Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; July 30, 2013; Arizona; State Appellate Court
Defendant Shawnte Shuree Jones appeals her convictions for two counts of child abuse and one count of felony murder related to the death of her ten-month-old child. The court affirms her convictions but addresses a sentencing issue due to a conflict between Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 13-116 and 13-705(M). The trial court had imposed consecutive sentences for the felony murder and one child abuse conviction, designating them as dangerous crimes against children. However, these convictions arose from the same conduct, necessitating that the sentences be served concurrently under A.R.S. 13-116, which prohibits double punishment for a single act. The indictment included counts for child abuse and first-degree murder, with Jones being found guilty of reckless child abuse as a lesser offense for one count. The trial court sentenced her to 3.5 years for Count 1, 17 years for Count 2, and life with the possibility of release after 35 years for Count 3. While the sentences for Counts 1 and 3 were ordered to be served concurrently, the sentence for Count 2 was to be served consecutively. Following a review, the court concludes that the sentences for Counts 2 and 3 should also be modified to run concurrently, aligning with the statutory requirement. Both parties acknowledge that the convictions for Counts 2 and 3 stem from a single act, thus confirming the applicability of A.R.S. 13-116 and the conflict with A.R.S. 13-705(M).
Section 13-705(M) mandates that sentences for dangerous crimes against children, excluding cases of child molestation or sexual abuse involving only one victim, must be consecutive to any other sentences previously imposed on the individual. The interpretation of statutes focuses on discerning and implementing the legislative intent, emphasizing that every word must carry meaning without rendering any part void or insignificant. When conflicts arise between two sentencing statutes, efforts are made to harmonize them. The State argues that A.R.S. 13-705(M) should take precedence over the older, more general A.R.S. 13-116, due to its specificity and recency. However, the court finds no support for this argument and maintains that A.R.S. 13-116 remains paramount in sentencing schemes, as established in State v. Arnoldi, which clarified that while consecutive sentences are required for dangerous crimes against children, they must not contravene A.R.S. 13-116. The court refuses to overturn the Arnoldi decision, noting that the legislature has made only minor amendments to the dangerous crimes statutes since then, implying approval of the court’s interpretation. Additionally, A.R.S. 13-705(M) lacks specific language that would indicate it applies to the "single act" situation addressed by A.R.S. 13-116 or that it is intended to supersede other statutes, which is typically signaled by specific wording in legislative texts.
The absence of explicit language in A.R.S. 13-705(M) undermines the State’s claim that this statute is an exception to A.R.S. 13-116 and should prevail in this case. A.R.S. 13-705(M) allows for concurrent sentencing in instances of child molestation or sexual abuse involving a single victim, but this exception does not suggest that A.R.S. 13-705(M) contradicts the requirement under A.R.S. 13-116 for concurrent sentences based on the same act. The legislature likely did not intend for A.R.S. 13-705(M) to apply when separate sentences arise from a single act. In the absence of clear legislative intent, the court will not assume an exception exists. Given that Jones' convictions for Counts 2 and 3 stem from the same conduct, a conflict between statutes is evident. The court resolves this by prioritizing A.R.S. 13-116, which mandates concurrent sentences in such scenarios. Thus, while A.R.S. 13-705(M) typically necessitates consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children, A.R.S. 13-116 prevails here, leading to the conclusion that Jones’ sentences for all three convictions will be served concurrently. The court affirms Jones' convictions and modifies the sentence for Count 2 accordingly. Additionally, it notes that the designation of first-degree murder in Count 3 as a dangerous crime against children is not supported by statute, but this does not affect the appeal's outcome. The court also highlights that proper legal citations regarding sentencing were not raised during trial, and it will not correct beneficial sentencing errors absent a cross-appeal from the State.
