Narrative Opinion Summary
William Mabry, II appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to modify or dissolve a family violence protective order obtained by Yarhonda Highsmith in January 2022. The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that Mabry's appeal was not subject to direct appeal due to the requirement under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a)(2) for discretionary appeals in domestic relations cases, including those under the Family Violence Act. The definition of 'family violence' encompasses various relationships, including those between spouses and parents. The court emphasized that compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure is jurisdictional, citing Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources. Consequently, Mabry's failure to adhere to this procedure resulted in the dismissal of his direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Legal Issues Addressed
Compliance with Appeal Procedures as Jurisdictionalsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedure results in the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as emphasized by the court citing precedent.
Reasoning: The court emphasized that compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure is jurisdictional, citing Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources.
Definition of Family Violence under Georgia Lawsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The case reaffirms the broad definition of 'family violence' within the context of protective orders, which includes relationships such as those between spouses and parents.
Reasoning: The definition of 'family violence' encompasses various relationships, including those between spouses and parents.
Jurisdictional Requirement for Discretionary Appealssubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that appeals in domestic relations cases, such as those under the Family Violence Act, require discretionary appeal procedures, impacting the appellant's ability to file a direct appeal.
Reasoning: The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that Mabry's appeal was not subject to direct appeal due to the requirement under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a)(2) for discretionary appeals in domestic relations cases, including those under the Family Violence Act.