Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals; September 30, 2013; Hawaii; State Appellate Court
The Court, led by Justice Reifurth, addressed a dispute involving neighboring property owners in Holualoa, North Kona, Hawaii, concerning the use of two adjacent easements for access and utility. The Plaintiffs-Appellants sought to prevent the Defendants-Appellees from obstructing these easements. The Circuit Court granted an injunction for one easement but denied it for the other. The appeal involves multiple parties, including Keola Childs, Philip and Clare Wilson, and Douglas Troxel, collectively referred to as the Plaintiffs-Appellants, against Defendants-Appellees Jack and Wallace Okayama, and the Haradas, who are also cross-appellants.
The June 25, 2009 Final Judgment by the Circuit Court stemmed from various prior orders, including summary judgments in favor of the Okayamas and a partial summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs against the Haradas. The Court found errors in the Circuit Court's conclusions regarding the abandonment of the easement over the Okayamas' property and the termination of rights by prescription. However, the Court upheld the Circuit Court's jurisdiction over the easement dispute involving the Haradas but determined that summary judgment on this matter was inappropriate due to genuine factual disputes. The Court affirmed part of the Circuit Court's decision but vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on June 14, 2005, asserting ownership of specific parcels of land.
Plaintiffs-Appellants claim ownership interests in several parcels of land. Alan J. Harada, Walter Harada, and Karen Fuke hold a one-half undivided interest in Parcel 31, TMK (3) 7-5-012:031 (Lot 8-C), while Mikie Harada owns the other half. Alan J. Harada and Sharon S. Harada also possess a leasehold interest in the entirety of Parcel 31. The Okayamas are said to own a one-half undivided interest in Parcel 29, TMK (3) 7-5-012:029, with Hirano owning the remaining half. Additionally, Ethel Nobuki Toki is identified as the owner of Parcel 32, TMK (3) 7-5-012:032.
The land is divided into a Southern Portion, including the Haradas’ and Toki’s parcels, and a Northern Portion, which encompasses the Okayamas’, Troxel’s, Childs’, and Wilsons’ parcels. The Southern Portion originates from Royal Patent Grant 863 (RPG 863), while the Northern Portion derives from Royal Patent Grant 982 (RPG 982). The Northern Portion is further split into the Makai Portion (Wilsons’ and Childs’ parcels) and the Mauka Portion (Troxel’s and Okayamas’ parcels).
Two easements are established along the boundary separating the Northern and Southern Portions: the 25' Right of Way, which runs along the southern boundary of the Mauka Portion, and Easement 3, which traverses the northern boundary of the Southern Portion and continues along the northern boundary of Toki’s parcel.
The Complaint references the 1896 Decree that partitioned RPG 982 into the Mauka and Makai Portions and identified the 25' Right of Way. Plaintiffs-Appellants seek declaratory relief for the right to use the 25' Right of Way over Parcel 29 and injunctive relief to prevent the Okayamas from interfering with this access.
Furthermore, it is noted that on June 8, 1953, the Roman Catholic Church filed Land Court Application No. 1666 to confirm its title to a twelve-lot portion of RPG 863, which included a 16' roadway easement designated as Easement 3 for Lots 7 and 8 (Parcels 32 and 31). The Application also addressed public ways through the lots and disclaimed ownership of any public land.
The Complaint references a June 18, 1953 land court examiner’s report indicating that lots 3, 4, 7, 8, and 12 are subject to easements for public roads or electric transmission lines, while Lot 10 is subject to an easement related to Exclusion 2. A map accompanying the application shows Easement 3 running along the northern boundary of Parcels 31 and 32. The land court confirmed that the applicant holds fee simple title to the land described in the application, subject to the easements mentioned. The Complaint notes that when the Church conveyed Parcel 31 (Lot 8) to the Haradas’ predecessor, it included a sixteen-foot roadway easement designated as Easement 3. Similarly, the deed from the Church to Toki’s predecessors for Parcel 32 (Lot 7) also conveyed a sixteen-foot easement for roadway use. Childs, who purchased Parcel 6 in 1978, and his company Freestyle Corporation, which bought Parcel 5, indicated that their deed included the same easement description. After receiving permission from the Haradas, Childs graded and paved Easement 3 and reimbursed the Haradas for prior paving costs. He claimed continued use of Easement 3 as the only access to Parcel 6. The Wilsons, who purchased Parcel 8 in 1998, also used and improved Easement 3 to access their property. In 2004, both Childs and the Wilsons were informed by the Haradas that their use of Easement 3 would no longer be permitted, and the Okayamas denied access to a claimed 25-foot Right of Way.
On July 8, 2005, the Okayamas responded with an answer and counterclaim, admitting land ownership but denying the existence of a 25-foot Right of Way and asserting defenses such as bona fide purchasers without notice, laches, and adverse possession. Their Counterclaim sought a declaration that Parcel 29 was free from easements benefiting Parcels 6 and 8. The Haradas filed their answer on July 25, 2005, admitting ownership of Parcel 31 but denying any connection between Easement 3 and Parcels 6 and 8, claiming those parcels were not part of Land Court Application No. 1666.
The Haradas argued that Easement 3 was intended solely for the benefit of Parcels 31 and 32, as identified in Land Court Application No. 1666. They raised additional defenses, asserting the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction under HRS 501-1 due to their property's land court registration and contending that the Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims should be dismissed since no easements benefiting Parcels 6 and 8 were listed on the Haradas' Transfer Certificate of Title.
On July 26, 2005, the Plaintiffs-Appellants responded to the Okayamas' Counterclaim, claiming the Okayamas lacked standing due to unclear legal title to Parcel 29. Following issues with their water line, the Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on July 18, 2005, and an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on July 19, 2005. The Circuit Court granted the TRO on July 22, 2005, preventing the Haradas from interfering with the use of Easement 3 pending the preliminary injunction's resolution. On December 23, 2005, the court issued an order granting the preliminary injunction.
On December 7, 2007, the Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the Okayamas' Counterclaim, arguing lack of standing. The Circuit Court denied this motion on April 2, 2008. In February 2008, both parties filed motions for summary judgment regarding the Okayamas' claims, and the Plaintiffs-Appellants also sought partial summary judgment against the Haradas. The Circuit Court granted the Okayamas' motion on June 16, 2008, determining that the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ predecessors had abandoned rights to the 25' Right of Way, which had also been terminated by prescription. On March 16, 2009, the court granted the Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion against the Haradas, confirming its jurisdiction under HRS 501-1 and upholding the right to use Easement 3, provided there was no increase in lot density.
The final judgment was entered on June 25, 2009, after which the Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a timely appeal, and the Haradas filed a cross-appeal. On appeal, the Plaintiffs-Appellants claimed reversible errors, particularly regarding the denial of their Motion to Dismiss, the denial of their motion for partial summary judgment against the Okayamas, and the court's conclusions about Easement 3's classification and lot density limitations.
The Haradas argue on cross-appeal that the Circuit Court made several errors: (1) It improperly granted the Plaintiffs-Appellants a temporary restraining order due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and low likelihood of success on the merits; (2) It similarly erred by granting a preliminary injunction under the same jurisdiction and merits concerns; (3) It wrongfully issued partial summary judgment against the Haradas and a default judgment against Toki; and (4) It incorrectly entered final judgment.
Jurisdiction is a legal question reviewed de novo, meaning the appellate court assesses whether the Circuit Court had the authority to hear the case at any stage. A judgment made without subject matter jurisdiction is void. Standing is also a question of law, and a plaintiff must demonstrate standing to invoke jurisdiction, reviewed de novo on appeal.
Summary judgment is assessed de novo by the appellate court. It is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact, with evidence viewed favorably towards the non-moving party. A judge's role in summary judgment is to apply law to established facts without attempting to resolve factual disputes. If evidence allows for differing interpretations, summary judgment is not warranted.
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Okayamas lack standing to bring their Counterclaim due to an alleged break in their chain of title, asserting that the Okayamas must prove legally cognizable private title to Parcel 29. However, the court finds that standing does not require ownership, as the Okayamas have possessed and asserted rights over Parcel 29, thus allowing the Circuit Court to adjudicate their claims regarding the property. The court properly denied the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Regarding the Okayamas' Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) and the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (MPSJ), the court erred in granting the Okayamas' MSJ. The Okayamas claim the Plaintiffs-Appellants abandoned their easement rights as established by a 1896 Decree and that the Plaintiffs-Appellants did not use the easement and acquiesced to the Okayamas’ use. In contrast, the Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that their potential exercise of easement rights was not negated by the Okayamas' actions, and nonuse does not equate to abandonment.
The court recognizes that abandonment of a deeded easement requires clear proof of the owner's intent to abandon, which can be demonstrated through various acts and circumstances. Mere nonuse does not extinguish the easement rights unless there is evidence of a definitive intention to abandon, which must be established by clear and unequivocal evidence. The court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the abandonment defense, indicating that the Circuit Court's determination was incorrect.
The issue of abandonment of an easement hinges on intent, which is fundamentally a question of fact typically resolved by a trier of fact. The Circuit Court determined that the Plaintiffs-Appellants had abandoned their easement over the Okayamas’ land based on motions for summary judgment rather than at trial. In making this determination, the court considered various factual elements, including the history of non-use of the 25' Right of Way since 1896, the presence of items obstructing its use, the lack of objections from the Plaintiffs-Appellants regarding these items, and their development of an alternative access route (Easement 3). These factors were relevant to assessing intent to abandon. However, the Circuit Court erred by inferring abandonment from these findings, as it stepped beyond its role in evaluating summary judgment motions, which should not involve resolving disputed facts. Under summary judgment principles, inferences should have been drawn adversely towards each movant. Thus, the court should have inferred intent to abandon only concerning the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ motion and the opposite for the Okayamas’ motion. The Circuit Court mistakenly concluded that summary judgment was warranted based on two sets of facts: (1) the absence of references to the 25' Right of Way in conveyance documents from 1896 to 1940 and (2) substantial improvements made to Easement 3 by the Plaintiffs-Appellants around 1978-1979. While these facts could support a finding of abandonment, they do not definitively establish it.
No legal principle supports the automatic abandonment of an unutilized easement appurtenant solely due to its exclusion from a conveyance. Plaintiffs-Appellants improved Easement 3 significantly rather than merely clearing the 25' Right of Way, and using an alternative access method does not prove abandonment. Although a history of nonuse may suggest abandonment, it is insufficient alone to establish it. The Plaintiffs-Appellants may have been unaware of their rights over the 25' Right of Way, which complicates the issue of abandonment intent. The Circuit Court found that actions by the Okayamas, such as planting trees and constructing a hoshidana that blocked access to the Right of Way, indicated intent to abandon. However, the Circuit Court's conclusion that the easement was effectively blocked is disputed, and the extent of impairment caused by the hoshidana is not definitively established. Additionally, factors like ignorance of rights, the severity of physical impediments, the duration of such impediments, and acquiescence to their presence are relevant to determining abandonment intent. Therefore, summary judgment on abandonment is inappropriate for either party.
The Okayamas argued that the Plaintiffs-Appellants' rights in the 25' Right of Way were terminated by prescription, similar to their abandonment defense. The Circuit Court sided with the Okayamas, referencing case law on adverse possession and the extinguishment of easements. To determine which party prevailed on the prescriptive termination issue, the necessary legal standards were assessed. While Hawaii lacks case law on termination by prescription of easements, other jurisdictions, such as Colorado, provide guidance. The Colorado Supreme Court outlined that an easement can be terminated by adverse possession if the use of the easement area is: 1) adverse to the easement holder’s use, 2) open or notorious, and 3) continuous for the statutory period without interruption. The standard for termination differs conceptually from creation; for termination, the user must demonstrate a stronger level of adversity and hostility. Specifically, only use that is incompatible with the easement holder's rights can justify termination. A party claiming termination must show that their use significantly interferes with the easement owner’s enjoyment, thereby signaling a threat to the easement. Furthermore, the analysis of qualifying use is case-specific, particularly when an easement is created but not utilized. In such cases, the burdened property owner may exercise a broader range of rights, akin to owning unencumbered property.
The easement holder's right to use an easement is afforded greater protection when the easement has not been developed, allowing the servient estate owner to utilize the easement area more extensively. In the case of Castle Assocs. v. Schwartz, a roadway easement was never used or specifically located, leading to the rule that if an easement exists but is unused, the servient tenement owner may fence their land without it being considered adverse to the easement until the dominant tenement owner demands its use, and the servient owner refuses. This principle was a modern restatement of longstanding law on prescriptive termination of easements lacking usage or location.
New York's highest court later characterized the Castle rule as a "narrow exception," indicating that easements not located through use are not in functional existence, meaning the easement holder cannot be expected to know of adverse claims until the easement is activated or a demand for use is made. Consequently, the prescriptive period for adverse possession begins only at that point. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed this rule and its applications across jurisdictions, noting it is applied consistently to cases where easements were created but not utilized, regardless of specific location or development. The court provided policy reasons supporting the Castle Associates rule.
The rule establishes that the owner of property burdened by an easement maintains the right to use their property, provided it does not interfere with the easement holder's rights. It underscores that easements cannot be lost due to nonuse and respects recorded easements, which are traceable through title instruments. Property purchasers are obligated to investigate potential easement burdens and are deemed to have constructive notice of them. The purchase price reflects the benefits or burdens of easements, reinforcing the agreements made between buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the rule aims to prevent unnecessary litigation for easement holders, who might otherwise feel pressured to act to preserve their rights even without a current need to use the easement.
The court's holding specifies that if an easement is created but not used, its area is not considered adverse, and the period for adverse possession does not begin until the easement holder requires its use. The applicability of this rule hinges on whether the easement was expressly created and previously used as a right-of-way. The concurrence highlights ongoing concerns regarding the servient owner's use in relation to the granted easement rights. Most jurisdictions post-Castle have recognized or adopted this precedent, focusing on either the requirement for demand or the nature of use in determining whether it is adverse. Cases referenced illustrate that non-use or certain developments on the easement area do not constitute adverse use until the need for the easement arises.
An easement is not lost by prescription during periods of nonuse unless the adverse use is clearly inconsistent with the future use of the easement. The court emphasizes that a demand requirement applies when the servient estate owner’s use of the easement involves easily removable obstructions. However, not all permanent or substantial uses will be deemed adverse without a demand to utilize the easement. Courts must assess whether the servient estate's use is irreconcilable with the dominant estate's future interest in the easement to trigger the prescriptive period.
In the case examined, the Circuit Court found that the servient estate owners, the Okayamas, utilized the easement area by constructing a hoshidana, planting coffee and macadamia nut trees, and building a rock wall. Conversely, the Plaintiffs-Appellants had never used the 25' Right of Way. The ruling cites Kolouch, where similar actions by a servient estate owner did not extinguish the easement as they were not deemed adverse until a need to use the easement arose. This principle supports the notion that a servient estate owner can use the land for purposes not inconsistent with the easement until such need arises. Therefore, in this case, the planting of trees and maintenance of the rock wall did not constitute adverse use, as the Plaintiffs-Appellants had not sought to utilize the easement. Courts generally reject claims that vegetation, whether cultivated or natural, constitutes adverse use sufficient to extinguish an easement.
The determination of whether the construction or existence of the hoshidana, in conjunction with trees and a rock wall, conflicts with the Plaintiffs-Appellants' predecessors' rights to use the 25' Right of Way remains unresolved. The evidence does not allow for a definitive conclusion regarding the irreconcilability of this use, thus presenting a genuine issue of material fact. The Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment for the Okayamas on the matter of prescription termination.
Regarding Troxel's claim for an implied easement, the Circuit Court correctly found no supporting evidence for such a claim over Parcel 29, as Troxel already possesses an express right to use Easement 3. The concept of implied easement applies only when necessary, and since Troxel did not plead this cause of action, they cannot assert it now. The Okayamas' counterclaim did not challenge the existence of an implied easement, preventing them from asserting that Troxel has none in their summary judgment motion.
The Plaintiffs-Appellants argued that summary judgment should have favored them concerning the Okayamas' defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, and bona fide purchasers without notice; however, the Circuit Court did not rule on this matter. Consequently, with the vacating of the Circuit Court's summary judgment for the Okayamas and remand for further proceedings, these defenses will be addressed by the Circuit Court initially, in line with established precedent.
Lastly, the court has left it to the Circuit Court to determine the permissible use of the 25' Right of Way and the necessity of a prohibitory injunction against the Okayamas.
Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the land court's original decree and certificate of title establish a public easement through Easement 3, citing references to “public ways” in the Application. The Haradas contend that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Easement 3, arguing these claims amounted to an attempt to register a public easement, which should be addressed in land court due to the registration of their land. They further claim that the public ways mentioned in the Application refer to roads other than Easement 3.
The land court has exclusive original jurisdiction over applications for land registration and easements, as outlined in Haw.Rev.Stat. 501-1, and has concurrent jurisdiction over issues arising post-registration. Although the Circuit Court can address matters involving registered land, not all controversies must be resolved by the land court. The excerpt notes that the Plaintiffs-Appellants are not seeking to register land or the easement but rather to clarify the scope of Easement 3. The document references case law supporting the idea that the circuit court may have jurisdiction over certain related matters, indicating that jurisdiction is not strictly limited to the land court even in cases involving registered property.
HRS § 501-196, which outlines the process for amending a certificate of title, grants exclusive jurisdiction to the land court for such amendments. However, the supreme court clarified that it did not rule on the land court's exclusive jurisdiction in this matter, instead determining that the expungement of a lis pendens did not constitute an amendment to the certificate, thus making HRS § 501-196 irrelevant. Consequently, the circuit court was found to have jurisdiction to expunge the lis pendens under HRS §§ 501-151 and 501-152.
The circuit court also had concurrent jurisdiction under HRS § 501-1 to address title matters related to land court property, allowing it to examine the scope of Easement 3. However, it lacked jurisdiction to amend the certificates of title for the Haradas and Toki. The court erred in granting summary judgment concerning the scope of Easement 3 due to unresolved factual disputes, specifically regarding whether it is a public road easement or one limited to Parcels 31 and 32. The determination of the easement's scope relies on the intent of the Church when establishing it and its correlation to the “public ways” indicated in the Church’s land court application.
The circuit court had deemed the land court decree ambiguous regarding the easement's scope and improperly considered parol evidence. Once the ambiguity was recognized, the determination of the easement’s scope and the intent of its creator shifted to factual questions. The circuit court's consideration of conflicting evidence exceeded its authority in adjudicating the motions for summary judgment.
The court vacated the relevant findings and orders from June 16, 2008, March 16, 2009, and July 3, 2008, except for specific portions related to Troxel's implied easement and the Haradas’ motion to amend the caption. The final judgment from June 25, 2009, was also vacated, with the case remanded to the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Honorable Elizabeth A. Strance presided over a case where Troxel was added as a plaintiff on October 11, 2005. The term "Plaintiffs-Appellants" encompasses Childs and the Wilsons prior to Troxel's addition, and includes Troxel thereafter. Hatsune O. Hirano co-owns land with the Okayamas, who are referenced collectively for convenience, with Hirano included unless stated otherwise. The opinion references Lots 7 and 8-C, which correspond to Parcels 32 and 31 respectively, and discusses historical land court documents, including a 1896 Decree that established a 25-foot right of way from the Makai Portion to the Highway, situated on the south side of the Mauka Portion.
The Southern Portion of the land is part of the Torrens System of property registration under chapter 501 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, while the Northern Portion is under the Regular System, governed by chapter 502. The Circuit Court examined evidence regarding a "dry stack rock wall" that allegedly obstructed access to the makai side of Parcel 29, as well as a hoshidana—a coffee-drying structure within the right of way. The hoshidana was described in detail, including its dimensions and mechanical features.
The Circuit Court incorrectly concluded that the hoshidana blocked approximately 20 feet of the right of way. The Plaintiffs-Appellants contested the Circuit Court's assessment of how the hoshidana affected the easement's usability for passage. Furthermore, the Circuit Court found that Childs became aware of his rights only in the 1980s, and it remains uncertain if the Wilsons’ predecessor knew of their easement rights. Wilson’s deed conveyed the 25-foot right of way, but he mistakenly believed his rights pertained to Easement 3.
The installation of structures by the servient estate on or around an easement, along with the dominant estate's acquiescence, may indicate intent to abandon the easement but does not legally confirm abandonment. The servient estate owner can use their property in various ways without impacting the dominant estate's rights or requiring the dominant estate to act against abandonment. "Termination by prescription" refers to the loss of easement rights due to adverse actions by the servient estate owner, which differs from adverse possession in the required proof. The Colorado Supreme Court has differentiated these terms, noting they are merely semantically different. The Spiegel case illustrated that the installation of gates and other barriers by a landowner’s lessee led to the easement being deemed terminated due to non-use for the prescriptive period. There is no evidence that the current or previous owners of the dominant estate asserted their rights to a specific 25' Right of Way prior to recent events, while Troxel's deed asserts his right to Easement 3, which the Haradas acknowledge despite lacking reference in their title. According to HRS 501-196, alterations in registered interests require a court petition. The Knauer case raised questions about the validity of the Iaea case concerning the forgery of a deed and the court's authority to expunge such deeds from the land court records.
Iaea asserts that the circuit court had jurisdiction to address the validity of a signature on a deed but lacked the authority to direct the land court to expunge the deed if the signature was found to be forged. The criticism in Knauer's footnote 13 questions whether HRS 501-196 grants the land court exclusive jurisdiction over cases requiring amendments to a certificate of title. However, Iaea remains authoritative. Therefore, the Haradas' claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or the Preliminary Injunction Order is unfounded. Although the land court did not designate public ways in the Decree, the circuit court retains the ability to identify these public highways upon remand. Additionally, the existence of a highway over registered land can be established as per Haw. Rev. Stat. 501-82(a)(4) (2006).
