Carrasco v. State

Citations: 199 Ariz. 494; 19 P.3d 635; 342 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 18; 2001 Ariz. App. LEXIS 50Docket: No. 2 CA-CV 00-0191

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 8, 2001; Arizona; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Arizona and Child Protective Services (CPS) in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by Theresa Carrasco, the personal representative of decedent Sky Andres Carrasco. Theresa contended that the court erred by ruling that, since Sky's mother, Nancy, a statutory beneficiary under A.R.S. 12-612(A), survived him, the estate was not authorized to recover damages. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the estate does not qualify as an authorized beneficiary.

Sky Carrasco, who was three months old, died on June 1, 1997, with his mother, Nancy, later charged and convicted of criminally negligent child abuse related to his death. Theresa, Sky's grandmother, alleged CPS had ignored multiple reports about Sky's safety. CPS defended against the lawsuit by citing Bowslaugh v. Bowslaugh, asserting that because Nancy survived Sky, the estate could not seek damages.

Theresa argued that Nancy's criminal actions severed her parental rights under the slayer statute, A.R.S. 14-2803, suggesting that the statute should treat Nancy as if she had predeceased Sky. However, the trial court found that Nancy remained a surviving parent and eligible beneficiary, concluding Theresa did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate Nancy had intentionally killed Sky, which would be required for disqualification under the slayer statute. 

The court clarified that under A.R.S. 12-612(A), wrongful death actions can only be pursued by surviving spouses, children, or parents, or the estate if none of these beneficiaries survive. Since Nancy survived Sky, the estate was not entitled to recover damages.

Theresa claims that Nancy's parental rights were implicitly severed due to her responsibility for Sky's death, but this argument lacks supporting legal authority and is therefore rejected. Additionally, Theresa asserts that Nancy is disqualified under the slayer statute, A.R.S. 14-2803, allowing her to sue on behalf of the estate. Subsection A of the statute states that a person who intentionally kills the decedent forfeits benefits under the probate code, which does not cover wrongful death actions. Subsection D applies only to governing instruments executed by the decedent, which are not present in this case. Subsection E, while potentially applicable to wrongful death actions, requires proof that Nancy feloniously and intentionally killed Sky. Theresa argues that Nancy's indictment for first-degree murder and conviction for criminally negligent child abuse indicate intent, but this is insufficient as the murder charge was dismissed. There is no legal precedent establishing that a mere indictment, without further evidence, satisfies the requirement to prove felonious intent under the slayer statute.

Nancy was convicted of criminally negligent child abuse, defined under A.R.S. 13-3623(A)(3) as causing or allowing physical injury to a child or endangering a child. Her conviction, based on "criminal negligence," indicates a failure to recognize a substantial risk of harm and does not imply intentional killing. The trial court noted this conviction suggests a lack of specific intent to kill the child, Sky. Theresa failed to present evidence to challenge Nancy's involvement in Sky’s death, leading to a determination that summary judgment against Nancy was appropriate. Additionally, even if Nancy was disqualified from wrongful death damages under the slayer statute, Theresa could not pursue recovery for the estate due to prior case law. In Bowslaugh, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that a decedent’s estate cannot recover wrongful death damages if there are surviving but ineligible beneficiaries, regardless of their legal status. Theresa argued that the subsequent abolition of interspousal immunity in Fernandez v. Romo weakened Bowslaugh’s authority, but this does not alter the fact that Bowslaugh was decided under existing law. The court's strict interpretation of A.R.S. 12-612(A) remains applicable, as it underscores that wrongful death actions are statutory and any changes must come from the legislature. Moreover, the recognition of common law attributes in wrongful death actions does not negate the need for strict adherence to the statute’s language.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Summerfield affirmed that the legislature has entirely governed the identification of wrongful death beneficiaries, maintaining the precedent set in Bowslaugh regarding legislative intent. The court clarified that the language of A.R.S. 12-612(A) remains unchanged and is clear in its enactment. As such, adherence to established supreme court rulings is mandatory. In this case, Nancy, despite being an undesirable beneficiary, legally qualified as a wrongful death beneficiary under the statute since she survived Sky. Consequently, Sky’s estate was deemed an improper beneficiary. The court upheld the summary judgment in favor of CPS. Although the 2000 amendment to A.R.S. 12-612(A) expanded the definition of proper wrongful death plaintiffs to include surviving children, parents, and guardians, the beneficiary provisions remained intact. CPS did not contest the impact of Sky’s unknown surviving father on the recovery of wrongful death damages, leaving that issue unaddressed. A.R.S. 13-3623(A) outlines the criminal liabilities for causing physical harm to children or vulnerable adults, detailing the classifications of felonies based on the intent and circumstances of the offense.