Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High School District No. 82

Citations: 184 Ariz. 419; 909 P.2d 486; 202 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 93; 1995 Ariz. App. LEXIS 241Docket: No. 2 CA-CV 94-0264

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; October 31, 1995; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Charie Wallace, a school administrator and teacher, filed a lawsuit against Casa Grande Union High School District No. 82 and its superintendent, Ted Adams, asserting claims of defamation, failure to pay salary (violating A.R.S. 15-544), wrongful denial of tenure, intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of equal protection and due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as treble damages for salary claims. The trial court dismissed the punitive, treble, and 1983 claims and subsequently granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, leading to this appeal.

Wallace began her career with the District in 1984 and was promoted to an administrative role after one year. Conflicts between her and Adams developed in 1989, resulting in her reassignment to a classroom teaching position in 1990, despite her objections. In March 1991, Adams recommended that her administrative contract not be renewed, offering her a lower-paid teaching contract instead, which she accepted under reservation of rights. Wallace initiated her lawsuit in February 1992 and rejected a later reinstatement offer. After Adams resigned in June 1993, she secured a new administrative position with the District in July 1993.

On appeal, the court will review the summary judgment de novo, examining whether any material facts were genuinely disputed and whether the law was correctly applied, considering evidence in the light most favorable to Wallace. The appellate court can affirm the trial court's decision for any valid reason.

The trial court's dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed with plaintiff's allegations accepted as true. The court only upholds the dismissal if it is certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling her to relief on her claims. In a defamation claim, the plaintiff testified that assistant principal James Cooper informed her that Adams alleged she had an affair with the former superintendent, a statement she never heard directly from Adams. The claim relied on Cooper’s recounting of Adams’ comments made during a meeting and later communicated to a District board member. The trial court granted summary judgment favoring defendants, finding insufficient admissible evidence to support the defamation claim. 

The plaintiff argued that Cooper's statements were admissible as admissions by a party-opponent under Arizona Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), asserting that Adams' statement was not hearsay since it was not offered to prove the truth of the affair but to show a defamatory statement was made. However, the court found no merit in this claim, stating that there was no evidence of Cooper acting as Adams' agent, and his statements did not pertain to his employment's scope. Furthermore, the court ruled that Cooper’s statements to the plaintiff and the board member were not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), as they did not relate to District business. The plaintiff's argument for Cooper’s statement being a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was also rejected.

Cooper's testimony regarding a February 1991 meeting about a rumored affair was not inconsistent with his prior statements to the plaintiff, as he could only recall a brief discussion but not specific details. There was no evidence to suggest Cooper's memory issues were disingenuous or colluded with the defendants. Thus, his prior statement was deemed inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims for admissibility under the present sense impression or excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, noting that Cooper's statement was made later and did not reflect excitement from a startling event. Consequently, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on these hearsay grounds.

Regarding the wage claim, the plaintiff argued that her contract for the 1991-92 school year, which offered $14,286 less than her previous salary, violated A.R.S. 15-544, entitling her to treble damages under A.R.S. 23-355. However, the trial court dismissed this claim, interpreting A.R.S. 15-544(A) as prohibiting salary reductions only for teachers employed for over three consecutive years. The court clarified that the statute's language distinguishes between teachers based on their tenure, thus upholding the summary judgment for the defendants on the wage claim.

The prohibition on salary reduction applies only to certificated teachers with more than three consecutive school years of service. The plaintiff, having served as an administrator for six years, was not protected from salary reduction, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants regarding her wage claim. The dismissal of her claim for treble damages under A.R.S. 23-355 was also justified, as it was solely based on the alleged violation of A.R.S. 15-544(A). 

Regarding her claim of wrongful deprivation of 'vested job security' due to lack of continuing status, the trial court's summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. Statutory authority limits school boards and superintendents, and no statute allows for granting continuing status to teachers who do not meet the requirement of being employed for over three consecutive school years. The plaintiff did not qualify for this status when offered the 1991-92 contract. 

The plaintiff’s assertion that a school district could issue three-year contracts to certain administrators under A.R.S. 15-503 is incorrect, as she was given a teacher's contract, which is limited to a one-year term under Arizona law. Additionally, her claim regarding the District granting continuing status to a male teacher returning from administration was dismissed as irrelevant; her entitlement to tenure was not affected by actions taken regarding other teachers.

In her allegation of intentional interference with contract against Adams, the plaintiff cited several grievances including refusal to offer an administrative contract, salary reduction, lack of continuing status, and other discriminatory actions. However, her claim essentially sought uninterrupted renewals of her administrator contract under the same terms, which was unsupported by evidence. The court did not find merit in her reliance on precedents that suggested fact issues existed to preclude summary judgment on her claim.

To establish a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) the interferer's knowledge of this relationship; (3) intentional interference causing a breach or termination; and (4) resultant damages. Additionally, the interference must be improper regarding motive or means. In this case, the plaintiff, not being a tenured teacher, lacked a right to continued employment or to renewal of her administrator's contract under the same terms. The District's decisions to not renew her contract, alter her duties, and reduce her salary were lawful under Arizona law. Superintendent Adams’ recommendations, which affected her employment, were within his employment scope and did not constitute tortious interference, even if he acted outside that scope as alleged. Citing Mintz v. Bell Atlantic, the court held that a supervisor acting within their employment cannot be personally liable for intentional interference if the employer is not liable. The court affirmed that the District was not liable for adopting Adams’ recommendations, and those actions were not improper. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the interference claim was upheld.

Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress rests on the same facts as her intentional interference with contract claim. To establish this tort, she must demonstrate the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause emotional distress or reckless disregard for its certainty, and resulting severe emotional distress. The court assesses whether the conduct meets the necessary threshold of extremity. The plaintiff's allegations, including lawful decisions regarding her contract nonrenewal, duty changes, salary reduction, and statements made by Adams, were deemed insufficiently extreme or outrageous, leading to the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

In her amended complaint, the plaintiff introduced a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of state law and equal protection rights due to her reassignment and demotion. She contended that defendants acted to defame and interfere with her duties, which led to her removal from her position without due process. The defendants argued she lacked a property right to sustain a due process claim, and the trial court agreed, dismissing her claims. 

Her equal protection claim was dismissed because it was based on the District's refusal to grant her continuing status—a decision not permitted under Arizona law. The plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for holding the District liable for equal protection violations when it declined to perform an illegal act. Additionally, her assertion of a procedural due process right was contingent on proving a protected property right, which she did not establish, leading to the dismissal of her claims related to procedural due process.

Plaintiff lacks a protected property right in her position and salary under Arizona law, which does not grant such rights to nontenured teachers and administrators. Relevant case law, including Petroni v. Board of Regents, indicates that A.R.S. 15-503(D) does not establish a property right in employment. Additionally, the plaintiff has no property interest in job assignments; transfers and reassignments do not invoke constitutional protections, as established in cases like Huang v. Board of Governors and Garvie v. Jackson. The plaintiff's reassignment to classroom teaching from administrative duties does not infringe on any protected property interest.

The plaintiff argues her due process rights were violated due to the District's policies that purportedly required decision-making based on school needs and established notice and hearing procedures. However, property interests cannot arise from vague policy statements; they require specific conditions limiting employer discretion. The District's policies, lacking such specificity, fail to create a protected property right under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Regarding substantive due process, the plaintiff's claim appears to be based on the assertion that the defendants’ actions were egregiously unacceptable. For a substantive due process violation to occur, a fundamental principle must be transgressed, and such rights stem solely from the Constitution, not state law property rights. Courts apply this doctrine cautiously to prevent trivialization of constitutional protections in workplace disputes, as illustrated in Santiago de Castro v. Morales Medina, where allegations of harassment were deemed insufficient to support a constitutional claim.

Allegations in the plaintiff's amended complaint are deemed insufficient to establish a claim for substantive due process rights violations. The plaintiff's request for punitive damages related to Adams’ alleged defamation, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress fails, as the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims linked to this request. Consequently, the court does not need to consider arguments regarding punitive damages. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, and the defendants' request for attorney's fees incurred during the appeal is denied. Furthermore, prior cases illustrate that defamation by a public official alone does not trigger procedural due process protections unless accompanied by the deprivation of a property right. The plaintiff did not specify the procedures allegedly required or denied, apart from seeking a "name clearing" hearing, which lacks evidentiary support relating to the defendants’ actions.