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Pinedo v. Arizona Department of Transportation
Citations: 200 Ariz. 95; 23 P.3d 90; 348 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4; 2000 Ariz. App. LEXIS 196Docket: No. 2 CA-CV 00-0016
Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; December 19, 2000; Arizona; State Appellate Court
After an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that there were reasonable grounds for a police officer to suspect Joseph C. Pinedo was driving under the influence (DUI) and that his blood alcohol concentration was .10 or higher, resulting in a suspension of Pinedo's driver’s license. Pinedo subsequently petitioned the superior court to review this suspension, which determined that the officer lacked the necessary 'reasonable suspicion of criminal activity' to justify detaining Pinedo, leading to a reversal of the suspension. During the administrative hearing, Pinedo's counsel acknowledged the requirements under A.R.S. 28-1385(1) for license revocation but contested the legality of the initial contact and detention. On appeal, the central issue was whether reasonable suspicion existed for a lawful Terry stop, referencing relevant case law. The appellate court focused on a legal question not addressed by the parties or the lower courts: whether a driver can appeal an adverse summary review of a license suspension. While the state argued that the officer had reasonable grounds for the stop, the appellate court noted that the ALJ had overstepped by considering the constitutionality of the stop, which fell outside the defined scope of A.R.S. 28-1385(1). It concluded that a license suspension could proceed without examining the legality of the initial stop, as state and federal constitutions do not mandate the exclusionary rule in license suspension cases and do not require probable or reasonable cause for the stop. Arizona courts have distinguished between criminal proceedings and civil administrative driver’s license suspension proceedings, particularly regarding the scope of issues considered. In Sherrill v. Department of Transportation, it was noted that civil suspension for refusing a breath test is separate from DUI criminal prosecution. Owen v. Creedon emphasized that in civil license suspension cases, the validity of the arrest or a conviction is not required. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) exceeded the limited scope of the proceeding by questioning the propriety of the stop, rendering that finding irrelevant to the suspension determination. Similarly, the superior court erred by addressing the lawfulness of the stop and subsequently reversing the ALJ's decision, which was beyond its review authority. Consequently, the superior court's order is reversed, and the ALJ’s order is reinstated.