 2020 to 73. The assessment of police conduct's reasonableness is contingent on the circumstances officers face, which often require split-second decisions in fluid situations. Appellate review of these encounters is challenging given the context-specific nature of the incidents. The trial court found that officers did not impede the defendant's ability to leave, a conclusion that the majority opinion disputes despite having less evidence than the trial court. The appellate court should not substitute its findings based on differing interpretations of the evidence in close cases. The dissent emphasizes adherence to established appellate principles and critiques the majority for overstepping by assuming a better understanding of the facts than the trial court. The dissent refrains from addressing the justification of a frisk due to the majority's omission of that issue.