State v. Agee

Citations: 181 Ariz. 58; 887 P.2d 588; 170 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 62; 1994 Ariz. App. LEXIS 156Docket: No. 1 CA-CR 93-0354

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; August 2, 1994; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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John Allen Agee appeals his convictions for aggravated driving under the influence and aggravated driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, both classified as class five felonies due to the alleged driving while his license was suspended. Agee contends that the trial court erred by not providing two jury instructions: one regarding the "knowledge" element of driving on a suspended license, and another supporting his defense that he believed his license was reinstated for work-related travel. The court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "knowledge" element constituted an error, leading to a reversal and remand.

On October 24, 1992, a police officer observed Agee driving erratically and subsequently arrested him after he failed sobriety tests and provided an expired temporary license, admitting knowledge of his suspension but believing it was reinstated. A blood alcohol test indicated a BAC between .133 and .155. Agee’s defense involved a restricted driver's license received on October 20, which he believed permitted him to drive to work starting October 19. The jury found him guilty on both counts, resulting in a three-year probation period with a six-month imprisonment condition. Agee filed a timely appeal.

The appellant sought a jury instruction requiring the State to prove that the defendant knew or should have known his license was suspended to establish the crime of driving on a suspended license. The trial court denied this request, citing amendments to A.R.S. section 28-445, which state that compliance with mailing provisions constitutes notice of revocation and eliminates the need for the State to prove actual receipt or knowledge of the suspension. The State argued that this amendment negated the knowledge requirement, rendering previous case law, particularly State v. Williams and State v. Jennings, no longer applicable.

However, the discussion clarifies that these cases maintain relevance, as they establish that driving on a suspended license is not a strict liability crime. Instead, the amendment creates a presumption of knowledge based on the mailing of the revocation notice rather than removing the mens rea requirement. The presumption of knowledge does not negate the necessity of proving that the defendant knew or should have known about the suspension; it simply allows the State to establish this element through alternative evidence, such as proof of mailing. Thus, the requirement for proving a culpable mental state remains intact, affirming that the defendant's knowledge of the suspension is still a critical component of the offense.

In State v. Williams, the court established that the State must prove the defendant's knowledge or presumed knowledge of a suspended license. The Appellant was entitled to an instruction regarding this "knowledge" element, which the trial court failed to provide. Although the Appellant admitted awareness of the suspension, the case involved two distinct knowledge issues: the suspension itself and the effective date of a restricted license. The trial court's error in not instructing on the knowledge element was prejudicial because it affected the Appellant’s defense that he believed his restricted license was valid at the time of his arrest. 

The Appellant requested a jury instruction based on his theory that he misunderstood the notice regarding the restricted license's effective date. However, the court determined that this instruction misrepresented the law and thus was not warranted. Despite the rejection of this specific instruction, the absence of any instruction on the knowledge aspect was significant, as it was central to the Appellant's defense. The trial allowed for evidence and arguments related to his knowledge of the license status, highlighting the focus on the mistake-of-fact defense. The State's rebuttal emphasized the clarity of the notice provided, challenging the Appellant's credibility regarding his claimed misunderstanding.

The trial court erred by instructing the jury that the Appellant's knowledge of his suspended driver's license was irrelevant to the case. Consequently, the judgment has been reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. At the time of the relevant decision, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) 28-446(B) stipulated that compliance with certain mailing provisions constitutes sufficient notice of suspension or revocation for prosecutorial purposes, with no requirement for the state to prove actual receipt or knowledge of the suspension. This statutory language remains largely unchanged. Furthermore, A.R.S. 13-204 outlines that ignorance or mistaken belief regarding facts does not exempt an individual from criminal liability unless it negates the required culpable mental state or supports a justification defense, while ignorance of the law does not absolve criminal responsibility.