Essick v. County of Sonoma

Citation: Not availableDocket: A162887

Court: California Court of Appeal; June 29, 2022; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mark Essick, the elected sheriff of Sonoma County, filed a legal appeal following the trial court's denial of his request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of the Oppenheimer Report. This report, produced by independent investigator Amy Oppenheimer, stemmed from a harassment complaint against Essick. A local newspaper sought access to the report and related documents under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Essick argued that the report should be confidential under specific exemptions of the CPRA, including classifications as a peace officer personnel record and findings related to a public complaint against a peace officer. He also contended that the County should be estopped from releasing the report due to a prior commitment to maintain the investigation's confidentiality in line with the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA). The court disagreed with Essick's arguments, affirming the decision to release the report.

The background details include an incident during an August 2020 town hall meeting, where, amidst wildfires, Sheriff Essick denied permission for evacuated residents to return to their homes to care for pets. This led to a complaint from Supervisor Lynda Hopkins, which was forwarded to County Administrator Sheryl Bratton. An impartial investigation by Oppenheimer's firm concluded that while the allegations against Essick were substantiated, there was no evidence of serious misconduct. On December 16, 2020, the Board of Supervisors formally notified Sheriff Essick of the investigation's outcome.

Prior to notifying Sheriff Essick, the Board of Supervisors received a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request from the Press Democrat for the final investigative report, referred to as the Oppenheimer Report. County Counsel Pittman informed Sheriff Essick of the Board's intention to release the report, which includes the original complaint, formal notice of the investigation's outcome, a confidential executive summary, and a redacted investigative report. Sheriff Essick's counsel, Diane Aqui, argued that these documents are personnel records protected from disclosure under Penal Code section 832.7. Pittman disagreed and confirmed the Board's plan to release the documents on December 24, 2020. On December 21, 2020, Sheriff Essick filed a complaint seeking to bar the release, requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The trial court granted the temporary restraining order but later denied the preliminary injunction on May 19, 2021, citing a lack of evidence supporting the classification of the records as personnel files. Sheriff Essick appealed, and a temporary stay was granted on June 24, 2021, preventing the release of the report. Subsequently, on July 30, 2021, the court granted a writ of supersedeas to maintain the stay pending resolution of the appeal.

The CPRA, enacted in 1968 and modeled on the federal Freedom of Information Act, aims to enhance public access to records held by government entities, recognizing this access as a fundamental right. The CPRA broadly defines public records, encompassing any writings related to public business prepared or retained by state or local agencies. While the act favors disclosure, it also considers individual privacy, incorporating exemptions that allow agencies to withhold certain records. In 2004, a constitutional amendment reinforced the directive to broadly interpret access statutes and narrowly interpret those that restrict access.

The California Supreme Court ruled that the California Constitution does not alter the interpretation of statutes concerning the privacy rights of peace officers, particularly regarding the discovery or disclosure of their professional qualifications. The law favors disclosure of peace officer records, placing the burden on those opposing disclosure to demonstrate that an exemption applies, thereby resolving doubts in favor of public access.

One significant exemption under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) is Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k), which shields records from disclosure if prohibited by federal or state law, including privilege established in the Evidence Code. Specifically, Sheriff Essick cites Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, part of the Pitchess statutes, which categorize peace officer personnel records and related information as confidential. This includes any file maintained under an officer's name that pertains to their privacy interests.

Additionally, Penal Code section 832.5 extends confidentiality to records of investigations into citizen complaints against peace officers. However, recent amendments to the Pitchess statutes require that records related to certain serious incidents, such as use of deadly force or sustained findings of sexual assault, are now public.

The core issue in the appeal is whether the records in question qualify as 'personnel records' under Penal Code section 832.8. Sheriff Essick also argues they are confidential under section 832.5. Both arguments fail as he must prove the County is his employer, which he has not established. The County's provision of payment to elected officials does not define their employer-employee relationship, as the sheriff is elected by the public and ultimately accountable to the voters of Sonoma County, not to the Board of Supervisors or county government officials.

The Board of Supervisors lacks the authority to hire, fire, or discipline the county sheriff, as they do not have an employer-employee relationship under Government Code section 25303. Their responsibility is limited to overseeing the conduct of elected officials like the sheriff, without the power to direct their official duties. The issuance of statements by the Board does not constitute "punitive action" under the Peace Officers Bill of Rights Act (POBRA), as reprimands require an employer-driven consequence, which does not apply to Sheriff Essick. The Oppenheimer Report, commissioned by the Board to fulfill its supervisory duties, does not impact Sheriff Essick's duties, tenure, or compensation and is not considered discipline. Criticism from the Board is viewed as expressions of free speech rather than disciplinary actions. Sheriff Essick's claim that the Board acted as his employer by initiating an investigation is rejected, as the Oppenheimer Report resulted from an independent inquiry and does not align with the internal personnel processes referenced in Copley Press v. Superior Court. The ultimate authority over the sheriff lies with the voters, who have a right to be informed of the sheriff's conduct and capabilities.

The Supreme Court determined that transferring internal affairs functions to an external agency does not remove the protective status of certain records generated internally. In contrast to this case, the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors was conducting an independent investigation, which differs fundamentally from routine disciplinary actions involving peace officers. The relevant precedent is the Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court case, where the court upheld the denial of a disclosure request for a report following a police shooting, stating it did not involve officer discipline and could not broadly encompass all law enforcement records as “personnel records.” 

Sheriff Essick's argument suggests that the Pitchess statutes could be misused to shield all records that might portray him unfavorably, which is rejected. The statutes do not protect an elected official from embarrassment linked to their role as a peace officer. Additionally, Sheriff Essick claims confidentiality for the Oppenheimer Report based on the County of Sonoma's promise to conduct the investigation under the Police Officer Bill of Rights Act (POBRA). However, the court found this unpersuasive, noting that POBRA does not explicitly confer confidentiality from California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests. While POBRA provided procedural fairness protections, it did not create confidentiality rights for the investigation's findings. The expectation of confidentiality or a right to appeal the findings is not substantiated by POBRA, as it lacks references to confidentiality. Therefore, the court concludes that the Pitchess statutes do not offer confidentiality protection, nullifying Sheriff Essick's estoppel argument as well. Ultimately, both his primary and backup arguments are rejected due to the absence of legal grounds for confidentiality.

Sheriff Essick's expectation that Sonoma County's adherence to POBRA procedures guaranteed absolute confidentiality for investigation reports is deemed a misunderstanding of the law. He cannot justifiably argue reliance on the County for confidentiality rights not provided by POBRA, nor can he use estoppel without evidence of misrepresentation, concealment, or reasonable reliance. The trial court's denial of his preliminary injunction request is affirmed. The court's July 30, 2021 order preventing the County from releasing the relevant records will expire 30 days after this opinion is filed. The unredacted opinion will also remain sealed for the same duration, after which it will be made public, allowing the County to release the records unless otherwise ordered by the California Supreme Court. Costs are awarded to the respondents. The opinion concludes with the judges' concurrence and notes the trial court and counsel details involved in the case.