State v. Montgomery

Docket: No. 1 CA-CR13-0654

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; November 12, 2013; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Leroy Montgomery's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his appeal as untimely has been denied by the court. Montgomery argued based on the decision in State v. Whitman, which suggested that the notice of appeal deadline begins with the filing of the minute entry documenting the judgment and sentence. However, the court disagreed, clarifying that according to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.3, the time for filing a notice of appeal starts from the date of sentencing itself.

Montgomery was sentenced on August 16, 2013, but filed his notice of appeal 24 days later, which was outside the 20-day window from the sentencing date, thus leading to a lack of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In comparing this to Whitman, who had initially acknowledged the correct timeline but later argued for a different interpretation regarding the timing of the appeal, the court maintained that the rules are clear: the appeal period begins at sentencing. The dissenting opinion in Whitman supported this interpretation, emphasizing that judgment and sentence are final upon oral pronouncement in court. The court concluded that the supreme court's intent is clear in stating that the entry of judgment and sentence occurs at the time of sentencing, reinforcing the jurisdictional nature of the filing deadlines for appeals.

The case Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8U1 examined the timeliness of a father's notice of appeal, hinging on the interpretation of the date on a minute entry order. The document bore a date of '10-18-90' in one corner, while 'Received' and 'Processed' stamps were dated October 25, 1990. The court had to determine whether the earlier or later date constituted the official filing date. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the latest date on the minute entry would be utilized, citing the county’s confusing practices regarding minute entries that complicate the calculation of appeal periods. The court expressed a desire for clarity in judgment entries, contrasting minute entries with file-stamped civil judgments and oral pronouncements in criminal cases. The ruling established that the time for filing a notice of appeal in criminal cases aligns with the sentencing date, as articulated in Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 26.2(b), which states that judgments are pronounced and entered with the sentence. This view is supported by prior cases, reinforcing that a defendant's notice of post-conviction relief must be filed within ninety days of the entry of judgment and sentence, which is valid upon oral pronouncement in court. The rules assert that the entry of judgment occurs at sentencing, regardless of when the clerk files the minute entry.

Judgment is entered at the time of sentencing according to Rule 26.2(b), and the judgment and sentence are deemed complete upon oral pronouncement in court as per Rule 26.16(a). Rule 26.16(b) mandates the court to promptly record the judgment and sentence in the minutes, while Rule 41, Form 23 clarifies that this entry occurs at sentencing. Notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days after the judgment's entry (Rule 31.3). Montgomery's appeal was dismissed because his notice was not filed within this timeframe. The motion for reconsideration is denied. The opinion, delivered by Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and joined by Judges Donn Kessler and Michael J. Brown, contrasts with civil cases by emphasizing that in criminal proceedings, judgments are complete once pronounced and recorded, with no need for a signed document for an appeal (State v. Dowthard). The case reference to Rosario pertains to post-conviction relief, analogous to a direct appeal. Delayed appeals may be permitted for criminal defendants if their attorneys failed to file timely (Rule 32.1(f); State ex rel. Neely v. Rodriguez).