State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes

Citations: 216 Ariz. 525; 169 P.3d 115; 515 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 29; 2007 Ariz. App. LEXIS 201Docket: No. 1 CA-SA 07-0201

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; October 25, 2007; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The court is tasked with determining whether Arizona's definition of 'prohibited possessor' in A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) necessitates proof that possession of a firearm or ammunition is connected to interstate or foreign commerce, as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). The court concluded that such proof is required based on the statute's plain language. 

The case involves Israel Saldana Perez, who was stopped by police for traffic violations and subsequently arrested for failing to provide valid identification. During a search of his vehicle, police found a .38 revolver. It was later revealed that Perez had been deported multiple times and was in the U.S. illegally. He was indicted for misconduct involving weapons under A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), with the State asserting he was a 'prohibited possessor' under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(6)(e) due to his illegal status as defined by U.S. law.

Perez sought to dismiss the indictment, arguing the State did not prove that the revolver had any connection to interstate or foreign commerce, as required by § 922(g)(5). The State acknowledged the lack of evidence regarding the commerce nexus but contended that it was unnecessary for a conviction under state law. The trial court agreed with Perez, remanding the case to the grand jury for a new probable cause determination, reasoning that the state law incorporated the federal requirement regarding interstate or foreign commerce. This special action followed the trial court's decision.

Jurisdiction is accepted in this special action due to its presentation of a legal question of first impression and statewide significance, alongside the absence of a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal. The court reviews the trial court's interpretation of A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) de novo, aiming to ascertain legislative intent primarily through statutory text. If the language is clear, it is given plain meaning; if ambiguous, secondary principles of construction are applied.

The State contends that the trial court incorrectly ruled that A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) necessitates proof of an interstate or foreign commerce nexus related to firearm possession. The State argues that the legislature intended to adopt only a portion of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), excluding the commerce requirement. In contrast, Perez asserts that 13-3101(A)(6)(e) fully adopts the entire definition of a prohibited possessor under 922(g)(5), which includes the necessity of proof regarding interstate or foreign commerce. The court agrees with Perez, stating that the definition in 13-3101(A)(6)(e) inherently requires proof of such a nexus.

The State further argues against this interpretation based on legislative history and the potential for absurd results. The court notes it will refrain from adopting the plain meaning if it contradicts legislative intent or leads to absurd outcomes, committing to address the State's arguments accordingly.

The legislative history of A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) supports a plain-meaning interpretation, contrary to the State's position. The Arizona Senate's 2004 Senate Bill S.B. 1345 aimed to amend this statute by expanding the definition of 'prohibited possessor' to include undocumented and nonimmigrant aliens, while excluding specific categories consistent with 18 U.S.C. 922(y). The Senate Fact Sheet outlined that the amendment sought to prohibit these aliens from possessing firearms, noting existing federal prohibitions but emphasizing the need for state enforcement. However, when the bill reached the House, the language regarding undocumented and nonimmigrant aliens was removed, and the definition was modified to align with 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The final adoption of A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) reflects the legislature's decision to fully incorporate the federal definition rather than a partial one, indicating a clear legislative intent. Courts are not to second-guess deliberate legislative choices, reinforcing the interpretation that the state law mirrors the entirety of the referenced federal provision.

The court rejects the State's argument that interpreting A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) based on its plain meaning leads to absurd outcomes, such as treating certain prohibited possessors differently and undermining Arizona’s misconduct-involving-weapons statute. The State asserts that Arizona prohibits possession of deadly weapons, which include firearms and destructive devices, and claims that adopting federal law (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)) would allow undocumented aliens to possess certain weapons without a firearm or ammunition related to interstate commerce. The court counters that the State misinterprets the federal definition of 'firearm,' which also includes destructive devices. It clarifies that individuals classified as prohibited possessors under A.R.S. 13-3101(A)(6)(e) cannot possess destructive weapons, regardless of whether they simultaneously possess a firearm. The court emphasizes that a legislative intent to facilitate local enforcement against illegal possession of firearms and other weapons justifies this interpretation. Since the State did not provide evidence that the Smith & Wesson revolver had the required interstate commerce nexus, the trial court's decision to remand the case to the grand jury was correct. The court accepts jurisdiction but denies relief to the State.

An alien with a nonimmigrant visa is not considered a prohibited possessor under 18 U.S.C. 922(y)(2) if they meet specific criteria, including being admitted for lawful hunting or sporting purposes, holding a valid hunting license, being an accredited official representative of a foreign government, or being a foreign law enforcement officer on official business. The court previously accepted jurisdiction and denied relief, stating a detailed opinion would follow. Perez requested dismissal of the case with prejudice but did not file a cross-petition against the trial court's refusal to dismiss, leaving that issue unaddressed. S.B. 1345 clarifies that certain nonimmigrant aliens, including those with hunting licenses and diplomats, are exempt from specific prohibitions. Additionally, the definition of 'destructive device' under Section 921(a)(4) includes various explosive weapons and components that can be readily converted into such devices. The burden of proof for establishing a nexus in such cases is minimal; for instance, demonstrating that a firearm was manufactured outside Arizona suffices to meet this requirement, as established in United States v. Humphreys.