Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.

Citations: 194 Ariz. 142; 978 P.2d 119Docket: No. 2 CA-CV 97-0181

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; November 2, 1998; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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In a personal injury case arising from a one-vehicle rollover accident, Carol Larsen appeals a jury verdict that awarded her $6,050,000 but found Nissan only eight percent at fault. The appeal primarily questions the interpretation of A.R.S. 12-2506 in relation to the Zuern v. Ford Motor Co. precedent and the constitutionality of Arizona's liability assessment system under article 2, section 31 of the Arizona Constitution. The court reaffirms the Zuern ruling and upholds the statute's constitutionality.

The case background indicates that Larsen's daughter, Kimberly Griesmer, was a restrained passenger in a Nissan Pathfinder driven by her employer, Sharad Pandhi, who was speeding when he lost control of the vehicle, resulting in a rollover that caused Griesmer severe head injuries. Larsen did not sue Pandhi due to his immunity as an employer under A.R.S. 23-906(A). However, Nissan named Pandhi as a nonparty at fault, leading to the jury assigning 92 percent of the fault to him and 8 percent to Nissan. 

The discussion highlights the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA), which allows for apportioning fault among tortfeasors, meaning each is liable only for their share. It clarifies that a defendant can identify nonparties at fault, even if the plaintiff cannot sue them directly, and emphasizes that an employer's negligence may be considered in fault assessments if it contributes to an employee's injury.

Plaintiff acknowledges that A.R.S. 12-2506 creates a system of several liability, holding each tortfeasor accountable only for their percentage of fault. However, she argues that allocating fault under this statute is distinct from apportioning damages caused by multiple tortfeasors, asserting that the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCATA) should require the latter. The court previously addressed this argument in Zuern, where it upheld a jury's allocation of 70% fault to a nonparty driver, limiting the manufacturer defendant's liability to 30% of the total damages. Unlike the appellants in Zuern, the plaintiff here does not contest the admissibility of evidence regarding the nonparty driver's fault but claims it should not influence damage assessments, arguing that fault should only determine liability and not damages owed. The court rejected similar arguments in Zuern, emphasizing that A.R.S. 12-2506(C) mandates the assessment of "degrees of fault," and once causation is established, the trier of fact must apportion fault among all parties. The plaintiff requests a reexamination of Zuern, proposing it be overruled or modified, but the court declines, citing the consistency of Zuern’s holding with A.R.S. 12-2506 and the implicit approval of Zuern in Finer v. Superior Court. The Finer court clarified that while the "indivisible injury" rule permits claims against all wrongdoers without proving individual damage contributions, A.R.S. 12-2506(A) abrogates the prior rule against apportioning damages based on fault, establishing that all defendants are severally liable according to their percentage of fault.

To establish each defendant's liability, the total recoverable damages for the plaintiff are multiplied by each defendant's percentage of fault, determining the maximum recoverable amount from each. In cases of indivisible injury, this method is applied consistently for all defendants whose actions contributed to the injury, aligning with legislative intent and common sense. The Arizona Supreme Court has adopted a rule that bases damage awards on the allocation of fault percentages in such cases. The plaintiff’s argument that causation should solely determine responsibility is flawed, as causation is already integrated into the comparative fault system, which requires showing a breach of duty that directly contributes to the injury. The statute A.R.S. 12-2506 is designed to evaluate degrees of fault rather than causation, which is an absolute concept and challenging to apportion.

Additionally, the plaintiff claims that A.R.S. 12-2506 is unconstitutional under the Arizona Constitution's article 2, section 31, which prohibits laws that limit damages for death or injury. The plaintiff argues that damages should be based on causation rather than fault. However, it is noted that this constitutional challenge was not raised in the trial court and no related jury instruction was requested. As a result, the appellate court typically does not address issues not presented at trial, although this is a procedural matter rather than a jurisdictional one.

A constitutional issue can be raised for the first time on appeal when it involves statewide importance, is based on a fully developed record, does not require resolving disputed facts, and has been thoroughly briefed. Statutes are presumed constitutional, placing the burden on the party claiming unconstitutionality to demonstrate it clearly. Courts strive to interpret statutes to avoid unconstitutionality, favoring constitutional interpretations. Article 2, section 31 of the Arizona Constitution guarantees a broad protection for injured individuals but does not guarantee specific recovery amounts or prevent legislative regulations that may reduce recovery. The legislature may not impose absolute prohibitions on lawsuits or cap recoveries if a right to sue exists. A.R.S. 12-2506, which addresses comparative negligence and abolishes joint and several liability, does not violate these principles as it does not prevent actions or limit recovery against defendants nor establish damage caps. This has been upheld in various court decisions, confirming that liability is limited to each defendant's conduct without infringing on constitutional rights to sue or recover damages.

Arizona courts have consistently dismissed the notion that defendants with preventative responsibilities cannot assign fault to individuals whose actions they should have foreseen and prevented from causing harm. This precedent includes McKillip v. Smitty’s Super Valu Inc. and other referenced cases, which the plaintiff does not contest, as they did not specifically address her constitutional argument. However, the rationale from these cases informs the rejection of her challenge. The plaintiff’s argument, framed in terms of "causation" to invoke article 2, section 31, resembles previously rejected arguments. The court affirms that A.R.S. 12-2506 is a valid legislative measure that may reduce a plaintiff's damages in practice but does not contravene article 2, section 31. The 1987 abolishment of joint and several liability may lead to lower recoveries for plaintiffs compared to previous laws, as illustrated in the Church case where the plaintiff received a reduced amount due to the current law’s fault allocation system. Under earlier laws, like the 1984 version of UCATA, a defendant could be liable for the total damages regardless of their fault. The court emphasizes that if the ruling in Church does not infringe upon constitutional limits on damages, then neither does the fault-based assessment of damages under A.R.S. 12-2506(A). The court warns that concluding otherwise would hinder legislative capacity to enact meaningful tort-related statutes. Although the plaintiff argues that the current fault-based damage assessment is poor policy and may lead to unfair outcomes, particularly when the plaintiff is fault-free, it is acknowledged that fault allocation relies on the specific negligence and causal contribution of each party involved.

Egregious negligence by a nonparty can lead to a greater allocation of fault to that party, decreasing fault percentages assigned to other defendants and ultimately reducing the plaintiff's recoverable damages. The allocation of fault system does not inherently favor either plaintiffs or defendants; it allows jurors to assess all evidence fairly, including causation factors. Although the judiciary should evolve tort law to reflect societal changes, any inequities stemming from factual variations in the comparative fault system should be addressed by the legislature, not the courts. 

The trial court's judgment is affirmed, and the plaintiff's claims for a new trial based on Nissan's disclosure violations and alleged erroneous evidentiary rulings were rejected. The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed a related petition for review as improvidently granted and denied a motion to depublish this court's decision. Questions regarding the plaintiff's standing to raise constitutional issues are noted, particularly in light of Arizona's workers' compensation scheme. However, since Nissan did not raise the standing issue on appeal, the constitutional argument is considered on its merits. 

The court references a previous case, Smith, which ruled that Arizona's periodic payment scheme for medical malpractice cases limits damages in a manner that violates the state constitution. In contrast, Nissan is liable for the full amount of damages based on the jury's fault allocation, indicating that the statutes in Smith do not apply here. The plaintiff contends that the distinction between legislative "regulation" and "abrogation" discussed in other cases is irrelevant, but both constitutional provisions must be interpreted together to protect the same rights.

Article 2, section 31 may prevent the legislature from arbitrarily capping damages in recognized causes of action, but it does not necessarily bar the adoption of a reasonable compensation system, such as a no-fault insurance framework for certain tort actions, provided no constitutional issues arise. It was noted that the case of Zuern did not engage with constitutional matters, despite Nissan's claims. The jury was informed that Kimberly Griesmer's medical expenses were covered by the Arizona State Workers Compensation Fund, and that she could not sue Pandhi; any repayment to the Fund would be adjusted based on Pandhi's percentage of fault. The court's ruling in Aitken established that a workers' compensation carrier can only claim a lien on third-party recoveries to the extent that benefits exceed the employer’s share of total damages. The comparative fault statute apportions fault, which may disadvantage the plaintiff. Some scholars have criticized the existing statutory framework. Furthermore, the Arizona supreme court referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, advocating for damage apportionment among multiple causes to enhance fairness in the tort system. The court emphasized that the legislative framework for several liability is not derived from common law but is a product of legislative action. Thus, issues regarding statutory interpretation must be resolved in the absence of constitutional violations.