Robert Holst v. Countryside Enterprises, Incorporated

Docket: 93-2665

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 2, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Holst appeals a judgment favoring Countryside Enterprises in a diversity negligence case following a jury verdict. Holst claims the district court erred by not instructing the jury on res ipsa loquitur and by preventing his expert from citing certain codes for his opinion. The incident occurred on May 30, 1988, when Holst, renting a golf cart from Countryside Enterprises, was struck on the head by a pull-type golf cart that fell from the clubhouse. Holst sustained a head injury resulting in brain damage and alleged that Countryside Enterprises negligently managed the clubhouse and failed to provide adequate guardrails.

The court rejected Holst's request for a res ipsa loquitur instruction, which led to his appeal. Under Iowa law, for a res ipsa loquitur instruction to be warranted, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrument causing the injury and that the injury would not ordinarily occur without negligence. The court found that Holst did not establish that Countryside Enterprises had exclusive control over the specific golf cart that struck him, as the cart's ownership was not definitively identified, and there was no evidence proving that the cart was not rented out at the time of the accident. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision.

Appellant contends that Appellee failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that the pull-type golf cart involved in the incident had been rented. However, under Iowa law, the responsibility to present evidence necessary for a res ipsa loquitur instruction lies with the plaintiff, not the defendant. Therefore, it was Appellant's duty to show that the golf carts, located on the clubhouse's upper level, had been rented on the day of the incident, which Appellant did not accomplish. Consequently, Appellant did not meet the burden of proving that Appellee had exclusive control over the golf carts at the time of the injury, justifying the district court’s decision not to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.

Additionally, Appellant challenges the district court's exclusion of certain evidence. The court holds broad discretion in evidentiary matters, and such rulings are typically upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. Expert witness William Latenser testified that the absence of guardrails rendered the clubhouse unsafe, citing industry safety standards. However, Appellant did not inquire about specific ordinances or codes during Latenser's direct examination. The court ruled that Latenser could not testify regarding violations of legal codes, including the Fire Marshall Safety Code, during cross-examination. This ruling stemmed from a prior agreement to exclude references to applicable codes during opening statements, although the court had encouraged Appellant to introduce this evidence during witness testimony.

The court expressed uncertainty on how to proceed regarding the introduction of evidence related to applicable codes, specifically the Fire Safety Code. Holst's attorney argued that the Fire Safety Code should apply, but the court maintained that no relevant standard had been established during direct testimony. The plaintiff's counsel failed to provide an offer of proof concerning the applicability of any codes, which precluded them from arguing the fire code at this stage. Key points established include: (1) the district court's ruling on the motion in limine did not prevent the introduction of evidence during witness testimony; (2) no effort was made to elicit testimony about specific codes during Latenser's direct examination; and (3) the appellant did not preserve the issue for appeal by failing to make the necessary offer of proof. The court emphasized that to challenge the exclusion of evidence, a party must demonstrate that a substantial right was affected and must provide the substance of the evidence through an offer of proof. Consequently, no error in evidence law occurred, and the district court's decision was affirmed. Additionally, while the court misapplied the law regarding the res ipsa loquitur instruction, its ruling was nonetheless correct as a matter of law, justifying the affirmation of the decision.

Appellant contends that Mr. Carrithers, an expert witness for Countryside Enterprises, acknowledged the absence of a common architectural rule requiring guardrails between elevation changes. This statement allegedly allowed for rebuttal testimony about the Iowa Administrative Code. However, Holst did not object to this testimony, resulting in failure to preserve the issue for appeal. Even if the issue had been preserved, Appellant's argument lacks merit since Mr. Carrithers' testimony aligned with the architectural standards cited by Mr. Latenser, and there is no evidence indicating that Carrithers referenced any specific code, statute, or regulation. The relevance of introducing the fire code through expert testimony is questionable, as typically, such codes are established through judicial notice. The fire code is not included in the record, raising doubts about its applicability to the case, which focuses on safety rather than fire prevention. Prior to instructing both parties to refrain from discussing codes in opening statements, the court expressed confusion about the introduction of building codes, indicating that the expert's testimony would address these points later.