Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Ronald McNally v. Michael Cooksey, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois
Citations: 14 F.3d 604; 1993 WL 524297Docket: 92-2181
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; December 16, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) prohibits the citation of unpublished orders as precedent except for specific legal doctrines. Ronald McNally, representing himself, appeals the district court's decision to deny his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which the court affirmed. McNally argues that the district court failed to conduct a de novo review of objections he raised regarding the magistrate judge's recommendations, citing Hernandez v. Estelle. However, the court found this argument meritless, noting that the magistrate's hearing was not evidentiary in nature, and the district court did review McNally's objections thoroughly before adopting the recommendations. McNally also contends that his due process rights were violated during Bureau of Prisons disciplinary proceedings, a claim the district court rejected. The magistrate judge indicated that the United States Parole Commission (USPC) can independently assess inmate behavior, allowing consideration of hearsay and uncharged offenses. The court ruled that addressing McNally's claims was unnecessary as they lacked substance. Furthermore, McNally claimed that the district court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing regarding his petition. The court clarified that 28 U.S.C. § 2243 does not guarantee an evidentiary hearing, emphasizing the importance of efficiency and finality in post-conviction proceedings. It concluded that no grounds existed to warrant such a hearing for McNally's case. McNally is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus as determined by the district court and the magistrate judge. He has failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact, negating the need for an evidentiary hearing. The district court’s factual findings are well-supported by evidence, and there is no indication of clear error. McNally's claims regarding improper placement at USP-Marion, reliance on expunged reports, failure to compile necessary documentation for parole determination, and inadequate disclosure of documents used in his parole decision were not included in his objections to the magistrate's report, rendering them waived for appeal. Additionally, his other challenges regarding transfer from military custody, record maintenance, alleged due process violations in parole proceedings, waiver status, appointment of counsel, and access to legal materials were thoroughly addressed and rejected by the district court. Consequently, the decision is affirmed based on the reasons provided by the district court and magistrate judge. McNally is serving a 45-year sentence for serious offenses and became eligible for parole in 1985, with determinations made by the United States Parole Commission due to his federal incarceration. McNally applied for parole on August 21, 1984, but his initial hearing scheduled for October 1984 was delayed due to the regional parole office not returning his file to USP-Marion. A subsequent inquiry revealed that additional information was needed for a pre-hearing assessment. McNally's case was postponed, and his file was sent back to the prison for a pre-sentence report, which lacked details about his offenses. His unit manager contacted the Department of the Army for official information, resulting in a letter from the prosecuting attorney but no additional details. The initial hearing was rescheduled for December 1984, but the examiner found the mini-file inadequate regarding McNally's offenses, leading to further continuances in February and April 1985. These delays were attributed to insufficient information and lack of military permission to disclose offense details. By May 29, 1985, the Bureau of Prisons provided an initial pre-hearing packet, but still lacked military disclosure authority. In June 1985, a hearing was attempted but postponed as McNally requested to review disclosable material 30 days prior. On the same day, a panel member obtained information about McNally's second arrest. The Regional Parole Commissioner responded to McNally's disclosure request, advising him to contact his case manager for materials that could be disclosed. McNally reviewed the documents in August 1985. On August 19, 1985, McNally refused to proceed with the hearing, citing incomplete disclosure. Another attempt on October 22, 1985, was made, but McNally requested a continuance, which was granted. No further proceedings occurred until he reapplied for parole in 1990, during which he unsuccessfully sought to compel his return to military custody through legal actions and was considered in waiver status. Upon reapplication, McNally waived his right to advance disclosure and an initial hearing was promptly conducted. The Regional Parole Commissioner decided to continue his incarceration until the end of his sentence. An appeal led to a modification of his guideline range due to an acquittal on an assault charge, but the decision to deny parole remained unchanged. Congress has granted the United States Parole Commission exclusive discretion to grant or deny parole, with judicial review limited to assessing potential abuse of that discretion. McNally argues for habeas relief, claiming the prison failed to provide complete and accurate information about his criminal record, resulting in a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4208(a), which mandates an initial parole hearing 30 days prior to parole eligibility when feasible. The Bureau of Prisons is responsible for compiling reports on inmates but is not legally required to gather specific details of their criminal activities. Due process only necessitates that parole decisions are based on reasoned judgment rather than speculation. Consequently, McNally's claims about the prison's informational shortcomings do not warrant habeas relief. Additionally, McNally contends that the Parole Commission's proceedings were untimely and lacked substance due to incomplete records. However, the Commission's examiners determined it was impractical to make a decision before his eligibility date and postponed the hearing until all pertinent information was collected. This delay was deemed reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. McNally further asserts a due process right to written notification regarding the reasons for the delay, though he does not dispute that he received multiple oral explanations and written communications indicating the need for additional information. Upon denial of parole, due process requires only a clear statement of reasons, which was provided in McNally's case. There is no requirement for a written statement on initial hearing delays, leading to the conclusion that his argument for habeas relief should be dismissed. McNally contests the use of prison misconduct reports in his parole determination, arguing that such reports should only impact parole decisions if the prison disciplinary committee recommends rescinding parole. This claim is rejected, as the Parole Commission has the authority to evaluate an inmate's behavior independently of disciplinary actions, referencing Levesque v. Brennan. He further argues that the March 9, 1990, Notice of Action lacked constitutional sufficiency by failing to clarify the calculation of his salient factor score. However, Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4206 mandates that the Commission provide specific reasons for parole denial, and the Notice adequately detailed individual salient factor scores, fulfilling regulatory requirements. McNally also raises concerns about the consideration of an adverse parole recommendation from a military trial attorney, claiming it contradicts his 1974 plea agreement, which suggested clemency. The court notes that recommendations from the sentencing phase do not bind the Parole Commission, as established in Augustine v. Brewer. Lastly, McNally argues he was not given a fair chance to contest findings from two disciplinary proceedings related to possession of a weapon and assaulting a correctional officer. Despite his denials, he was found guilty in both cases, which were documented and available for review prior to the parole hearing. The parole authorities confirmed these violations, and the National Appeals Board reviewed his challenges but upheld the disciplinary findings. The Parole Commission has the authority to consider disciplinary reports from prison staff, including evidence from disciplinary proceedings. McNally had multiple opportunities to contest the disciplinary reports, including during prison hearings and his initial parole hearing, as well as before the National Appeals Board. This indicates he had a fair chance to challenge the charges, and the reports provided sufficient evidence of new criminal conduct, rendering habeas relief inappropriate for these claims. McNally also claims that the Bureau of Prisons did not gather accurate records regarding his criminal offenses, hindering his classification process. He argues that upon his transfer from the U.S. Army to the Bureau of Prisons in May 1978, the bureau should not have accepted or retained him without proper classification information. Responses to his administrative requests noted that he was placed at USP-Marion due to being unmanageable in less secure settings, and his transfer from USP-Leavenworth in 1982 was linked to his involvement in an escape plot. There is no evidence that his confinement at USP-Marion violates any statutory or constitutional requirements. According to Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4083, individuals convicted of federal offenses may be housed in any U.S. penitentiary. The Supreme Court has determined that decisions regarding inmate assignments to specific institutions are not subject to due process challenges, and the Seventh Circuit has ruled that assignment to USP-Marion does not carry constitutional protection. Consequently, McNally’s challenge regarding his classification does not warrant habeas relief. The court recommends denying McNally's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, as outlined in the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, against which McNally has filed timely objections. Plaintiff McNally claims the Bureau of Prisons inadequately maintained records of his military convictions, leading to an insufficient basis for the United States Parole Commission's parole determination. He alleges violations of his disclosure rights under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 4308(b) and asserts that he was denied due process regarding his parole hearing in December 1985. McNally seeks a notice of action explaining continuances and requests a return to military custody. He argues that the Bureau is obligated to provide military legal research materials and contends that the Parole Commission improperly considered incident reports lacking disciplinary sanctions. His objections include being in waiver status between his 1985 parole hearing and a 1990 reapplication. McNally also challenges his transfer from military custody to the Bureau of Prisons, asserting that he has a constitutional right to choose his incarceration location, which is unsupported by law. Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4083, individuals convicted of certain offenses may be confined in a U.S. Penitentiary, and established case law indicates no constitutional right to choose one's place of incarceration. Regarding record-keeping, McNally claims this failure rendered his parole proceedings ineffective. However, it is noted that the Bureau is not required to compile information for the Parole Commission and that due process requires the decision to be rational, not based on speculation. The magistrate affirmed that any delays in the parole determination process did not constitute a constitutional violation, and McNally's disclosure rights under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4208(b) were deemed satisfied according to the record. Due process requires the parole commission to provide reasons for continuances in parole hearings sufficient for court review, as established in Solomon v. Elsea. Plaintiff McNally received both oral and written explanations regarding delays in his parole proceedings, leading to the rejection of his habeas relief argument. McNally objected to being classified as in waiver status from October 22, 1985, until his new parole application in 1990, but the record indicates he requested a continuance on that date. Judicial review of parole decisions is limited to instances of abuse of discretion. The parole board's consideration of McNally's waiver status was not arbitrary or capricious, thus rejecting his objection. McNally also alleged inadequate access to military legal research materials at the United States Penitentiary, claiming it infringed on his constitutional right to access the courts, as per Bounds v. Smith. Despite his conviction under military law and entitlement to similar treatment as civilian prisoners, this court noted that habeas corpus is not applicable for this claim. McNally has not exhausted administrative remedies, leading to the denial of this claim without prejudice for potential future re-filing after exhausting remedies. Additionally, McNally's repeated requests for court-appointed counsel were denied as he failed to demonstrate any change in circumstances justifying such an appointment. Consequently, the court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, denying McNally's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court, presided over by Judge William L. Beatty, concluded that oral arguments were unnecessary for this case after reviewing the briefs. The parties were informed that they could submit a "Statement as to Need of Oral Argument," but none were filed, leading to the appeal being decided based solely on the written materials. Michael Cooksey has replaced John L. Clark as the warden of the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. Inmates are guaranteed reasonable access to information intended for use by hearing examiners at least 30 days prior to the proceedings, as mandated by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4208(b), with the Bureau of Prisons required to respond to disclosure requests within 15 days per 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.55(a)(1). Various issues are raised within McNally's supplemental memorandum (Document No. 41), including discussions on pages 1-10, 22-23, 24-25, and 25-32. The salient factor score, derived from six scored factors detailed in 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.20, is also mentioned. Additionally, two disciplinary reports concerning McNally noted the discovery of shanks in his bed and an incident where he struck a correctional officer.