Courtney Saunders v. Kyle Thies

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-2180

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; June 29, 2022; Federal Appellate Court

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Courtney Saunders filed a lawsuit against Des Moines Police Department officers Kyle Thies and Clint Dee, Chief of Police Dana Wingert, and the City of Des Moines, claiming violations of his constitutional rights following a traffic stop on July 8, 2018. Saunders, a 29-year-old Black man, was cited for driving with an open liquor bottle in his vehicle, which was illegally parked in front of a fire hydrant. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case after the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied Saunders’s motions to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court and for reconsideration.

During the traffic stop, Thies and Dee, operating a police transport van, observed Saunders’s vehicle making an abrupt turn. They did not activate lights or sirens and did not notify dispatch before approaching Saunders, who was on a phone call. Thies inquired if Saunders was home and, after Saunders indicated he was picking someone up, Thies noticed a child in the back seat not in a booster seat and a sealed liquor bottle. Thies informed Saunders of the illegal parking, the open liquor bottle, and the unsecured child. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment, maintaining that the officers acted within their capacity as law enforcement.

Saunders informed Thies that the vehicle was his girlfriend's, denied ownership of the liquor bottle present, and claimed he was dropping off a child due to an emergency. Thies cited three observed infractions: illegal parking in front of a fire hydrant, an open liquor bottle in the vehicle, and a child not secured in a booster seat. Despite Saunders questioning the basis for the stop, he eventually provided his driver’s license and handgun permit, disclosing the presence of a handgun in the vehicle. Thies inquired about alcohol consumption, to which Saunders replied he had not been drinking. Thies requested that Saunders exit the vehicle and walk to the back for further questioning, assuring him he was not in trouble but was being detained for the infractions.

As Saunders exited, the child's mother arrived and removed the child from the car. Saunders maintained that the child’s age was irrelevant due to the emergency. When questioned about drinking, Saunders suggested testing equipment for sobriety evaluation. Thies wanted to conduct a field sobriety test based on his observations of Saunders, although another officer, Dee, testified that there was no visible impairment. Thies then left to check Saunders’s license and warrants but did not immediately report the stop to dispatch. Upon returning, Thies requested a field sobriety test, which Saunders refused, preferring a preliminary breath test (PBT). Thies informed him they lacked a PBT machine and did not call for one immediately. Instead, he searched the vehicle, retrieving the liquor bottle and noting the handgun. During this search, Saunders asked Dee for the officers' badge numbers. After a short interval, Thies called dispatch for a PBT unit and reported the stop for the first time. He continued searching the vehicle, including checking the handgun's serial number.

Thies searched Saunders’s car for marijuana or liquor but found nothing. He then returned to the transport van to write a citation for an open liquor bottle. During this time, Saunders questioned why he was being asked if he had something in his mouth, asserting that he felt he was stopped due to his race. After four-and-a-half minutes, a third officer arrived and conducted a breath test on Saunders, which indicated he was not under the influence of alcohol. Saunders inquired about the reason for the traffic stop, and Dee explained it was due to his parking in front of a fire hydrant. Saunders's family arrived at the scene, and Thies discussed the age of a child in the vehicle but decided not to cite Saunders for not using a booster seat. Ultimately, Thies issued a citation for the open liquor bottle, and the officers left without requiring Saunders to move his vehicle. The encounter lasted about 22 minutes and was recorded by dash and body cameras. Saunders subsequently filed 11 claims in state court against Thies, Dee, the Chief of Police, Wingert, and the City of Des Moines, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, as well as various Iowa constitutional provisions related to unreasonable search and seizure, racial profiling, and conspiracy to violate civil rights. After the case was removed to federal court, the defendants sought summary judgment, while Saunders moved to certify questions regarding his racial profiling claim to the Iowa Supreme Court.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied Saunders’s motion to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court. For claims under the federal and state constitutions regarding unreasonable search and seizure, the court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Saunders did not establish a genuine issue of material fact, given that he voluntarily parked his vehicle in front of a fire hydrant, the officers observed this, and Thies patted him down following the disclosure of his handgun permit and the presence of an open liquor bottle in the vehicle, which provided probable cause for a search. Regarding the federal claim of unreasonable extension of a traffic stop, the court also granted qualified immunity to the officers, as it was not clearly established that their actions violated the Fourth Amendment. However, for the analogous Iowa constitutional claim, the court denied qualified immunity, indicating that a reasonable factfinder could potentially determine that the officers did not take all reasonable actions to comply with the Iowa Constitution.

On the claims of racial profiling, Thies and Dee were granted qualified immunity since Saunders did not present sufficient evidence to suggest they enforced the law based solely on his race, particularly as there was no indication they were aware of his race when they followed his vehicle. For the conspiracy claims under federal law (1983 and 1985), the court ruled in favor of the officers, as Saunders failed to demonstrate any underlying constitutional violation necessary to support such claims. In contrast, for the Iowa law conspiracy claim, the court found that because the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the unreasonable extension of the traffic stop claim, they also could not claim it on the conspiracy claim due to the viability of the underlying constitutional claim.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on Saunders’s claim of a pretextual traffic stop since he did not contest the motion on that claim. Lastly, regarding claims against the Chief of Police and the City of Des Moines for deliberate indifference, the court ruled in their favor as Saunders did not provide evidence of past constitutional violations nor show that his encounter resulted from systemic failures rather than individual officers' actions.

Saunders's request to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court regarding his racial profiling claim under the Iowa Constitution was denied by the district court, which found that its rationale for granting summary judgment to Thies and Dee was unrelated to the certification questions, making it unnecessary. Saunders subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court misapplied the standard and incorrectly stated that the officers were unaware of his race prior to approaching his vehicle. He contended that if the court rectified its errors regarding the state law racial profiling claim, it should also certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court, but this motion was also denied. The district court remanded the remaining claims regarding unreasonable extension of a traffic stop and conspiracy to state court. Saunders appealed, asserting that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Thies and Dee on various claims, including unreasonable seizure, racial profiling, conspiracy, and deliberate indifference under both federal and state law. The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, with the facts viewed favorably toward the nonmoving party. The court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The analysis for qualified immunity consists of a two-step inquiry: whether a constitutional right was violated and whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged misconduct. Similarly, Iowa law requires a two-step inquiry for qualified immunity, focusing on whether a state constitutional right was violated and whether the defendant exercised due care to comply with the law. Saunders argues that there are factual disputes regarding whether Thies and Dee unreasonably seized him, particularly noting that the seizure began when they blocked his vehicle without reasonable suspicion.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, considering a traffic stop as a seizure of vehicle occupants. A traffic stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, which necessitates an objective basis for suspecting the individual. This principle parallels the Iowa Constitution, which similarly guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop is deemed a seizure, and it must be reasonable under the circumstances. 

In this case, Saunders claimed he was seized when officers approached him, but evidence showed he voluntarily stopped his vehicle, and officers did not block his departure or activate sirens. Therefore, the court found no seizure occurred at that moment. Regarding the legality of the stop, Saunders was observed stopping in a no parking zone directly across from a fire hydrant, constituting a traffic violation under Iowa law. This provided the officers reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop, fulfilling constitutional requirements.

As Saunders failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the seizure, officers Thies and Dee are entitled to qualified immunity, resulting in the district court's appropriate granting of summary judgment. Additionally, Saunders contended the district court erred in granting qualified immunity based on claims of an unreasonably prolonged stop, asserting that factual questions remained about whether the officers pursued the initial purpose of the stop related to the fire hydrant violation.

A traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment can become unlawful if it is unnecessarily prolonged. Officers may detain vehicle occupants to complete routine tasks, such as checking identification and vehicle registration, preparing citations, and asking general questions. An officer's suspicion of criminal activity may increase as the stop progresses and new facts emerge. Evaluating the reasonableness of the stop's duration is fact-intensive, with no fixed time limit applicable to all stops. Complications can justify extending the detention.

In this case, the district court examined qualified immunity and concluded that it was not clearly established that delaying the request for additional officer assistance constituted an unreasonable extension of the stop. However, it also noted that a jury could find a delay of about two-and-a-half minutes in requesting a preliminary breath test (PBT) unreasonably prolonged the stop. The court disagreed, stating that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop due to the vehicle being parked in front of a fire hydrant, and their suspicions were further justified by observing an open liquor bottle and an unrestrained child in the vehicle.

The delay in requesting the PBT did not unreasonably extend the stop, as it was brief and occurred while the officers continued their investigative tasks. The overall duration of the stop was approximately 22 minutes, partly due to Saunders being on a phone call. The stop concluded shortly after the PBT indicated no alcohol influence, leading to a citation for the open liquor bottle, not the parking violation. Thus, the short delay and the context of the entire stop did not support the claim of an unreasonable extension.

The video evidence shows that during the five minutes between the officers receiving the PBT results and concluding the stop, they primarily interacted with Saunders's family members at the scene. The court determined that officers Thies and Dee did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop, thus not violating Saunders’s Fourth Amendment rights. Saunders did not present a genuine issue regarding the prolongation of the stop, leading to the district court's proper grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Additionally, Saunders claimed that the district court wrongly granted summary judgment to Thies and Dee regarding his racial profiling allegations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. He argued that the court misinterpreted the record by concluding that the officers were unaware of his race prior to the encounter and that the court wrongly required him to prove that race was the sole motivating factor for the officers' actions, rather than just a motivating factor.

The court indicated that no distinction exists in the analysis of equal protection claims under Iowa law versus federal law. For a successful equal protection claim of selective enforcement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the enforcement had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by discriminatory intent, often requiring proof that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. 

Saunders contended that the court's conclusion regarding Thies and Dee's lack of awareness of his race was unsupported, citing an incident where Thies made eye contact with him before initiating the stop. However, the court found this irrelevant, as Saunders's evidence of comparators did not adequately demonstrate discriminatory effect and purpose, with none being similarly situated to him in all relevant respects. The body camera footage he provided included stops of black and white individuals, but these did not meet the criteria for comparison, as each involved different circumstances from Saunders's situation.

Each traffic stop referenced differed in circumstances, occupant questioning, and the nature of the offenses investigated, making them unsuitable as comparators to Saunders's stop. Saunders contends that the district court incorrectly required him to demonstrate that officers Thies and Dee were solely motivated by race, rather than allowing a partial motivation standard. To establish an equal protection claim in police interactions, a plaintiff must show that an officer enforced a law solely based on race. Saunders did not prove any racial motivation on the part of the officers, so the court did not need to resolve this issue and found no genuine material fact to counter the qualified immunity and summary judgment granted to Thies and Dee. 

Regarding Saunders's conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the district court granted summary judgment based on the absence of constitutional violations. For a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate an agreement to violate rights, an overt act in furtherance, and an injury. The court noted an error in stating that all federal claims against the officers had been resolved on constitutional violation grounds, particularly concerning the unreasonably prolonged stop claim. However, this error does not affect the analysis since Saunders did not establish a genuine dispute regarding the legality of the stop.

In essence, both the § 1983 and § 1985 conspiracy claims must fail due to the lack of an underlying constitutional violation. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Lastly, Saunders argued that summary judgment was improperly granted to the Chief of Police and the City regarding claims of deliberate indifference related to policies and training violating constitutional amendments.

Saunders asserts that Thies exhibited a pattern of targeting Black motorists, and claims that both the Chief of Police and the City are liable for showing deliberate indifference to the policies and training of their officers, leading to violations of his constitutional rights. For municipal liability to attach under federal law, individual liability for an underlying substantive claim must first be established. Since Saunders failed to demonstrate that Thies and Dee violated his constitutional rights, he cannot maintain his federal claim against the City or the Chief of Police. 

However, the district court found that Saunders's claims under the Iowa Constitution for unreasonable extension of the stop and conspiracy survived summary judgment, allowing for further analysis of his state claim. There is no indication that Iowa courts would interpret deliberate indifference under its constitution differently from federal law. Thus, federal standards apply to his Iowa claim.

Under federal law, a municipality may be liable if an official policy causes a constitutional tort, and a pattern of similar violations is generally necessary to establish this liability. Yet, this pattern is not required if the need for training is so apparent that the municipality is deemed deliberately indifferent. Supervisor liability under Section 1983 necessitates proving that a supervisor's indifference to a subordinate's conduct caused the constitutional injury, which is a stringent standard requiring evidence of reckless disregard for constitutional harm.

Saunders's evidence of deliberate indifference from the City and Chief of Police is insufficient. He has not shown past violations of rights nor demonstrated that the circumstances of his traffic stop were clearly the result of inadequate training or supervision. While he cites comparator cases alleging Thies's mistreatment of Black motorists, these cases involve different violations and circumstances, failing to establish a discernible pattern. The record indicates that the officers acted based on individual decisions, not a systemic issue of deliberate indifference.

Saunders failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the municipality's need for additional training was so apparent that it constituted deliberate indifference, nor did he establish a factual dispute about the Police Chief's alleged reckless disregard for constitutional risks. Consequently, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Police Chief concerning the deliberate indifference claims under both federal and Iowa law. Additionally, Saunders challenged the district court's refusal to certify questions to the Iowa Supreme Court regarding his racial profiling claim under the Iowa Constitution. The review of such certification decisions is under the abuse of discretion standard. The district court found the questions unnecessary for resolving Saunders's claim, as they pertained to standards for racially-biased policing and comparisons with individuals of different races. Despite Saunders’s assertions that the Iowa Constitution might allow for a more lenient standard, the Iowa Supreme Court has indicated that it generally interprets its provisions in alignment with federal law unless a distinct argument is presented. Given this context and the deferential review standard for certification motions, the district court did not err in denying both the certification motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.